Ensuring Economic Viability and Sustainability of Coffee Production by Sachs, Jeffrey D. et al.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment 
Staff Publications Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment 
10-2019 
Ensuring Economic Viability and Sustainability of Coffee 
Production 
Jeffrey D. Sachs 
Columbia University, The Center for Sustainable Development, sachs@columbia.edu 
Kaitlin Y. Cordes 
Columbia Law School, Columbia Center on Sustainable Development, kaitlin.cordes@law.columbia.edu 
James Rising 
London School of Economics and Political Science, J.A.Rising@lse.ac.uk 
Perrine Toledano 
Columbia Law School, Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, ptoled@law.columbia.edu 
Nicolas Maennling 
Columbia Law School, Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, nmaenn@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/
sustainable_investment_staffpubs 
 Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Agriculture Law Commons, 
Environmental Law Commons, Food and Drug Law Commons, International Law Commons, Law and 
Economics Commons, and the Transnational Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jeffrey D. Sachs, Kaitlin Y. Cordes, James Rising, Perrine Toledano & Nicolas Maennling, Ensuring 
Economic Viability and Sustainability of Coffee Production, (2019). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/sustainable_investment_staffpubs/53 
This Report/Policy Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Columbia Center on Sustainable 
Investment at Scholarship Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Columbia Center on Sustainable 
Investment Staff Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more information, please 
contact cls2184@columbia.edu. 
Ensuring Economic Viability
& Sustainability of Coffee Production
October 2019
Jeffrey Sachs, Kaitlin Y. Cordes, James Rising, 
Perrine Toledano, and Nicolas Maennling
REPORT
2 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND METHODOLOGY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
I. COFFEE SECTOR SNAPSHOT: CONSOLIDATION AT BOTH ENDS OF THE VALUE CHAIN
A. The recent decline in global coffee prices
B. Global supply and productivity improvements in Brazil and Vietnam
C. Stark	contrast:	high	profitability	among	roaster-retailers	and	persistent
poverty among producers
II. GLOBAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND PROSPECTS
A. The basic analytics of supply and demand
B. A quantitative assessment of the future of coffee supply
1. our approach
2. changing climate
3. changes in coffee yields
4. changes in planted area
5. opportunities to close yield gaps
C. Future prospects
D. Discussion of the model results
III. COFFEE SUSTAINABILITY
A. Coffee sustainability and the sustainable development goals
B. Current sustainability efforts in coffee
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS – PARTNERING FOR SUSTAINABILITY INVESTMENTS AND
THE SDGS, AND SUPPORTING INCREASED ECONOMIC VIABILITY OF PRODUCERS
A. National coffee sustainability plans and the global coffee fund
1. national coffee sustainability plans
2. a global coffee fund underpinned by a multi-stakeholder approach
3. operations and governance of the gcf
4. scale	of	effort	and	financing	of	the	gcf
B. Increasing	producer	profits
CONCLUSION 
APPENDICES – METHODOLOGY OF THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND MODELS 
1. Changing climate
z-score deviations
shifting suitability
2. Changes in coffee yields
updates to the coffee supply database 
weather data 
weather emulation 
cross validation
3. Changes in planted area
farm gate price model 
planting model 
production costs
ENDNOTES
3
4
10
14
14
18
21
26
26
32
33
36
39
40
42
48
52
54
54
59
66
66
66
69
69
73
81
88
89
89
89
90
92
92
94
96
98
105
105
108
110
120
Photo by Mike Kenneally on Unsplash
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT | 3
ENSURING ECONOMIC VIABILITY & SUSTAINABILITY OF COFFEE PRODUCTON A REPORT
This report was authored by Jeffrey Sachs (Columbia 
University and UN Sustainable Development Solutions 
Network), Kaitlin Y. Cordes (Columbia Center on 
Sustainable Investment (CCSI)), James Rising (London 
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For this report, we developed a new economic model of 
supply and demand in the coffee sector, which forms the 
core of our quantitative analysis. The model simulates a 
global price equilibrium between 136 consuming countries 
and the farming decisions in 3024 coffee-growing regions. 
Our report is also grounded in extensive desk research 
and at least 72 interviews with 86 people, representing 
producers, small and large companies, civil society 
organizations and multi-stakeholder platforms, research 
institutions and academics, and others. It has also been 
strengthened by feedback we have received through other 
channels, including via email and particularly in response 
to public presentations at events organized by the ICO and 
the European Coffee Federation in June 2019 and by the 
World Coffee Producers Forum in July 2019.
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herein. This report is part of an ongoing and evolving 
analysis of how to achieve sustainability in the coffee sector, 
and we look forward to continuing to build our analysis in 
partnership with producers, industry actors, and the many 
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Photo by Rodrigo Flores on Unsplash
4 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
Coffee is the world’s favorite beverage, with an 
estimated 400 billion cups consumed per year. 
Coffee provides livelihoods for at least 60 million 
people, across dozens of countries. Coffee is 
healthful and protective against many chronic 
diseases. For these and other reasons, promoting 
the long-term health, wellbeing, and environmental 
sustainability of the much beloved coffee sector 
should be a clear priority.  
Yet coffee is experiencing a sustainability crisis, 
stemming from unsustainable economic, social, 
and environmental aspects of coffee production. 
The recent decline in world coffee prices has 
further squeezed coffee producers, and thrown 
a tremendous number of producers below the 
global extreme poverty line of US$1.90 per day. 
While many consumers willingly pay high prices 
for coffee, coffee farmers receive a tiny fraction 
of that retail price. At these low farmgate prices, 
coffee production is not economically viable for a 
significant number, perhaps a majority, of coffee 
farmers. 
The sustained low prices hurt even more as coffee 
producers begin to bear the brunt of climate 
change and variability. Climate change is expected 
to undermine the suitability of coffee across large 
regions, to decrease coffee bean quality, and to 
increase the risk of coffee diseases. The coffee 
industry as a whole has an interest in ensuring that 
coffee production can adapt to climate change, yet 
it currently lacks effective industry-wide responses. 
For now, producers lose the most when climate-
induced weather events and diseases wipe out 
crops or reduce their quality. 
Although coffee producers shoulder the biggest risks of 
low prices and climate-induced events, farmworkers in 
the coffee industry can be even more vulnerable. In the 
worst cases, workers have been found in “conditions 
analogous to slavery”—even on certified farms. More 
generally, farmworkers on both non-certified and 
certified farms can be vulnerable to exploitation, and 
many are not paid the required minimum wage. 
There are, of course, bright spots within the coffee 
sector. Highly efficient producers, especially in Brazil 
and Vietnam, for example, are able to make a profit even 
at today’s low prices. Producers who grow high-quality 
coffee and who are able to access ethically-minded 
specialty roasters can command prices significantly 
above the quoted international price. Some producers 
have found ways to capture more of the final retail price, 
including through producer-owned businesses that sell 
directly to consumers. Yet, these remain bright spots 
juxtaposed against the grim reality faced by producers 
around the world. 
Four years after the adoption of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), and in the face of the 
ongoing price and climate crises, the coffee sector 
now stands at a crossroads. Will the coffee sector 
continue following a business-as-usual trajectory of 
limited and piecemeal sustainability endeavors, which 
would ultimately result in further concentration of 
coffee producers and heightened supply risks? Or will 
the coffee sector undertake strong concerted efforts 
to support a more sustainable and resilient future for 
producers and the sector overall? 
Based on our research, we believe there is a clear 
opportunity for coffee sector actors to work together to 
achieve greater sustainability within coffee production 
and in coffee-growing regions. Below, we provide a 
brief summary of our findings and recommendations. 
Photo by Isaac Benhesed on Unsplash
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Coffee Sector Snapshot: Consolidation at Both 
Ends of the Value Chain
Beyond the collapse of the International Coffee 
Agreement’s quota regime, the most fundamental 
reason for lower prices post-1990 appears to be the 
continued rise of productivity of Brazil and Vietnam. 
From the 3.7 million tons of coffee added to world 
production between 1995 and 2017, 83% came 
from Brazil and Vietnam. Yield rates have increased 
by over 100% in Vietnam and 30% in Brazil in that 
time period. Those increases contrast starkly with the 
relatively stable yields for most other coffee-producing 
countries. 
Our model suggests that today’s low prices are only 
moderately lower than the long-term equilibrium. 
Prices are further pushed down by a strong US Dollar, 
a weak Brazilian Real, and, potentially, the increased 
market power of buyers. While the financialization of 
the futures market may contribute to short-term price 
fluctuations, we do not believe that this phenomenon 
is the main driver for recent low prices. 
Alongside low coffee prices, production costs for 
producers have also increased (particularly sharply 
since 2010), further squeezing incomes. These 
low prices and rising costs have increased the 
concentration of coffee producers. Under a business-
as-usual pathway, this consolidation is likely to 
continue, resulting in less variety in origins, in tastes, 
and in quality, with a potential dampening effect on 
demand; lost smallholder knowledge; and heightened 
supply risks of large-scale disruptions and greater 
price volatility.  
In stark contrast to the millions of coffee producers 
currently suffering an economic crisis, the roaster 
and retail sector is flourishing. Total coffee industry 
revenues are estimated at between $200-250 billion. 
The profitability of the coffee sector and its growth 
potential have led to consolidation. In the grocery 
market segment, brands are increasingly intertwined, 
and working to sell at higher premiums. 
Brand market power and the resulting high margins 
of leading roasters and retailers have been driven in 
particular by increased value addition in importing 
countries, which comes through the development 
of lucrative “intangible” aspects of coffee. The 
evidence suggests that a rising share of total coffee-
sector income is earned downstream, with enormous 
markups and returns for intangibles such as brand.
The starkly contrasting situations of profitable 
downstream actors and suffering upstream ones may 
lead an important segment of consumers to strongly 
question whether the brands they trust support 
producers’ economic sustainability. This plausibly 
could shift some brand loyalty towards companies 
that are better partners for producers; it may also 
create an opportunity for producers to capture more 
of the final retail price through marketing directly to 
consumers.  
Global Supply and Demand – Analytical Model
The world coffee price is determined by global supply 
and demand. To simplify the reasoning for ease of 
understanding, it is useful to divide the global supply 
for Arabica coffee into two parts, Brazil and the rest of 
the world (ROW). Brazil’s coffee sector is composed 
of a low-productivity and non-mechanized subsector, 
and a high-productivity and mechanized subsector 
with a highly elastic supply curve when prices reach 
a certain level. This is because Brazil has millions of 
hectares of land that were previously cultivated for 
coffee production, but are not currently used for 
that purpose. This land could be returned to coffee 
production under the right price conditions. 
Outside of Brazil, there is considerably less available 
land to bring into new coffee production and most 
coffee lands are in mountainous regions that are not 
suitable for mechanized harvesting. Production is 
labor intensive and yields are lower. ROW’s supply 
curve is therefore inelastic and the main opportunity 
for increased production and profitability in ROW is 
related to higher yields and quality on existing coffee 
farms. 
6 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This analytical model allows us to ask and answer 
three important questions. First, what happens 
if ROW improves its coffee farming techniques? 
Output in the ROW rises, while production in high-
yield Brazilian farms contracts by the same amount. 
The world price remains unchanged. Second, 
what happens if high-yield Brazil further improves 
its technologies? Production in high-yield Brazil 
expands, while production in ROW and in low-yield 
Brazil contracts, and world coffee consumption rises 
at a lower world price. A similar outcome occurs if 
the Brazilian Real experiences a real depreciation 
compared with the dollar and euro. Third, what 
happens if world demand increases? The increase 
in supply is met by high-productivity Brazilian 
coffee production with supply from low-tech ROW 
remaining unchanged. 
We also revised the model to account for imperfect 
competition in the coffee industry: in particular, 
potential market power in the roast-retailer segment 
of the market, given the increasing consolidation 
of this segment. This is a valid concern, given 
increasing concentration in the roaster-retailer 
component of the market, as well as the increased 
intertwining of brands through various branding 
and sales agreements.
At the farm gate, the big difference between a 
competitive buyer and a monopsonistic buyer 
of coffee is that the monopsonistic buyer has the 
incentive and the ability to put downward pressure 
on the price paid to the producers. When a market 
faces a monopsonistic buyer, it may set a minimum 
price without endangering the quantity purchased. 
Since the monopsonist can no longer push the 
farmgate price lower, it would buy up the entire 
quantity available; doing so will still earn it a net 
profit.  
Although there is probably little monopsonistic 
power vis-à-vis Brazil’s high-tech producers given 
that their supply elasticity is quite high, it may be true 
that coffee producers in ROW are facing increased 
monopsonistic pressures. If these pressures exist, 
creating a minimum price linked to the Brazil high-
tech farmgate price might be a workable and 
beneficial solution for ROW producers.
Global Supply and Demand – Empirical Model 
To quantify the relationships illustrated in our analytical 
model and test for potential climate change impacts, 
we developed quantitative coffee supply and demand 
models. These are grounded on high-resolution data, 
account for regional differences, and are projected 
under climate change. 
The empirical results are as follows:
• Under a business-as-usual scenario, by 2050,
average warming in coffee producing regions
will be 2.8 °C (up from 1.5 °C today), and the
average temperatures in 90% of the tropics
will exceed the current 1-in-100 year annual
temperatures heat events.
• By 2050, we project 75% of suitable land for
Arabica coffee production and 63% of land
for Robusta coffee production to be lost. In 20
countries, including Honduras and India, the
remaining suitable land will be less than the land
currently under coffee cultivation.
• If prices remain unchanged, average yields
are projected to decrease by 7% and planted
area to be reduced by 13% by 2050. Total
production of Arabica coffee declines by 10%,
but production of Robusta coffee increases due
to yield increases in Vietnam.
• Considerable yield gaps exist, and closing these
would both increase total production and the
share of the market held by countries other
than Brazil and Vietnam. Improving agricultural
practices and engaging in renovation and
rehabilitation of coffee trees could increase
global Arabica coffee production by 18% and
Robusta coffee production by 16%.
• If coffee were to return to areas that it previously
occupied, global production could increase by
60%.
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Over the next decades, significant changes to 
coffee demand will also occur, driven by expanding 
consumption in emerging markets, the rise of capsule 
use, and continued activity in the specialty market. 
As a result, total consumption is expected to increase 
by 26% by 2030, under a business-as-usual scenario, 
with most of the demand increases coming from 
developing countries.
We do not expect a significant recovery of prices 
without intervention. Despite the combined effects of 
climate change and increased demand, the potential 
for low-cost production in Brazil is expected to prevent 
prices from rising more than $1/kg.
Without efforts to close yield gaps, 76% of the 
predicted increase in demand will be provided by 
Brazil and Vietnam, thereby further concentrating 
coffee production in these two countries 
and reducing variety in origins and quality. 
Addressing Coffee Sustainability
Coffee’s sustainability crisis has thrown into stark 
relief one indisputable fact: the current structure 
of the coffee industry is not working well for most 
producers. In light of this reality, we make several 
recommendations.
1. National Coffee Sustainability Plans
We suggest that each coffee-producing country 
develop a National Coffee Sustainability Plan 
(NCSP), that accounts for differentiated needs,
challenges, and opportunities within the country’s 
coffee sector. At their core, NCSPs would offer clear 
strategic plans for supporting producers, promoting 
sustainable coffee production, and aligning producing 
regions with the SDGs. 
The design of NCSPs should be done through multi-
stakeholder, participatory, inclusive, and transparent 
processes. We suggest that they could be prepared 
by multi-stakeholder Country Coffee Platforms 
(CCPs) in each coffee-producing country.
There is not a one-size-fits-all approach for NCSPs. 
However, each NCSP should include a focus on 
the following collective goods: (a) Developing 
and implementing comprehensive climate change 
adaptation strategies, including insurance options; (b) 
ensuring on-farm financing options at attractive rates 
for producers; (c) strengthening on-farm support to 
viable small- and medium-scale producers with a focus 
on increasing their profitability; (d) implementing 
other improvements to the enabling environment for 
farmers, such as formalizing and protecting land rights 
of small-scale producers; (e) supporting producers’ 
market opportunities; (f) providing income support 
to the poorest farmers during periods of sustained 
low prices; (g) help support broader realization of the 
SDGs in coffee-growing regions; and (h) strengthening 
capacity to enforce compliance with labor laws, 
monitor deforestation and other environmental 
harms. 
The activities to be undertaken under NCSPs should 
be designed and implemented using a gender-
sensitive approach. Implementation and monitoring 
of many activities could also be facilitated through the 
use of mobile applications, new technologies, and 
other innovations.
2. A Global Coffee Fund Underpinned by
a Multi-Stakeholder Approach
A Global Coffee Fund (GCF), financed by the main
coffee industry actors and used to leverage additional 
public sector funding, would enable stakeholders 
to implement activities under the NCSPs. The GCF 
would be a key pre-competitive initiative of the coffee 
sector to fill critical financing gaps for sustainability 
investments in coffee-producing regions. The GCF 
would multiply, at a far greater scale, the public-
private efforts that have been undertaken by specific 
companies within their own coffee supply chains, 
and would ensure the necessary financing for more 
robust and comprehensive sustainability efforts. 
The pre-competitive industry funding would be 
complemented by: 1) increased funding by bilateral 
and multilateral donors, 2) increased commitments 
in the national budgets of coffee-growing nations, 
and 3) commercial investments by the private sector 
within their own value chains.
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The GCF is not charity. Rather, it is an avenue for 
downstream and midstream actors such as roasters, 
retailers, and traders to fulfill their co-responsibility 
for achieving a sustainable coffee sector and to 
shoulder more of the risks that currently fall too 
heavily on producers alone. 
The operations and governance of the Global 
Coffee Fund would integrate strong oversight 
through a multi-stakeholder Governing Board, 
local ownership of planning through the CCP, 
and independent expert support. Governance 
mechanisms would be designed to guard against 
corruption and fraud. To minimize redundancy and 
the need to develop entirely new bureaucracies, the 
GCF could potentially be hosted by one or more 
existing multi-stakeholder initiatives focused on 
coffee sustainability.
Our estimates suggest that the amount of money 
needed to make considerable progress on 
implementing activities under the NCSPs is in 
the region of US$10bn per year. We provisionally 
suggest a goal of raising $2.5bn per year through 
pre-competitive private sector contributions to the 
GCF. Using the 2018 global export number of 7.3bn 
kg of green coffee, this would amount to 34 cents 
per kg of green coffee contributed to the GCF, 
which is in the range of 0.25-0.50 cents per cup. 
In other words, the targeted level of funding would 
require no more than half a penny per cup sold. 
Taken together, these various contributions would 
result in a 25% allocation of the overall funding goal 
for each main source of funds: the GCF, donors, 
producing-country governments, and competitive 
private sector investments. Such an approach would 
embody a public-private partnership grounded in 
equally shared responsibility between the public 
and the private sectors. 
While these private sector and public sector funds 
would be roughly equal at the global level, money from 
the GCF would not have to be distributed in equal 
proportions for each participating country. Doing so 
would enable the GCF to support all coffee-producing 
countries, while also taking into consideration the 
country-specific needs and funding opportunities that 
each country has (e.g., government budgets, private 
sector competitive investments), as well as prioritizing 
the SDG gaps in the poorest places and for the poorest 
producers and workers. 
The scale of contributions suggested for the GCF is much 
higher than the current sustainability spend within the 
coffee industry, yet it is entirely reasonable as a fraction 
of the overall value of the industry, particularly given the 
significant benefits that would accrue to coffee industry 
actors if a sustainable coffee future were realized. We 
suggest that the largest roasters, retailers, and traders 
should be both the forerunners in contributing to the 
fund, as well as the entities that contribute the most. 
These actors have outsized impacts on the industry, 
should have particularly strong interests in a sustainable 
coffee future, and proportionally have the largest 
responsibilities for ensuring the long-term sustainability 
of coffee value chains.
Taken together, the National Coffee Sustainability 
Plans and the Global Coffee Fund provide a means to 
implement the strategic locally owned actions within 
countries and the significant investments throughout 
the sector that are necessary for a sustainable coffee 
industry and thriving coffee producers.
3. Increasing Producer Profits
The coffee industry has changed significantly in recent 
years, which has created new challenges for many 
producers, but also opens up new opportunities. In 
particular, the high consolidation of the industry, and the 
mainstreaming of e-commerce technologies and mobile 
applications for farmers, provide unique conditions to 
depart from the traditional coffee business model that 
has become increasingly unsustainable for many coffee 
producers.
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We suggest that producing countries as a group 
seriously examine two options for capturing more 
of the retail price of coffee. The first, as mentioned 
above, is implementing a minimum price linked to 
the farmgate price of the high productivity sector in 
Brazil. The second is supporting producers to harness 
the potential of new technologies to improve their 
incomes. The development of e-commerce has the 
potential to reduce market concentration and provide 
a means for producers to add and capture more 
value through more direct-to-consumer sale models. 
Although currently niche, direct-to-consumer models 
have potential to scale with sustained institutional 
support. This could include aggregating producers 
for economies of scale, and making the administrative 
and logistical aspects feasible for many producers. 
Some of the institutional support needed could 
potentially be undertaken by producer associations. 
This could include, for example, identifying and 
negotiating better rates with existing entities and 
companies that could provide necessary services, such 
as transport or distribution. Online retail is also fiercely 
competitive, and producers can be at a disadvantage 
given the high consumer loyalty to major brands. 
To break through the competition, significant offline 
investments would have to be made by producers and 
supporting institutions on marketing, quality control, 
and logistics.
Way Forward
Coffee sector actors have acknowledged deep 
sustainability concerns, particularly in light of the 
ongoing price crisis and impending climate crisis. 
Multiple calls for global collective action have been 
made. In this report, we address these calls, and 
we recommend strategies that provide ambitious 
yet achievable pathways for making coffee truly 
sustainable. 
We very much welcome feedback on the ideas 
presented herein and we look forward to continuing 
to build our analysis in partnership with producers, 
industry actors, and the many other stakeholders 
focused on making coffee sustainable.
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Coffee is the world’s favorite beverage, with an 
estimated 400 billion cups consumed per year. 
Coffee is grown in dozens of countries, providing 
livelihoods for at least 60 million people, and 
potentially many millions more.1 Unlike soda 
drinks with sugar additives, coffee is healthful and 
protective against many chronic diseases. For these 
and other reasons, promoting the long-term health, 
wellbeing, and environmental sustainability of 
the much beloved coffee sector should be a clear 
priority.  
Yet coffee is experiencing a sustainability crisis. 
This crisis stems from currently unsustainable 
economic, social, and environmental aspects of 
coffee production. Despite the hundreds of millions 
of dollars annually put towards coffee sustainability,2 
and despite the fact that over 50 percent of all 
coffee has been grown (but not necessarily sold) 
under a sustainability standard in recent years,3 
coffee production is still burdened by persistent 
poverty, child labor, and environmental damages 
and threats, such as deforestation and climate 
change.  In many coffee-growing regions in low-
income countries, basic services remain out of reach 
for millions of coffee farmers and laborers and their 
respective families.  
This sustainability crisis in coffee production has 
been deepened by the recent decline in world coffee 
prices, which has further squeezed coffee producers 
around the world.  While many consumers willingly 
pay high prices, often several dollars per cup of 
coffee at a coffee shop, coffee farmers receive a 
tiny fraction of that retail price, currently between 1 
and 2 cents per cup (assuming 25 cups per pound 
and $US 1 per pound). At these low prices at the 
farmgate, coffee production is not economically 
viable for a significant number, perhaps a majority, 
of coffee farmers today. Even before the recent price 
decline, farmgate prices were low, and farmers faced 
many risks and rising costs, including  price volatility, 
spreading coffee diseases, rising fertilizer and other 
input costs, and lack of access to capital and insurance 
on attractive terms.4 For many smallholders in low-
income countries, seasonal hunger and poor nutrition 
were already a part of life, and implementing more 
sustainable practices required risky investments beyond 
the financial means of poor farmers.5 Yet the recent 
price crisis has exacerbated these challenges, and has 
thrown a tremendous number of additional producers 
below the global extreme poverty line of US$1.90 per 
day.6 At the time of writing, the price paid for green 
coffee is lower than many producers’ long-term costs of 
production,7 yet most of these producers have no other 
option than to sell at a loss. Producers are price-takers 
in a global market that has turned against them. Only 
the highly efficient, large-scale, and often mechanized 
producers, notably in Brazil and Vietnam, are navigating 
today’s low prices.   
These sustained low prices hurt even more as coffee 
producers begin to bear the brunt of climate change and 
variability. Climate change is expected to undermine 
the suitability of coffee across large regions, to decrease 
coffee bean quality, and to increase the risk of coffee 
diseases. Although the coffee industry as a whole has 
an interest in ensuring that coffee production can adapt 
to climate change, it currently lacks effective industry-
wide responses. For now, producers lose the most 
when climate-induced weather events and diseases 
wipe out crops or reduce their quality. Smallholders 
are particularly vulnerable, with fewer resources to put 
towards adaptation or to absorb shocks. There is little if 
any effective weather insurance for most smallholders. 
In the current context, those who bear the greatest 
risks from low prices, price volatility, and the increasing 
impact of climate change are also those with the fewest 
means to manage such risks.
Photo by Max Letek on Unsplash
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Although coffee producers shoulder the biggest risks 
of low prices and climate-induced events, farmworkers 
in the coffee industry can be even more vulnerable. 
In the worst cases, workers have been found in 
“conditions analogous to slavery”8—even on certified 
farms.9 While child labor is not uncommon on family 
farms, instances of children working on coffee farms 
that do not belong to their parents have also been 
documented10 and are likely widespread in some 
locales.11 The United States Department of Labor 
has identified 17 countries, including the top three 
coffee-producing countries, that use child labor in the 
coffee sector.12 More generally, farmworkers on both 
non-certified and certified farms can be vulnerable 
to exploitation, and many are not paid the required 
minimum wage.13 
These endemic sustainability challenges, and the fact 
that coffee producers face particularly dire prospects 
due to current coffee prices, will not come as a surprise 
to anyone familiar with the industry. Coffee producers 
have publicly urged action on today’s historically low 
coffee price.14 The multi-stakeholder Global Coffee 
Platform has issued a call to action to collectively 
address the price crisis,15 while the Specialty Coffee 
Association has developed an ongoing Coffee Price 
Crisis Response Initiative.16 Awareness of coffee’s 
sustainability challenges has also begun to spread 
to the broader public, with mainstream news 
articles highlighting how smallholder coffee farmers, 
pummeled both by low prices and by climate change, 
have begun abandoning their coffee farms, choosing 
instead paths such as migrating to the United States17 
or working on illicit crop plantations.18
There are, of course, bright spots within the coffee 
sector. Highly efficient producers, especially in Brazil 
and Vietnam, but also in other locations, are able to 
make a profit even at today’s low prices. Indeed, the 
high and rising productivity of coffee production in 
Brazil and Vietnam helps to explain the low world prices. 
Also, coffee producers who grow high-quality coffee, 
and who are fortunate enough to have developed 
strong ties with ethically-minded specialty roasters, 
can command prices significantly above the quoted 
international price. Some producers have found ways 
to capture more of the final retail price, including 
through producer-owned businesses that sell directly 
to consumers. Other producers have benefited, to 
varying degrees, from the multitude of initiatives, 
projects, and programs offered by governments, 
industry actors, or non-profit organizations. These 
latter efforts by various stakeholders have not been 
in vain—many have had real and significant benefits 
for people around the world. Yet they also have not 
been enough—a reality that has become starkly clear 
during the current price crisis—and their limited scale 
has stymied efforts to make coffee production and 
the coffee industry more broadly sustainable.  
At the same time that many producers’ livelihoods 
have been decimated by the price crisis, the roasters 
and retailers at the other end of the value chain have 
continued to enjoy high profitability. The retail end of 
the value chain has also seen increasing concentration 
and market power. Greater consolidation could have 
theoretically made it easier to embed sustainability 
throughout the coffee sector. Instead, as roasters 
and retailers have become increasingly concentrated, 
some of their practices, reflecting their increased 
market power, have apparently placed even more 
pressure on producers and farmgate prices.  
Four years after the adoption of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) at a historic UN Summit,19 
and in the face of the ongoing price and climate 
crises, the coffee sector now stands at a crossroads. 
In one potential path forward, the coffee sector could 
continue following a business-as-usual trajectory 
of limited and piecemeal sustainability endeavors, 
which would ultimately result in a sector that looks 
far different from the one we see today. Prices will 
generally reach an equilibrium that remains too low 
for producers in many countries, climate change will 
batter coffee-growing regions around the world, and 
the incidence of coffee diseases and crop failures will 
rise. Many producing country governments will be 
inadequately prepared to support their producers to 
effectively confront these challenges, while farmers 
may feel forced to leave coffee even though they lack 
significantly better options. These factors will ultimately 
result in more concentration of coffee production, 
with fewer countries of origin, and, within countries, 
fewer and larger producers. This concentration will 
lead to less variety in origins, in tastes, and in quality, 
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with a potential dampening effect on consumer 
demand in mature markets.20 This concentration 
in production will also result in greatly heightened 
supply risks of large-scale disruptions and greater 
price volatility, as climate-induced, political, or 
disease events in one country could potentially 
disrupt the entire global supply chain. One only has 
to consider the massive forest fires in the Amazon 
and the resulting worldwide backlash against Brazil 
in August 2019 to envision the risks to an industry in 
which a vast proportion of output is in just a handful 
of countries. Moreover, as the industry struggles 
to absorb such shocks, it would have to do so 
while also explaining to the media and the public 
the continued failures to eradicate child labor, to 
support decent livelihoods for producers, and to 
achieve resilience against climate change impacts 
on a proactive and comprehensive basis. This too 
could reduce customer goodwill and support, in 
particular from millennials who seek and expect true 
sustainability.21
Yet that is not the only path that can be taken. 
Following a sustainable development path, the 
coffee sector could look very different. While the 
sector cannot avoid many of the challenges arising 
in the business-as-usual path—climate change will 
occur, real prices for commercial-grade coffee will 
remain low, and many farmers will still need to 
exit coffee—sustained efforts undertaken now will 
prepare the global coffee sector for more success. 
Strategic planning and investments at the country 
level will help producers withstand external shocks 
and prepare for a more resilient future. Coffee 
producers will be supported to better understand 
their opportunities in coffee and other sectors; 
as some areas become less productive due to 
climate change, producers will receive needed 
support to adopt climate-adaption measures, to 
diversify, to move, or to transition from coffee. For 
those producers who remain, many could be more 
productive and profitable, through increased access 
to new research, better inputs, better options for 
credit and insurance, and more support for direct 
marketing, among other factors. 
Alongside these efforts, changed business practices 
by roasters, retailers, and traders, such as long-term 
relationships with fixed contracts, would also support 
increased producer viability and resiliency. This wider 
economic viability would allow for a broader range 
of coffee production, with specialty and commodity 
coffees coming from more countries, thereby supporting 
greater availability of high quality coffee and continued 
strong demand in mature markets, as well as reducing 
the risks of deeper supply shocks. When diseases hit 
or crops fail, these incidents will be less damaging at 
the producer and industry levels, because producers 
will have the resources to continue to care for their 
coffee trees. Child labor could finally be eliminated, 
through concerted efforts to make coffee production 
economically viable, to step up enforcement of relevant 
labor laws, and to improve access to basic services 
in coffee-growing regions. And this increased access 
to basic services—such as healthcare, clean water, 
electricity, and quality education—will help to realize 
broader sustainable development within coffee supply 
chains. 
Based on our research and the model developed for this 
report, we believe there is a clear opportunity for coffee 
sector actors to work together to take the sustainable 
development path, and to achieve greater sustainability 
within coffee production and in coffee-growing regions. 
An industry-wide and pre-competitive approach is 
needed to protect the future of coffee and to realize 
sustainability on this scale. Industry actors, of course, 
cannot be expected to address these challenges on 
their own; their efforts and funding commitments should 
be leveraged to obtain additional matching funding 
from donors and from producing-country governments 
to support more widespread sustainable development 
within coffee-growing regions. Industry must take the 
first step, however; they cannot expect others to step in 
to save an industry that is not interested in saving itself. 
At the same time, producers and their associations, 
civil society organizations, research institutions, and 
other stakeholders also have significant roles to 
play in developing solutions and supporting their 
implementation. 
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Coffee sector actors appear to agree that serious 
collective interventions are needed. As one of the 
leading roasters, Nestlé has argued, “[a]dressing 
underlying issues to the current [price] crisis is 
beyond the scope of any one company’s actions.”22 
As the International Coffee Organization (ICO) has 
asserted, “joint action is needed by all stakeholders 
in the sector … to put the coffee sector on a positive 
development and sustainability trajectory.”23 In this 
report, and alongside other recommendations for 
increasing producers’ viability and profitability, we 
propose a path for a collective intervention that would 
turn coffee’s current price, climate, and sustainability 
crises into an opportunity to showcase the industry as 
a sustainability leader and coffee as a truly sustainable 
agricultural commodity. 
Section I provides a snapshot of the coffee sector 
showing the drivers that have led to the current low real 
prices, underscoring the contrast between a thriving 
retail sector and a poverty-stricken production sector 
in many low-income exporting countries. Section II 
focuses on global supply and demand, providing an 
economic analysis that explains, among other things, 
how the recent changes in the global coffee market 
might rationally reopen the possibility of setting 
a minimum price for global coffee under certain 
conditions. This section also presents the results of 
our econometric modeling, which pays close attention 
to the potential impacts of climate change on coffee 
production and analyzes how closing the productivity 
gaps could help share the coffee market growth more 
equitably between producers. Section III discusses 
what sustainability in coffee means, and considers how 
current sustainability efforts fit into what is needed 
more broadly in the coffee sector. Section IV presents 
our recommendations for achieving sustainability 
and economic viability within coffee production. In 
particular, we suggest the use of National Coffee 
Sustainability Plans and the development of a Global 
Coffee Fund, which would receive contributions 
from industry actors, be matched by donors and 
producing-country governments, and support critical 
investment in sustainability that benefits producers, 
coffee-growing regions, and the sector overall. In 
addition to the Global Coffee Fund, we discuss the 
possibilities for producers to harness the potential of 
new technologies (e-commerce and targeted mobile 
applications) to enable greater participation in sales 
to consumers.
Photo by Rodrigo Flores on Unsplash
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A. The Recent Decline in Global Coffee Prices
Two mechanisms have determined coffee prices in recent years. Under the quota regime of the 
International Coffee Agreement (ICA) (1962-1989), prices were kept artificially high (although 
higher prices did not always benefit producers).24 Subsequent to the quota regime’s collapse, the 
free market has driven down average prices, as shown in Figure 1.25     
Under both historical regimes (during and after the ICA’s quota regime), real prices are basically 
trendless. That is, since 1990 (or better yet, 1992, after adjustments to the collapse of the ICA’s 
quotas), there is no discernible downtrend in prices, at least until the very recent decline in 
2018-9. Since the collapse of the quota system, coffee prices have been mostly a function of 
the fundamentals (changes in long-term supply and demand), and have been affected by the 
fluctuations of the Brazilian Real (Figures 2 and 3) and the US Dollar (see Figure 3), as well as other 
short-term shocks (e.g. climate, global commodities prices, interest rates, global business cycle). 
The Brazilian Real affects coffee prices because of the dominance of Brazilian production in the 
world coffee supply (as discussed below), making Brazil the price setter; a weak Real is positively 
correlated with higher Brazilian coffee production and exports and consequently lower coffee 
prices in US dollars. This occurs because a weak Real increases Brazilian producers’ prices relative 
to local (Real) costs. Conversely, a strong Dollar exchange rate raises coffee prices expressed in 
euros, cuts European demand, and thereby lowers world coffee prices expressed in dollars. 
Figure 1: Two Historical Price 
Setting Regimes: ICA Quotas 
and	Post-ICA	Quotas	(ICO	Mild	
Arabica, $US/pound 2018 Prices)
Source: World Bank (May 2019) 
Monthly prices adjusted with US CPI72
Photo by Rodrigo Flores on Unsplash
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Figure 2: Strong Correlation 
of ICO Composite Coffee 
Prices and the Real 
Exchange Rate of the 
Brazilian	Real	(1992-2018)
Source: FRED for exchange 
rates73 and ICO composite coffee 
prices
Figure 3: Coffee Prices Since 
1992 and Brazilian Real 
Exchange Rate (Top); Coffee 
Prices Since 1992 and US 
Dollar Real Exchange Rate 
(Bottom)
Source: FRED for exchange 
rates74 and ICO composite coffee 
prices.
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The recent low prices have been produced in 
part by a strong US Dollar combined with a weak 
Brazilian Real. The exchange rate movements 
explain perhaps up to half of the decline in coffee 
prices since early 2017 (roughly 30 percent decline 
in average prices).  The rest of the recent decline 
is due to other factors. One possible factor is the 
increasing consolidation of the retail-roaster side of 
the industry, which may be giving increased market 
power (monopsony power) to the buyers, and 
thereby depressing prices for the producers. We do 
not have direct evidence of such a market power 
effect, but do find some anecdotal evidence.   
In summary, we believe that world market prices 
for coffee are moderately low today (mid-2019) 
because of four factors:
• Strong dollar
• Weak Real
• Increased market power of buyers (indirect 
evidence only)
• Other factors not identified
Given the relatively low coffee prices today, many 
producers around the world are experiencing extreme 
financial duress, with low incomes and business losses. 
Yet the impact is felt very differently in the high-
productivity countries (Brazil and Vietnam), where the 
more productive farms are still profitable, and the lower-
productivity countries (most of the rest), where losses 
are rampant. We believe that, beyond the collapse of 
the ICA’s quota regime, the most fundamental reason 
for the lower prices after 1990 than before is due to 
the continued rise of productivity of Brazil and Vietnam, 
even as global demand for coffee has increased. In 
1995, those two countries produced 21% of the world’s 
coffee. By 2017, they produced 46%, as shown by the 
dotted line in Figure 4. From the 3.7 million tons of 
coffee added to world production between 1995 and 
2017, 83% came from Brazil and Vietnam. 
Today’s low prices therefore do not appear too far 
below the price that would otherwise be seen under 
the long-term equilibrium (also discussed in Section 
II); they are perhaps 25 percent or so below the long-
term equilibrium price. Similarly, today’s low prices 
are not fundamentally related to the financialization of 
the futures market (see Box 1), but rather result from a 
supply-driven equilibrium, with increased global supply 
arising in large part from the significantly increased 
production in Brazil and Vietnam. 
Figure 4: Global Coffee 
Production,	1961-2017
 
Source: FAO75
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Box 1: The Role of the Futures Markets and Coffee Trading
Washed Arabica coffee is traded on the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE Futures US) futures 
market, formerly the New York Board of Trade (NYBOT), while Robusta coffee is traded on the ICE 
Futures Europe futures market, formerly the London International Financial Futures and Options 
Exchange (LIFFE). The trading price of Arabica coffee on the ICE is known as the “C-Price.” The 
prices represent a range of qualities and are thus average prices. Differentials (i.e., a premium 
or discount) are then set for coffee from different origins. The differentials reflect local physical 
market conditions in addition to coffee quality grades. The Arabica and Robusta coffee futures 
contracts are used as global benchmarks for the pricing of physical coffees.
In the short term, futures prices do not always reflect the equilibrium of supply and demand in the 
physical market, due to large volumes that may be traded for speculative reasons. The volume 
of futures trading far exceeds the trading volume of physical green coffee. For instance, the 
volume of futures trading was 15 times that of world imports in 2010.76 The ICO has noted that 
the volume of futures trading nearly tripled for Robusta and increased five-fold for Arabica from 
1994 to 2018, whereas Arabica output only grew by 64% and Robusta by 144% over the same 
period.77 This increased volume of trading “suggests that the coffee market has been subject 
to a significant process of ‘financialization’ over the past two decades.”78 This financialization is 
characterized by active trading strategies, which contrasts with the traditional index investors that 
dominated the market before the 2000s.79 Some argue that these increased trading activities are 
in excess of what is needed to provide liquidity in the market. 
The role of financial variables in determining coffee price dynamics has been the subject of study 
by a number of reports. Most concur that the impacts are short term, and that the long-term 
coffee price is determined by the fundamentals.80
These short-term impacts, however, can affect producer welfare. Some studies have found that 
the financialization of coffee trading has exacerbated price volatility.81 Even in the short term, this 
can have deleterious impacts on farmers, as it inhibits farmers’ ability to plan for planting cycles. 
For this reason, some stakeholders in the field have suggested regulating the non-commercial 
actors that trade coffee, by limiting their position or by increasing the cost of non-hedging 
positions.82  
Financialization can also temporarily exacerbate fundamental price trends, which could have the 
effect of decreasing farmers’ incomes in times of low prices and increasing their incomes in times 
of high prices.83 
Despite these short-term effects, the fundamentals in the physical market of supply and demand 
seem to prevail in the long run in determining price behavior.84 
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B.  Global Supply and 
Productivity Improvements in 
Brazil and Vietnam
The global production increase has been driven 
significantly by productivity improvements in Brazil 
and Vietnam, by over 100% in Vietnam and 30% in 
Brazil between 1995 and 2017 (see Figure 5). These 
increases contrast starkly with the relatively stable 
yields for the remaining coffee-producing countries. 
(The average for other countries in Figure 5 hides 
some discrepancies. For example, countries such 
as Honduras and Guatemala have seen rising yield 
rates, while others such as Uganda and Mexico have 
seen yield rates fall.) 
The yield increases since 1995 in Vietnam and 
Brazil can be explained in large part by large public 
and private investments in their respective coffee 
sectors. This includes investments in agronomic 
practices, training, infrastructure, and the availability 
of financing. 
In Vietnam, where the coffee sector is almost entirely 
composed of smallholder farmers, investments have 
been made in irrigation, and farmers use large amounts 
of chemical fertilizers.26 Factors such as the planting of 
improved yield varieties of Robusta trees, extension 
programs, and better pruning practices—much of 
which has been supported through public-private 
collaboration and investments—have been key to the 
country’s massive productivity increases.27 The Western 
Agroforestry and Scientific Institute in DakLak (WASI), 
for example, has played a key role in developing 
high-yield and climate resilient Robusta varieties. The 
Institute has benefitted from the support of, and from 
cooperation with, private sector stakeholders such as 
Nestlé.28 Other factors also play a role; the Vietnam Bank 
of Agriculture and Rural Development (Agribank), for 
example, provides accessible credit to coffee farmers. 
In 2014, the Government also developed a Sustainable 
Coffee Development plan with a vision to 2030 in order 
to improve sustainability of the sector and increase 
producer earnings.29 
Figure 5: Area Planted and 
Yield Rates
Source: FAO
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Brazil’s coffee sector is very diverse, ranging from large-
scale farms in Cerrado Minero, which have adopted 
mechanization, to family-run farms in Matas de Minas. 
In the former region, technological progress and 
investments have led to high productivity increases, 
and farmers have collaborated to maximize marketing 
strategies and develop direct relationships with 
roasters. In the Matas de Minas region, which is more 
mountainous, mechanization is difficult and family-run 
farms rely on more intensive labor and sharecropping.30 
In yet another region, Sul de Minas, some farming is 
mechanized, and local cooperatives play an outsized 
role.31 Access to finance and the development of 
coffee varieties suited for the different environments 
in Brazil have contributed to the success of the sector 
throughout the country.32
While coffee prices have been pushed down due to 
increased production from Brazil and Vietnam, costs 
have increased, further squeezing farmer incomes. 
This has led to a situation where many farmers cannot 
cover short-term operating costs, let alone cover their 
investment expenses. By drawing upon a variety of 
reports, Figure 6 shows that these production costs 
have risen particularly sharply since 2010.
Although the rise in production costs shown in the 
figure below is somewhat obfuscated by the different 
countries that are surveyed in different years, some 
general trends are clear (see also the appendix for 
more details). Costs have risen an average of 3% per 
year in real terms since 2005, while farmgate prices 
have fallen during that time. Arabica coffee is about 
$0.71/kg more expensive to harvest than Robusta 
coffee. Costa Rica has consistently high production 
costs, and Vietnam (not shown in the figure) has 
consistently low ones, but other countries have even 
higher costs than Costa Rica while others have lower 
costs than Vietnam. Within countries, ranges of costs 
in excess of $1.00/kg are typical. 
In a 2016 study, the ICO attributed these rising costs 
to several factors.33 First, producers face increasing 
labor costs due to economic development and rural-
urban migration. Second, the price of inputs such as 
fertilizer and pesticides has increased. Third, more 
capital goods are used in the production process. 
Figure 6: Total Production 
Costs per kg, as Reported 
for Different Countries, 
Varieties, and in Different 
Years. 
Sources: ICO 2016, Specialty 
Coffee Association 2017, 
Caravela Coffee 201985
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These drivers vary by country. Costs of production 
can be divided into direct costs, such as labor and 
inputs, and indirect costs, such as administration, 
maintenance, and infrastructure (see Figure 7). 
Overall, labor costs vary significantly from one 
country to another. In El Salvador, for example, labor 
comprises 33% of the total costs of production, 
while in Peru it represents 48%.34 The amount of 
fertilizer and pesticides used by farmers also varies 
significantly. These input costs have fluctuated 
significantly in recent years given that they tend 
to follow volatile oil prices.35 Other factors, such 
as the size and level of diversification of the farm, 
the national legal framework, the support provided 
by coffee associations, and the exchange rates 
determine the various components of the total 
production cost. (In addition, there are a number 
of externalized costs of production that are not 
currently represented in producer economics, but 
which are also important. These include social costs, 
such as child labor and health and safety concerns, 
as well as environmental externalities around water, 
energy, and land use.)
Since the ICO’s 2016 analysis discussed above, 
operating losses in many countries have intensified, 
as input costs have continued to rise (for instance, 
fertilizer prices surged by almost 20% between 
November 2016 and December 2018)36 alongside the 
continued downward pressure on coffee prices. These 
factors have also negatively affected more efficient 
farmers.37 For instance, a 2019 study found that 53% of 
Colombian farmers and more than 25% of Costa Rican 
and Honduran farmers are operating at a loss.38 
Two conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis. 
First, the current low-price environment does not seem 
to be a temporary short-term phenomenon, although 
prices now may be slightly lower than otherwise would 
be expected because of the relative weakness of the 
Brazilian Real and strength of the US Dollar. Similarly, 
rising labor costs are part of a longer-term trend, to 
the extent that the economies of coffee-producing 
countries continue to develop. These low prices and 
rising costs have increased the concentration of coffee 
producers. As noted above and further below, this 
consolidation will continue under the business-as-usual 
pathway, resulting in less variety in origins, in tastes, 
and in quality, with a potential dampening effect on 
demand; lost smallholder knowledge; and heightened 
supply risks of large-scale disruptions and greater price 
volatility. Second, the examples of Brazil and Vietnam 
Figure	7:	Conceptual	
Framework for Factors 
Contributing to Coffee 
Production Costs86 
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show that with the right combination of investments in 
coffee-producing regions, there are opportunities to 
increase farmer productivity, efficiency, and resiliency. 
C. Stark Contrast: High 
Profitability	among	Roaster-
Retailers and Persistent Poverty 
among Producers 
While millions of coffee producers are suffering 
an economic crisis, the roaster and retail sector is 
flourishing. 
To our knowledge, the latest estimation of the 
revenues of the global coffee industry dates back to 
2015, where gross retail sales were estimated to be 
around $200 billion.39 This was roughly divided up 
by grocery, coffee shop, and food services market 
segments (Figure 8).40 In terms of volume, the largest 
proportion of coffee is sold in grocery markets and 
consumed at home, making up around 65-80% of the 
total.41 Interviews with coffee experts have suggested 
that total industry revenues may have grown to $250 
billon today.  
Operating profit margin42 estimates for Starbucks 
(15% in 2019)43 and Keurig Dr Pepper (17% in 2019)44 
suggest that the coffee majors are performing very 
well indeed. For the smaller players in the retail 
industry, this margin is estimated to be much lower, 
at around 2.5%.45 Taking the average of the lowest 
and highest operating margin values in the market, 
which roughly reflects the split between industry 
leaders and small roasters/retailers, and applying it to 
the estimated $250bn retail sales revenues, a rough 
approximation is that the industry has an annual 
operating profit margin of $25bn, although this is just 
a rough estimate. 
The future also looks bright for roasters and retailers. 
Coffee is one of the fastest-growing sectors in an 
otherwise slow-growing food and beverages market. 
It is estimated to grow at a compounded annual 
growth rate (CAGR) of 5.5% between 2019 and 
2024.46 Significant investments are even being made 
in startups. Coffee startups raised $600 million in the 
first seven months of 2018—four times the amount 
of money raised in the year before, with the average 
deal size increasing more than fivefold within a year.47 
Traditional soda beverage producers such as Coca 
Cola are moving into coffee because of the health 
benefits of coffee and the disease hazards associated 
with sugar-sweetened soda.
Figure 8: Global Coffee 
Industry Value Distribution
Source: Samper, L; 
Giovannucci, D; Vieira, L M 
(2017) 87; Acronym caption: 
OCS: Office Coffee Service, 
Horeca: Hotels, Restaurants 
and Cafeterias, QSR: Quick 
Service Restaurants
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The profitability of the coffee sector and its growth 
potential have led to a significant consolidation, and 
to numerous financial investments, on the roaster 
and retail side, in particular around premium brands. 
In the past decade, for example, JAB Holding 
Company, the fastest-growing actor in the sector, 
has invested over $50 billion to acquire premium 
consumer coffee brands and restaurant chains 
(including Peet’s Coffee & Tea, Caribou Coffee Co., 
Intelligentsia, Stumptown Roasters, and Keurig 
Green Mountain); the companies in its expansive 
portfolio sell large coffee volumes in two lucrative 
coffee segments—specialty and capsule—that have 
emerged in recent years.48 Similarly, Nestlé has 
also acquired in the specialty segment, and is now 
a majority owner in Blue Bottle, a select specialty 
Californian chain, after signing a deal valued at 
approximately $500 million in 2017.49 These mega-
purchases highlight the enormous profitability––and 
the huge price markups over costs––of the world’s 
top coffee brands.  
In the grocery market segment, brands are increasingly 
intertwined, and working to sell at higher premiums. 
Starbucks branding is an example.50 In 2011, Starbucks 
and Keurig signed a deal to sell single-serve Starbucks 
packs for Green Mountain’s Keurig brewer in grocery 
stores, creating a synergy between the leading café 
brand and the leading brewer in the USA.51 In 2018, 
Nestlé acquired, through a $7.2bn deal, the global 
rights to market Starbucks’ consumer and food service 
products (outside of Starbucks coffee shops) in its 
grocery channels.52 Under this deal, Starbucks continues 
purchasing the green coffee beans from farmers, but 
Nestlé roasts and distributes the coffee for consumers 
under strict Starbucks licensing and branding rules, 
while paying annual royalties.53 This follows a similar 
but ultimately failed deal with Kraft, signed in 1998 and 
terminated twelve years later, with Starbucks claiming 
that Kraft had mismanaged its brand.54 This speaks to 
the tremendous importance of branding in the coffee 
industry, which enables faster growth and higher profit 
margins.5556
Figure 9: Coffee Retail Sales, 
World Market Share by 
Company, 2018 (%) 
Note: Jacob Dower Egberts and Keurig 
Dr Pepper belong to JAB Holding Co.
Source: Euromonitor through Bloomberg
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The growth and consolidation at the roaster-retailer 
end of the value chain has led to two outsized actors 
globally. As of 2018, the top two roasters, Nestlé 
and JAB Holding Company, had a combined global 
market share of nearly 38% (about 25% for Nestlé and 
12.5% for JAB). Lavazza came in third place, with an 
estimate of roughly 2.5% of global market share (see 
Figure 9).  
On a market segment and geography basis, the 
significant market power of leading brands is even 
more striking.57 For example, the soluble/instant 
coffee segment is largely dominated by Nestlé’s 
Nescafé;58 the single-serve capsule segment is 
captured by JAB’s Keurig Green Mountain in North 
America59 and Nestlé’s Nespresso and Dolce Gusto 
in Europe;60 traditional espresso coffee brands are led 
by Illy and Lavazza;61 and out-of-home specialty coffee 
is in the stronghold of Starbucks.62 
Brand market power and the resulting high margins 
of leading roasters and retailers have been driven in 
particular by increased value addition in importing 
countries, which comes through the development 
of lucrative “intangible” aspects of coffee. This 
includes “innovation, brand image and the consumer 
environment in general, which transcends products’ 
taste characteristics.”63 Symptomatic of this 
phenomenon is the opening of the Starbucks Reserve 
Roastery stores, which are “theatrical, experiential 
shrines to coffee passion”64 and where consumers pay 
extra for the experience. The increased value addition 
through “intangibles” is also observed in the grocery 
retail market segment, where pods and capsules 
generate value beyond the taste of coffee.65 The 
evidence suggests that a rising share of total coffee-
sector income is earned downstream, with enormous 
markups and returns for intangibles such as brand.66
 
Figure 9: Coffee Retail Sales, 
World Market Share by 
Brand, 2018 (%) 
Note: Jacob Dower Egberts and Keurig 
Dr Pepper belong to JAB Holding Co.
Source: Euromonitor through Bloomberg
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This change in the value distribution between 
the upstream actors (producers and in-country 
merchants) and downstream actors (roasters and 
distributors) within coffee global value chains is 
captured by the figure below, which shows the value 
distribution for coffee consumed at home in France 
over a 20-year interval (Figure 10). It demonstrates 
that the downstream sector has increased its derived 
value of the finished product, while the proportion 
that goes to producers has fallen.67 
The continued investments and profits closer to the 
consumer end of global value chains stand in sharp 
contrast with the dire situation of coffee producers 
in recent years. In 2019, for example, the ICO found 
that in all 13 surveyed countries, coffee producers’ 
average annual income had decreased over the last 
two years.68 As a result, the proportion of producers 
living below the extreme poverty line of US$1.90 
per day had increased dramatically in the surveyed 
countries—by as much as 44% in Cameroon and 
50% in Nicaragua (Figure 11).69  
The starkly contrasting situations of profitable 
downstream actors and suffering upstream ones may 
eventually upend business-as-usual approaches within 
the coffee industry. While some of the profitable 
roasters and retailers have used sustainability attributes 
to justify higher retail prices and/or to take advantage 
of the profit margins in the sustainability/conscious-
consumer segment of the market,70 consumers—in 
particular millennials—are increasingly able to discern 
true sustainability commitments from greenwashing.71 
In this context, the dire situation of coffee producers 
could lead an important segment of consumers to 
strongly question whether the brands they trust support 
the economic sustainability of producers. This plausibly 
could shift some brand loyalty towards companies that 
are better partners for producers, or that are willing 
to more actively facilitate economic sustainability. It 
may also create an opportunity for some producers 
to capture more of the final retail price of coffee, by 
marketing more directly to consumers, as discussed in 
Section IV.  
Moving from this snapshot of the current state of the 
coffee sector, we turn now to future global supply and 
demand prospects. Understanding what the future 
may hold—particularly in light of climate change—is 
critical for assessing the ways in which the sector can 
achieve economic viability and sustainability in coffee 
production.
Photo by Gerson Cifuentes on Unsplash
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Figure 10: Changes in Value 
Distribution for Coffee 
Consumed at Home in 
France	in	1994-1997	vs.	
2014-2017
Source: Adapted from Le Basic89
Figure 11: Increase 
in the Proportion of 
Farmers Living Under 
the Extreme Poverty 
Line of US$1.90 a Day88
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A.  The Basic Analytics of Supply 
and Demand
In this section, we illustrate the basic determination of 
the world coffee price, production and consumption, 
using a simple supply-demand model. In the 
following section, we use econometric and simulation 
techniques to quantify the relationships illustrated in 
this section.    
A World Model Assuming Perfect 
Competition in the Coffee Sector
At the most fundamental level, the world coffee 
price is determined by global supply and demand, 
as illustrated in Figure 12. The world supply QS(P) is 
a rising function of the price ($US/lb) of coffee. The 
world demand QD(P) is a declining function of the 
price. Assuming a high degree of competition among 
producers, and no market power among roaster-
retailers (see below), the world price and quantity 
are established at the intersection of the supply and 
demand curves, resulting in world price P* and global 
quantity Q*.  
Consumers and producers in fact face different prices. 
The price P* facing producers is the farmgate price. 
The price facing consumers is P* + M, where M is the 
mark-up for buying, shipping, roasting, branding, 
and retailing the coffee beans. For the moment, we 
will assume that M is a constant, determined by the 
costs of handling the beans from the farm to the retail 
shelf. This would be an appropriate assumption if 
the buying-shipping-roasting-retailing component 
of the market is highly competitive, an assumption 
that is less true today than in the past. For now, we 
assume that M is fixed and consequently ignore M 
in the discussion. In the following sub-section, we 
explore the implications of market power among the 
roaster-retailers, in which case M changes according 
to market power.     
In the era of export quotas under the International 
Coffee Agreement (ICA), the world price was held at 
P** > P*, as shown in Figure 13. As a result there was 
an excess supply of coffee in the amount QS(P**) – 
Figure 12:  Supply and 
Demand in the World Coffee 
Market
Photo by Annie Spratt on Unsplash
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QD(P**). In order to maintain the price at P**, it was 
therefore necessary to restrict the supply of coffee. 
This was done by assigning a quota to each coffee 
exporting country. In turn, each exporting country 
had to limit the production of coffee in line with the 
export quota.90 This was accomplished through a 
combination of export taxation and export quota 
permits assigned to individual coffee producers (as 
also discussed in Box 7).   
The most important quantitative restrictions on 
total exports were imposed in Brazil, the world’s 
dominant coffee producer. The ICA’s quota system 
collapsed in 1989 when, among other reasons,91 
Brazil declared that it would no longer restrict its 
export supply. At that point, the price declined from 
P** to P*. During 1960 – 1989, the average price of 
coffee was $8.38/kg ($3.80/ lb) (measured in 2019 
dollars). During 1992-2019, the average price of 
coffee was $3.74/kg($1.70/lb) (measured in 2019 
dollars).  
To simplify the reasoning for ease of understanding,92 
it is useful to divide the global supply curve for 
Arabica coffee into two parts, Brazil and the rest 
of the world (ROW). Brazil’s supply curve, QSB in 
Figure 14, is positively sloped at very low prices 
but then turns basically flat at the price P*. The 
reason is as follows. At very low prices, only low-
intensity production techniques (hand-harvesting 
of coffee beans, for example) are profitable with 
low yields in a limited land area. When the price 
reaches P*, however, high-yield, mechanized coffee 
farming becomes profitable, using intensive inputs 
(e.g. fertilizers and irrigation) and mechanization for 
harvesting and other purposes. (In fact, the supply 
curve will be gently upward sloping rather than perfectly 
flat, given that some lands will be preferred to others 
in terms of natural fertility, access to input markets, 
access to export markets, and other factors, and these 
favorable lands will therefore supply coffee at slightly 
lower prices.)
We can therefore think about Brazil’s coffee sector as 
having two distinct parts: a low-productivity and non-
mechanized sub-sector, shown as QLB(P), and a high-
productivity and mechanized supply, shown as QHB(P), 
which is highly elastic at the price P*. Brazil’s national 
coffee supply curve, QSB(P), is the horizontal sum of the 
two sub-sectors as shown in the figure below.   
Brazil in fact has millions of hectares of land that were 
previously cultivated for coffee production, but that are 
not currently used for that purpose. Since 1974, 5.8 
million hectares have been used for coffee production 
in Brazil,93 but only 1.8-1.9 million hectares are currently 
planted with coffee.94 Much of that formerly used land 
is flat enough to be used for high-yield, mechanized 
coffee production (an estimated additional 1.9 million 
Figure 13:  Excessive Supply 
Under the ICA
Figure	14:	Two-Part	Supply	
Curve for Brazil
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hectares), and could be brought back into coffee 
production at a relatively modest cost, albeit over the 
course of several years of new planting. Moreover, 
millions of hectares of land suitable for mechanized 
coffee farming could be brought into production for 
the first time if producers were incentivized by prices 
slightly higher than P*: we estimate that there are 18 
million hectares of land in Brazil that are relatively 
flat, suitable for coffee production, and non-forested. 
Although much of that land is currently used for other 
purposes, the amount that theoretically could be used 
for coffee means that Brazil could vastly increase its 
coffee production with prices slightly higher than P*.95 
The rest of the world (ROW) has an upward-sloping 
supply curve, QR(P), that is similar to the supply 
curve of the low-productivity Brazilian subsector, 
as depicted in Figure 14. Outside of Brazil, there is 
considerably less available land to bring into new 
coffee production. Moreover, most coffee lands 
are in mountainous regions that are not suitable for 
mechanized harvesting. Production is labor intensive 
and yields are lower (although by how much varies 
across countries, as noted in the next section). New 
coffee areas in most of ROW would entail deforestation 
or strong competition with other profitable crops.  
The main opportunity for increased production 
and profitability in ROW is therefore higher yields 
and quality on existing coffee farms through the 
intensification of production, especially through the 
improved use of fertilizers, irrigation, improved coffee 
varieties, and science-based farming methods (while 
respecting sustainable environmental practices). New 
technology that supports the harvesting of mountain 
hand-picked coffee, such as the machine developed 
by Cenicafé (Centro Nacional de Investigaciones de 
Café) in Colombia to help take down coffee cherries, 
could also help make mountainous coffee more 
competitive, by significantly cutting down harvest 
times.96 These various steps towards sustainable 
intensification are indeed possible, and highly 
desirable for ROW. 
The global supply curve, shown in Figure 15, is found 
by adding horizontally Brazil’s supply curve, QSB(P), 
and the rest-of-the-world supply curve, QSR(P). The 
global demand curve is QD. The world equilibrium 
Figure 15: World Supply 
and Demand with Brazil and 
ROW
is shown as P* and Q*. At the world price, there are 
three categories of supply: low-productivity Rest-of-
World, QR(P*), low-productivity Brazil, QLB(P*), and 
high-productivity Brazil, QHB(P*). Of course, at the 
price P*, world demand, QD(P*), equals the world 
supply, QLB(P*)+QR(P*)+QHB(P*).  
Now, we can ask three important questions:
(1) What happens if ROW improves its coffee farming 
techniques?
(2) What happens if high-yield Brazil further improves 
its technologies?
(3) What happens if world demand increases?
The answer to the first question, improved farming 
techniques in ROW, is illustrated in Figure 16. The 
supply curve for QR+QLB (ROW plus low-yield Brazilian 
farms) shifts to the right to the new line QR+QLB(II). 
Output in the ROW rises, while production in high-
yield Brazilian farms contracts by the same amount. 
The world price P* remains unchanged. In short, ROW 
replaces part of the high-tech Brazilian production in 
satisfying demand.    
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Figure 16:  Technological 
Improvement in ROW
The answer to the second question, improved 
technologies in high-yield Brazil, is illustrated in 
Figure 17. We can consider the technological 
advance to be a reduction in the break-even cost of 
high-yield coffee farming. In that case, production in 
high-yield Brazil expands, while production in ROW 
and in low-yield Brazil contracts from QR+QLB(I) to 
QR+QLB(II). World coffee consumption rises at the 
new lower world price P**. A similar outcome occurs 
if the Brazilian Real experiences a real depreciation 
compared with the dollar and euro. In that case, the 
supply price of coffee measured in dollars and euros 
will decline for any given Brazilian Real price.    
The answer to the third question, higher demand 
among coffee consumers, is illustrated in Figure 18. 
The world demand curve shifts to the right (higher 
coffee consumption at any price), to the dotted 
demand curve. The world price remains unchanged 
at P*, and the entire increase in supply is met by 
high-productivity Brazilian coffee production. The 
supply from the low-tech ROW remains unchanged. 
(Of course, since the Brazilian high-tech supply 
curve is likely to be gently upward sloping rather 
than completely flat, a rise in world demand would 
likely increase the long-term equilibrium price, but 
not by much.)
Figure	17:		A	Technological	Advance	in	
High-Tech	Brazil:		
Price falls from P* to P**, low-tech production 
falls, and high-tech production rises 
Figure 18:  Increase in Global Demand  
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Imperfect Competition in the Coffee Industry
Let us now revise the model to take into account 
potential market power in the roaster-retailer segment 
of the market. This is a valid concern since the roaster-
retailer component of the market is increasingly 
concentrated with two main leaders, Nestlé and 
JAB Holding Company. Moreover, because of the 
importance of branding, it is likely that brand-name 
roaster-retailers enjoy a significant mark-up over their 
production costs. In that case, the mark-up factor M 
reflects not only the costs of handling and processing 
the beans from the farm gate to the retail shelf, but 
also a return to brand name, earned by a mix of quality, 
advertising, reputation, and consumer habit. It could 
also be a mark-up due to implicit or explicit collusive 
behavior of the major roaster-retailers, who control a 
significant proportion of the coffee market (especially 
the largest two) and who are increasingly intertwined 
through various branding and sales agreements (as 
discussed above in Section I(c)).  
At the farm gate, the big difference between a 
competitive buyer and a monopsonistic buyer of coffee 
(i.e., the sole buyer of coffee, who thus has significant 
market power) is that the monopsonistic buyer has the 
incentive and the ability to put downward pressure on 
the price paid to the producers. Suppose that a brand 
name can retail its Guatemalan coffee beans at $6 per 
lb and has $2.50 of production costs (excluding green 
coffee bean procurement), for a net revenue of $3.50 
per lb. Now suppose that this roaster-retailer can 
procure 120 million lbs from Guatemala at a price of 
$1.50 per lb or a smaller amount, 100 million lbs, at $1 
per lb. In the first case, the profits are $3.50/lb x 120M 
lb - $1.50/lb x 120M lb = $240 million. In the second 
case, the profits are $3.50/lb x 100M lb - $1/lb x 
100M lb = $250 million. In this case, the monopsonist 
would use its market power to buy fewer beans from 
Guatemala but at a considerably lower cost. 
Note that the monopsonist succeeds in raising the 
mark-up of retail prices over costs, from $2 per pound 
($6 – $2.50 - $1.50) to $2.50 per pound ($6 - $2.50 - 
$1). This is an essential and basic point. When there 
is market power, the mark-up between the farmgate 
price and the consumer price, which we earlier 
labeled M, is a reflection not merely of production 
and handling costs (shipping, packaging, roasting, 
etc.) but also of market power.  
When a market faces a monopsonistic buyer, it 
may set a minimum price without endangering the 
quantity purchased. For example, if the Guatemalan 
government or the Guatemalan coffee producers 
set a minimum price of $1.50/lb, the monopsonistic 
buyer would buy up all 120 million lbs, because the 
monopsonist still earns a net profit of $2/lb. Since 
it could no longer push the farmgate price lower, it 
would buy up the entire quantity available.  
Monopsonistic buyers need to take into account the 
difference of short-run and long-run supply curves of 
the producing countries. In the short run, with a given 
planting of coffee, supply curves are highly inelastic. 
It may be possible to drive down the purchase price 
of the coffee without reducing the supply on offer. 
In that case, the monopsonist can drive farmgate 
prices down considerably. Yet the longer-term supply 
response will be much higher. Farmers will shift from 
coffee to other crops. The monopsonist will not be 
able to buy the desired quantities in the future. For 
this reason, monopsonistic buying power should be 
exercised with great discretion, taking into account 
longer-term implications of low supply prices.  
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There is probably little monopsonistic power vis-à-
vis Brazil’s high-tech producers since their supply 
elasticity is quite high. It is therefore unlikely that 
market power explains much of the decline in prices 
facing Brazil’s high-productivity sector. Still, with 
the recent decline in prices during 2018 and 2019 
corresponding with the increased concentration 
of roasting-retail in the hands of Nestlé and JAB 
Holding Company, we do not rule out the possibility 
of some monopsonistic downward pressure on prices 
even regarding Brazilian high-productivity coffee. It 
is possible, for example, that the major buyers are 
pushing down prices excessively without taking into 
account the long-term negative consequences on 
supply even in Brazil.  
It may also be true that coffee producers in the rest 
of the world are facing increased monopsonistic 
pressures. If this is the case, we would see a decline 
in farmgate prices faced by ROW producers 
relative to the farmgate prices paid to Brazil’s high-
productive farmers.  We do not have the detailed 
evidence necessary to determine if any such price 
differential has recently occurred.   
If this is in fact the case – that farmers outside of Brazil 
have suffered a larger decline in quality-adjusted 
prices than have Brazil’s farmers – one remedy 
would be to institute minimum prices in the non-
Brazilian markets linked to farmgate prices paid in 
Brazil to the high productivity sector. The minimum 
price could not deviate sharply from the Brazilian 
reference price, as that would shift purchases away 
from the ROW farmers towards Brazilian farmers. But 
if Brazil’s farmers are being paid, say, $1.50 - $2.00 
for mild Arabica coffee beans and farmers in other 
countries are receiving a lower price, then imposing 
a minimum price in the other markets that is linked 
to a Brazilian reference price would be beneficial for 
the ROW farmers and for global efficiency.   
If the roaster-retailer has market power both on the 
buying side (as a monopsonist) and on the retail side, as 
a seller, the situation is more complicated. The markup 
of retail prices over farmgate prices will now include 
three factors: Monopsonist Power + Costs + Marketing 
Power. Marketing power may also be considered to be 
“brand power.” It is partly a reflection of quality (and the 
associated costs and returns of R&D to produce high-
quality coffee), as well as brand loyalty and advertising. 
In the coffee industry, it is likely that large roaster-
retailers such as Nestlé and JAB Holding Company have 
both monopsonistic power in the producing countries, 
with this power being passed through to traders buying 
on behalf of the monopsonists, and marketing power 
in the consuming countries. The result is a mark-up 
over production costs that is often several dollars per 
pound. For example, a pound of high-quality branded 
Arabica coffee might retail for $10/lb (or higher), while 
the farmgate price is $2/lb and the production costs are 
another $3/lb, leaving the markup due to monopsony 
and brand power at $5/lb. 
The existence of a large mark-up on the consuming side 
also has powerful implications for coffee producers. 
To the extent that coffee producers can enter the 
consumer market directly, for example through direct 
e-marketing, they will capture a larger proportion of the 
value added in the coffee supply chain. Of course this 
has been a hope and aspiration of coffee producers for 
a long time, but the advent of direct online marketing 
and e-branding/e-commerce may facilitate the entry of 
new producers into consumer markets (see Section IV). 
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To summarize the main conclusions of this section: 
1. The ICA’s export quotas collapsed mainly because 
of the excess supply of Brazil’s efficient producers.
2. Since the collapse of the ICA’s export quotas, world 
prices have determined mainly by the supply of 
Brazil’s efficient producers (and to lesser extent 
by that of Vietnam’s producers when it comes to 
Robusta coffee, as discussed in Section I).
3. Rising efficiency in Brazil lowers the world price 
and squeezes farmers that lack Brazil’s efficient 
production. 
4. Rising world demand is likely to be met primarily 
through increased production in Brazil, without a 
significant rise in world coffee prices.
5. The survival of production in the ROW will depend 
on raising yields in the ROW, as well as competing 
on quality, through more sustainably intensive 
production techniques, more inputs, irrigation, 
and improved varieties and farm techniques.
6. Increased market concentration, and hence 
increased monopsonistic prices especially in the 
ROW, may have contributed to the recent decline 
in world coffee prices.  
7. Creating a minimum price linked to a reference 
price in Brazil might be workable and beneficial 
for ROW farmers.
8. Coffee producers should more aggressively 
explore options for penetrating the branded value 
chain through the new opportunities offered by 
e-commerce (discussed further in Section IV). 
B. A Quantitative Assessment of 
the Future of Coffee Supply 
The rest of this Section discusses results from a new 
quantitative model of coffee supply and demand. 
First, we consider the challenges to coffee production, 
and implications for coffee supply, over the next 30 
years. We are particularly interested in the effects of 
climate change on yields: what areas will see benefits 
from near-term climate change, and what regions will 
struggle to continue to grow coffee? Although many 
of the changes in climate that will unfold over the next 
30 years are already inevitable, any economic changes 
that can result from climate change are far from 
predetermined. We are interested in the potential for 
improving yields, reducing farmer risks, and helping 
them to adapt.
Challenges for Coffee Production
Coffee production and coffee farmers will face an 
array of new challenges over the next 30 years. The 
ability of farmers to adapt, innovate, and learn from 
these challenges will shape the economic stability of 
coffee farming, the fate of many regions’ biodiversity, 
and the coffee varieties available to consumers. 
The potential applications of new technologies for 
mechanization and precision agriculture, and new 
heat- and drought-resistant varieties, will also shape 
farmers’ prospects.
Climate change will be one of the most pervasive 
challenges facing farmers. Higher temperatures 
and other changes to the seasonal cycle will affect 
yields and increase the risk of coffee tree die-off. 
Coffee production also relies on other species in 
the environment, to maintain soil health and for 
pollination.97 Shade-grown coffee, intercropped 
systems, and agroforestry systems all make the role 
of other species more explicit, although other species 
are present for all coffee production. The effects of 
climate change on each individual species and on the 
agricultural system as a whole are hard to predict and 
represent pervasive risks.
Warmer temperatures will also increase the risks of 
coffee diseases. Hotter conditions have influenced 
the spread of coffee rust98 to altitudes that were once 
free of the fungus. Such conditions have also been 
shown to increase the reproductive cycle of coffee 
berry and white stem borers.99 More farmers may 
switch to cultivating Robusta coffee as a result, with 
losses both for coffee quality and to farmers who will 
earn less for their work.
Climate change will also change rainfall patterns and 
make them more variable. Storms will become more 
intense and damaging, while dry periods will become 
longer. This will also undermine the potential for 
irrigation. Ensuring a consistent water supply through 
irrigation is one of the most effective ways to adapt 
to higher temperatures,100 but, in the future, water 
supplies for many regions will become less reliable.
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Climate change will also have a direct effect on 
coffee quality.101 The highest quality coffees are 
generally grown at high elevations, because these 
cooler temperatures slow coffee fruit growth and 
allow flavors to develop. Higher temperatures, as 
well as higher CO2 levels, will cause coffee fruits 
to mature more quickly, resulting in a less flavorful 
product.
Finally, warmer temperatures will have a direct 
effect on farmers, as well as on their workers. 
Outdoor work in tropical areas can be dangerous 
on hot days, particularly for the aging coffee farmer 
population. Small increases on top of existing high 
temperatures can have a large effect on farmer and 
farmworker health102 and labor productivity103. This 
will be compounded by water and food security 
challenges that climate change will exacerbate in 
some regions.
Some of the challenges of the next 30 years are 
not new, but their interactions are important to 
understand. The persistence of low prices paid 
to farmers make it difficult for them to make the 
investments necessary to adapt to climate change. 
Low prices and extreme events are likely to drive 
further consolidation in coffee production, both 
geographically and into larger plantations. These 
changes, in turn, will increase the costs of smaller 
farmers outside of these consolidated regions to 
get their coffee to markets. All of these effects can 
contribute to poverty for smallholder farmers.
Another sustainability challenge in the coffee sector 
emerges from the responses of farmers to these 
changes. As some coffee-producing areas become 
less productive, there will be a greater demand to 
expand into natural land, impacting biodiversity.104 
The increasing use of pesticides, fungicides, 
and fertilizer may also seep into the surrounding 
environment and disrupt it. New irrigation systems, 
if not properly managed, will draw water away 
from environmental needs. Responding to these 
sustainability challenges requires a comprehensive 
approach.
1. Our Approach
As part of this report, we develop models that represent 
some of the most important economic, environmental, 
and adaptation changes that will challenge the industry 
in the next 30 years. These models are aimed at 
helping us to anticipate long-term changes in supply 
and demand relations in the coming decades. Many of 
the opportunities and challenges facing the industry 
will emerge from the long-term tendencies regarding 
supply and demand relations, and their effects on long-
term world prices for coffee.  
First, we discuss the insights of the coffee supply model, 
which represents the behaviors and outcomes of farmers 
in response to prices, weather, and suitability. This 
model is the basis for our coffee production estimates 
and supply-demand interactions below.
The approach taken here is global, quantitative, 
and largely physical. This means that our supply 
analysis considers the role of farmers as they affect 
yield and economic suitability, but does not analyze 
other important aspects of farmer welfare, including 
employment opportunities, health, social services, and 
direct consequences of climate change on farming 
families through heat waves and extreme events.
We pay special attention to the differences between 
regions. Coffee production in different areas shows 
different kinds of sensitivity, depending on the 
varieties of coffee grown and details of local costs 
and management. First, throughout the analyses, we 
distinguish between Arabica coffee, which has a higher 
quality but is generally more sensitive to environmental 
conditions, and Robusta coffee, which has a less 
favorable taste profile, a higher caffeine content, and is 
less susceptible to disease. We also estimate different 
parameters of our model in every region, to reflect 
different varieties within these species, to the extent 
that the data allow.
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A number of important aspects of coffee production are largely implicit in our model. We do not explicitly 
model coffee diseases, although these are likely to expand under climate change and we capture their historical 
trends within our yield model. Similarly, coffee bean quality is not studied here, but we estimate different prices 
for coffee according to region and species.
A simplified representation of the resulting supply curve is shown in Figure 19. At any price level, the curve 
represents the quantity of Arabica or Robusta coffee available, and where it is produced. However, this curve 
is not static, and depends upon pre-existing coffee planting, coffee tree ages, and grower experience. Over 
time, as climate changes, coffee-producing areas will need to shift, and many current coffee areas will become 
ecologically unsuitable for high-quality coffee. Simultaneously, improved cultivars, management techniques, 
and automation will increase coffee supply.
  
This curve can only be estimated by developing high-resolution estimates of coffee productivity and suitability. 
Figure	19:	Simplified	Coffee	
Supply Curve. 
Depending on the changing 
state of climate and management 
practices, both the total amount 
and spatial distribution of coffee 
production across the globe will 
shift.
Figure 20: Diagram of the 
Major Components of the 
Coffee Supply Model. 
Models for Farm Gate Prices, 
Planting Decisions, Yield Gaps, 
and Harvests, are described 
below.
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The model developed for this project is represented 
in Figure 20. All of the model components are 
grounded in data; some also represent coffee 
biology, economic theory, and farmer dynamics. In 
each year, coffee production responds to the prices 
from the previous year.
The components of the coffee supply model are 
described briefly below, with more details in the 
appendices.
The Farm Gate Price Model is an econometric 
model, which predicts farm gate prices from 
international prices, underlying trends, and records 
of differentials. This model is estimated from annual 
World Bank international coffee prices for Arabica 
and Robusta coffee, and prices paid to producers 
collected by the ICO. Records of differentials are 
used to estimate a simple model of how regional 
production levels can demand price premiums, and 
were provided by Lavazza.
The Planting Model represents the decision for 
farmers to expand land under cultivation or switch 
to or out of coffee production. It uses farm prices 
and yields as inputs to determine whether positive 
profits are inducing more coffee production. While 
there is an enormous variation in observed decisions 
to change planted area at the regional level, we find 
that revenues, as a combination of prices and yields, 
predict the general direction of these changes. It 
also accounts for the ability of some countries, most 
notably Brazil, to vastly expand their production. The 
model produces an estimate of the area of coffee 
farms that is currently harvestable (the “bearing 
area”), based on past planting.
The Harvest Model includes both the biological 
model, which estimates yields as a function of 
weather, and the harvesting decisions of farmers. 
Yields depend upon several features of the growing 
conditions within each season, including minimum 
and peak temperatures, the distribution of rainfall, 
humidity, and sunshine. The Harvest Model 
uses these to predict yields at a high resolution. 
Depending on these yield levels and labor costs, 
farmers then make harvesting decisions, obscuring 
the true biological yields. The model uses a Bayesian 
approach to simultaneously estimate the hidden 
biological yields and farmer adaptation practices.
The Yield Gaps Model captures the relationship 
between model parameters in the harvest model and 
suitability, as estimated by the Global Agro-ecological 
Zone (GAEZ) project. The model parameters are the 
result of both ecological suitability and management 
practices, such as irrigation and input use. We relate 
GAEZ suitability, which reflects surveyed management 
practices, to develop model parameters in areas of the 
world that are not well-represented in our data. This 
also allows us to model the opportunity to close yield 
gaps through investing in new management practices, 
by describing the corresponding change to model 
parameters.
Future predictions: The process for predicting coffee 
production in the future and its responses to changes 
in prices and climate uses all four models. We use 
projections of future climate from the state-of-the-art 
MIROC-ESM-CHEM climate model under a business-as-
usual (RCP 8.5) scenario. In each year from 2017 to 2030, 
we translate predicted international prices into farmgate 
prices, and combine them with local projected weather 
to estimate yields using the Harvest Model. These 
predicted yields are then used to determine if farmers 
expand or reduce coffee areas, which determines the 
conditions for the next year. Under some scenarios, we 
also model investments taken to close yield gaps, as 
well as assumptions about expansion into new areas. 
The combined estimated global coffee production is 
fed into the Coffee Demand Model to estimate the next 
year’s international prices.
In the sub-sections below, we first discuss changes in 
climate that have already occurred and will occur by 
2050 (sub-section 2). In sub-section 3, we present the 
sensitivity of coffee yields to climate, and changes in 
these yields that are predicted to occur over the next 
30 years. These yield changes will then affect regional 
planting decisions, which we explore in sub-section 
4. Finally, sub-section 5 discusses the opportunities 
to close yield gaps and adapt to climate change with 
improved management. 
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2. Changing Climate
The coffee belt105 has already experienced a significant 
shift in temperatures, and that shift becomes more 
extreme every year. The average annual land 
temperature of the coffee belt is now about 1.5 °C 
higher than its pre-industrial average, and continuing 
to increase. Figure 21 reports temperatures relative 
to the 1951 - 1980 average, which was already 0.5 °C 
warmer than the preindustrial average. Temperatures 
have increased at a rate of about 0.2 °C per decade 
since 1970, and the rate is increasing. This warming 
is driving several other changes that affect coffee. 
Although all times of the year are getting warmer, the 
range of temperatures throughout the year is growing 
wider as hot months get even hotter. Total rainfall is 
increasing, but becoming less useful for agriculture: 
wet months are getting wetter and dry months are 
getting drier with more intense but less frequent 
downpours.106
Different parts of the coffee belt are subject to 
different amounts of warming (Figure 22). In the 
Americas, much of the coffee heartland in southern 
Brazil and Guatemala has already warmed 2 °C above 
pre-industrial temperatures, while Colombia remains 
cooler.107 The largest increases in temperature in Africa 
are in non-coffee-producing regions, and Uganda in 
particular has avoided most of the warming in our 
data, but with higher rates reported elsewhere.108 
Across southern Asia, coffee-growing areas in India 
and Vietnam have warmed by 1 °C, but much of 
Indonesia has experienced less change.
By 2050, few places in the tropics will have experienced 
less than 1 °C of warming, and the average warming 
over the coffee belt will be 2.8 °C. Almost 20% of the 
coffee belt will have warmed by more than 4 °C, which 
represents the limit of warming that can be offset by 
shade grown cultivation.
More importantly, the range of average temperatures 
across the coffee belt no longer overlaps with its 
historical range, and it has not overlapped it since the 
1980s. This is clear both at an average level across 
the tropics in Figure 21, and for the historical range 
of temperatures in individual regions. Over the last 
20 years, the average location in the tropics was 
at the 94th percentile of its historical temperature 
range, and most regions were experiencing 1-in-10 
year temperatures every other year. Currently, the 
only major coffee-growing region that is far outside of 
its historical temperature range is southern Brazil. By 
2050, only 10% of the tropics will be below the 99th 
percentile of their historical range; in other words, 
the normal annual temperatures in 90% of the tropics 
will fall into what were historically classified as 1-in-
Figure 21: Annual Average 
Temperatures Over Land in 
the Coffee Belt. 
Data from GISTEMP.129
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100 year heat events. These shifts are shown in Figure 23. The exceptions are parts of Colombia, Honduras, 
and eastern Indonesia. The consequences of such a fundamental shift are difficult to predict, and certainly of 
concern.
All of these changes are predicted to continue to occur with high confidence. In this report, we use a “business-
as-usual” climate scenario, which assumes that strong, global climate policies will remain out of reach. The 
first successes of the Paris Agreement, falling costs of renewables, and growing agitation for a green transition 
all offer hope that we will diverge from this pathway long before 2050. However, the past 20 years of inaction 
on climate have made most of the warming between now and 2050 inevitable. It is prudent to prepare for 
Figure 22: Changes in 
Climatic Temperature Already 
Experienced as of 2010 in the 
Coffee Belt (Top) and Those 
Predicted by 2050 (Bottom) 
Under	a	Business-As-Usual	
Scenario. 
Existing changes are measured 
by station observations130 
from 1999 - 2018, relative to 
their average before 1950, 
and future predictions use the 
MIROC-ESM-CHEM global 
climate model.131 
Figure 23: The Distribution of Average 
(Climatic) Temperatures in 1999 to 
2018 (Top) and Around 2050 Under a 
Business-As-Usual	Scenario	(Bottom).	
The distribution of temperatures historically 
is shown with a black curve, and is calculated 
using observed temperatures from 1900 to 
1960, as normalized using z-scores. That is, 
all temperatures in the figure are reported in 
terms of their difference from their historical 
mean for each region, in units of the standard 
deviation of their historical temperatures. 
Yellow portions of the distribution are above 
the 90th percentile of historical temperatures, 
while red portions are above the 99th 
percentile.
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climate changes from a business-as-usual scenario, 
because near-term actual changes cannot be much 
less extreme than these.
Shifting Suitability
Coffee is highly sensitive to climate, and grown in areas 
where climate change could rapidly drive lands out 
of these narrow suitability envelops. As temperatures 
increase, coffee production will be forced toward the 
poles and to higher elevations. If warming continues 
at its current rate, with an average increase of 0.2 °C 
per decade, coffee production will need to shift an 
average of 58 km per decade toward the poles or 37 
m higher per decade. Under the warming expected 
around mid-century (2-2.5 °C globally), the minimum 
altitude suitable for coffee production in Central 
America and Kenya is expected to increase by around 
400 m.109
In the next 30 years, the GAEZ suitability dataset 
suggests that 75% of available, unforested land 
suitable for Arabica farming will be lost due to climate 
change, and 63% of similarly suitable land for Robusta 
farming. However, there is vastly more suitable land 
available than currently in use by coffee, and this fact 
will remain under near-term climate change: over 9 
times as much land is estimated to be suitable for 
Arabica production globally in 2050 than the total of 
land currently under its cultivation. The largest pool 
of available coffee land remains in Brazil, despite 
considerable losses.
At the same time, the land currently being used by 
coffee farmers in many regions will become unsuitable 
economically. Even allowing for coffee farming to shift 
within countries, 14% of land currently under Arabica 
cultivation is at risk of becoming economically 
unsuitable. As shown in Figures 24 and 25, the portion 
of coffee area at risk varies greatly across countries.
These shifts are a problem both for smallholder 
farmers and the coffee industry as a whole. While 
coffee production as a whole can shift, smallholder 
farmers are unlikely to migrate. Most affected 
smallholder farmers will leave coffee production, 
resulting in losses of coffee farming knowledge, 
physical and institutional capital, and the productive 
trees themselves.
At the level of the coffee industry, two concerns are 
worth highlighting. First, the loss of these farmers will 
drive further consolidation, undermining a diverse 
coffee market. Second, these farmers have knowledge 
and expertise that could take decades to recover.
Figure 24: Portion of Currently 
Suitable Area Projected to 
Become Unsuitable Due to 
Climate Change. 
The red bar shows the percent of 
suitable area lost, and the green 
bar shows the portion that remains 
economically suitable. Values exclude 
forested land and wetlands.
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3. Changes in Coffee Yields
We develop a statistical approach to predicting 
the future of coffee yields. This work builds upon 
advanced approaches that combine a biologically-
motivated representation of moderate and extreme 
temperatures110 and account for the potential for 
adaptation.111 However, as a perennial tree-crop, 
coffee is much more complicated than the field crops 
that these methods were first developed to model. 
We need to account for the period before seedlings 
can produce coffee berries, the yield of different 
ages of the trees, and the maintenance required. 
Farmers play an important role in mediating the 
relationship between coffee trees and climate, and 
we develop our model to account for that.
As temperatures increase, not all regions will be impacted 
identically. Depending on the specifics of climate 
change that each region is subject to, and the specifics 
of management practices, we predict different changes, 
as shown in Figure 26. After 2 °C of warming, all regions 
show decreases in yield, but Colombia and Ethiopia 
see increases prior to that point. This is explained by 
the beneficial effects of moderate temperatures in the 
coffee-growing areas of those countries. At 4 °C, yields 
on average fall by over 10%, and many major coffee-
producing regions, including Vietnam, India, and 
Honduras, experience losses in excess of 25%.
Figure 25: The Portion of Suitable 
Land Currently Under Cultivation 
Lost Due to Climate Change, for 
Affected Countries. 
The total currently cultivated land is 
represented by the full range of each 
bar (in some cases approximated by 
an even division between Arabica and 
Robusta, where data is unavailable). The 
red portion represents how the shortage 
of suitable land across the whole country 
can force reductions in planted area, even 
allowing for movement within countries.
Figure 26: Changes in Average 
Yields as a Function of 
Temperature Increases. 
These changes are applied to 
weather in 2017. The violin plot on 
the right shows the distribution of 
changes under 4 °C warming.
40 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
SECTION II. GLOBAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND PROSPECTS
As a global average across production, these losses will 
start hitting soon and will increase rapidly (see Figure 
27). These losses can be offset by improvements in 
management (discussed in sub-section 5), but without 
such improvements, they will already be noticeable 
by 2020.
4. Changes in Planted Area
As demand increases and yields fall, prices for coffee 
will increase slightly. Higher prices will incentivize 
farmers to expand their coffee production, particularly 
in Brazil where there are low barriers to reclaiming land 
previously used for coffee production. Although the 
literature on the response of farm planting to prices is 
quite old,112 researchers have generally not integrated 
it with more recent work on crop yields. Taken alone, 
prices are not a very good predictor for changes in 
coffee planted area. However, when combined with 
yields to form an estimate of farmer revenue, there 
is a clearer relationship (see appendix). Farmers with 
higher yields are more likely to expand under price 
increases than those with lower yields.
Our model shows that, under recent prices from 2018, 
held constant into the future, most countries decrease 
their land under cultivation because of low current 
prices and falling yields. Nine countries leave coffee 
production entirely, although these only account for 
2% of current production. Of the large producers, 
India is projected to have the greatest decreases in 
planted area. Ethiopia is projected to increase its 
Arabica planted area, and Vietnam is projected to 
increase both Arabica and Robusta production (see 
Figure 28).
The combined effect of these changes is predicted 
to be a 13% decrease in planted area globally (see 
Figure 29). However, it is important to note that this 
analysis assumes constant prices for coffee. As a result 
of both lower yields and reduced areas, lower total 
coffee production may raise prices slightly, due to the 
increased scarcity of coffee. These higher prices will 
induce some farmers to plant more than predicted 
here. However, the ease of increasing production in 
some countries, such as Brazil, will keep the effect 
of climate change on prices small for the next few 
decades.
Figure	27:	Average	Loss	
in Yields Due to Climate 
Change, Through 2050. 
We project losses to reach about 
7% by 2050.
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Figure 28: Changes in Planted Area, in 
Response to Current Prices. 
A baseline year of 2013 is used, and data 
on planted area up to 2018 is used where 
available.
Figure 29: Evolution 
of Planted Area by 
Country to 2050. 
Prices are held constant at 
2017 levels.
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5. Opportunities to Close Yield Gaps
Baseline Future Projections
In Figure 30, we show forecasts of production, split by country, under constant prices. In Figure 30, 
we also do not include the continuation of historical yield increases, to isolate the relative effect of 
climate. Arabica production ceases to climb, and falls gradually by 10% over the next 30 years due 
to climate change, in the absence of improvements in management. Robusta production increases, 
driven by additions from Vietnam, but also does not follow its previous trend. 
Considerable increases in production are possible, if prices increase. The predicted supply curve, 
as a function of prices, is shown in Figure 31. As an indication of the responsiveness to prices, a 
doubling of price results in a 30% more Robusta production by 2030, but only 15% more Arabica 
production over the same time. The majority of supply increases come from large producers that 
are highly responsive to changes in prices—in particular, Brazil and Vietnam. Although the increase 
in Brazilian production at higher prices is not as extreme as described in Section II(a), the predicted 
effect is the same: at any level of prices, Brazil can increase production to take advantage of almost 
all of the additional demand. At higher prices, production continues to climb through 2040, as more 
trees come to maturity. However, this long delay also affects the potential for production to quickly 
shift in the near term. When we look at the effect of higher prices on 2020, rather than 2030, Arabica 
production is almost entirely unaffected by increased prices, and Robusta production only increases 
slightly. Countries are, however, responsive to lower prices, and will abandon coffee production if 
prices continue to fall. 
Figure 30: Projected 
Production for Arabica 
(Top) and Robusta 
(Bottom), in Terms of 
Dried Beans. 
The continued variation in 
production after 2025 is 
driven by a natural cycle 
as harvests are adjusted to 
follow prices and respond 
to demand.
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Yield Gaps
Enormous disparities exist between the yields 
typical of different parts of the world (see Figure 
32). The countries at the 75th percentile in yield 
have over 3 times the yields of those at the 25th 
percentile. If yields globally could be brought to the 
yield levels in Brazil, which makes widespread use 
of fertilizer and irrigation, global production would 
increase by 70%. 
Using our model, we can project improvements in 
yield that could result from the large-scale investment 
of countries in improved management. In particular, 
we look at the potential of increased use of fertilizer 
and irrigation (see Figure 33). Most countries see the 
greatest benefit from irrigation, with Ethiopia increasing 
Arabica yields by 22% and Indonesia and Honduras 
increasing yields by 14%. Fertilizer also has potential 
for increasing yields, although in some cases we cannot 
distinguish these effects from irrigation (e.g., Ethiopia 
and Indonesia), and in many cases the potential is more 
modest (< 5%), except in the case of India, which is 
estimated to have over 10% increases in yield.
 
Figure 31: Supply Curves for 
Arabica and Robusta, as a Function 
of International Price Changes. 
Colors split the supply by country. 
Results are evaluated in 2030. The larger 
share of production in Vietnam reflects 
continuing yield trends, which we did 
not apply in Figure 30, but which are 
included here.
Figure 32: Observed Yields 
(X-Axis)	and	Harvested	Area	
(Y-Axis),	by	Country. 
Since production is the product of yield 
and harvested area, the area of each box 
is proportional to the production of the 
country. Only some boxes are labeled, 
in each case at the base of that country’s 
box.
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We apply these improvements globally, while keeping planted area the same, to understand the 
potential for increasing production by closing yield gaps. Total Arabica production could increase by 
18%, and Robusta production by 16%, under the high range of yield gap potential. This represents a 
total of an additional 770,000 MT, about the production of Colombia. These productivity improvements 
would be shared across many producing countries, with the greatest potential in currently under-
performing countries.
Some countries have considerable opportunities to improve yields, such as Ethiopia, Peru, Papua 
New Guinea, and Uganda. These opportunities require multiple investments: in irrigation systems, 
inputs like fertilizers and pesticides, more effort in tree care, and in many cases, the replanting of old 
trees.113
Figure 33: Percent Increases in 
Yields That Could Occur Through the 
Application	of	Country-Wide	Irrigation	
and Input Measures. 
The changes are estimated by considering 
potential increases in GAEZ suitability of 
the main coffee-growing area, and then 
normalized to match results from USAID.132
Figure 34: Estimated 
Production if Development 
Practices are Fully Adopted. 
The effects of development 
improvements upon yields are 
applied uniformly within each 
country.
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Table 1: Improvements in Production, 
by Country and Management Practice
Opportunities to 
Expand Production
Another insight in Figure 
31 is that many countries 
are not using the full area 
for coffee production 
that they historically 
had. Returning 
cultivation to these 
areas could increase 
total production by an 
additional 60%, if yields 
were to remain constant, 
without causing coffee 
to expand into new 
areas.
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From a suitability perspective, many countries 
have more land that is suitable for coffee 
production than is currently under cultivation. 
The area that is highly suitable for Arabica 
and Robusta coffee for each country is listed 
in Table 2.
These highly suitable areas depend only upon 
the biological and climatological conditions 
within each region, and do not require 
irrigation or additional fertilizer inputs. We also 
report the highest level of suitability for each 
coffee species, which ranges from 0 – 100%. 
Areas that are highly suitable for coffee have 
the potential to produce high quality coffee 
at yields comparable to the most competitive 
regions. However, the ultimate potential for 
any region depends upon a variety of other 
constraints, including labor availability, the 
ease of machinery use in the landscape, 
transportation infrastructure and access to 
markets, and suitable seed varieties. 
We can consider the potential of China 
and Laos as a case study, as shown in Table 
3. Currently, almost all of the area of Laos 
is potentially suitable for Robusta coffee; 
however, the area that will remain suitable in 
the future will diminish. The Yunnan province 
in China has considerable potential as well, 
and unlike Laos, this potential will increase 
as temperatures warm. These suitability 
estimates should be treated with care, as the 
climatologic data is uncertain in many of these 
regions.
Table 2: Total Available Land that is Highly 
Suitable for Arabica and Robusta, and the 
Highest Level of Suitability for Each Found in the 
Country
Suitability levels are reported by GAEZ as between 0 and 
100%, and we consider highly suitable land to be >80% 
for Arabica and >90% for Robusta.
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Table 3: Baseline and Future Suitability for China and Laos
Baseline suitability is evaluated at the current temperatures, with no irrigation or fertilizer inputs. Future 
irrigation is evaluated in 2050, with advanced management practices. All maps have protected areas 
removed, with suitability and protected area data from GAEZ.
Immediate Opportunities (Low-Input, 
Rain-Fed, Baseline)
Mid-Century Opportunities (High-
Input, Irrigated, 2050)
 
China’s coffee growing 
potential will grow 
over the course of the 
century, particularly in 
Yunnan province. Hainan 
is productive now, but 
will fade.
  
Laos has considerable 
coffee production 
potential, mainly for 
Robusta coffee. Many 
of the lower-lying areas, 
however, will experience 
yield losses over the next 
30 years, so investment 
choices should be made 
carefully.
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C. Future Prospects
To assess future prospects, we developed a coffee 
demand model based on projections of income 
and population growth. The relationship between 
coffee demand and prices is highly variable across 
countries.114 
A summary measure of the responsiveness of demand 
to prices is price elasticity. This is the portion of a change 
in prices that translates into a change in demand. For 
example, a price elasticity of -0.5 means that if prices 
increase by 10%, demand will reduce by 5%. We find 
that Arabica coffee has a global price elasticity of 
-0.08 and Robusta coffee has an elasticity of -0.15. 
These values imply that demand is extremely inelastic, 
reflecting the apparent low sensitivity of consumers to 
price changes. However, the responsiveness to prices 
is not identical everywhere. Elasticities vary from over 
-0.09 (Japan) to below -0.075 (Germany) for Arabica 
coffee. The comparatively narrow range for these may 
reflect a real similarity in how countries respond to 
prices, or may be the result of the noisy and limited 
data available for the analysis (see annex 4).
The demand curves are also determined by growing 
income (according to an income elasticity of demand) 
and population growth. The demand curves, across 
all countries, are shown in Figure 35, below. 
Combining the two models for supply and demand 
allows us to understand how the market equilibrium 
affects both producers and consumers. As demand 
continues to climb and more regions experience 
losses from climate change, prices will begin 
to recover. However, this increase is likely to be 
modest, because the higher prices will incentivize 
more production, particularly Brazil’s mechanized 
production. Importantly, the most responsive farmers 
are those that are able to produce coffee most 
cheaply, and these will be able to keep up with the 
increased demand for the foreseeable future.
The figure below shows the predicted change in prices, 
under two scenarios: “business-as-usual” and “closing 
yield gaps” (See Figure 36). The business-as-usual 
scenario is based on Brazil and Vietnam’s continued 
dominance when it comes to productivity growth, 
resulting in greater concentration in production. This 
productivity growth keeps prices for Arabica coffee 
low, although growing demand increases them by 
about $1/kg by 2030. Increases in Robusta coffee 
consumption boost its prices somewhat, and Robusta 
coffee production approaches Arabica coffee levels. 
Figure 35: Demand Curves 
in 2030 (Top) and Showing 
the Growth Globally Across 
2020, 2030, and 2040 
(Bottom). 
Error bars show the 90% 
confidence intervals for each 
country’s curve. The greater 
demand in later years is the 
result of increases in income and 
populations.
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Under the closing-yield-gaps scenario, we allow 
countries to close yield gaps to the extent described 
in the previous section. Productivity gains are then 
more distributed, which decreases Vietnam and 
Brazil’s domination of the market. However, the 
increased global production resulting from closing 
yield gaps also depresses prices below the level 
of the business-as-usual scenario. Most countries 
see greater benefits from the higher yields than 
they lose from lower prices, and as a result show 
increases in production. Brazil and Vietnam produce 
less coffee relative to the business-as-usual case, 
because these countries are more responsive to 
prices and have less to gain from closing yield 
gaps. In addition to the benefits of higher yields 
to offset lower prices, any comprehensive plan for 
sustainable development should include support 
for incomes, prices, or diversification, to ensure 
that all producers see benefits from the increased 
production.
In addition to the effects resulting from closing yield 
gaps, the persistence of low levels of prices under 
the closing-yield-gaps scenario is explained by a 
combination of factors. First, we assume that yields 
continue to improve as they have in recent years. 
This effect is notably strong for Vietnam yields, 
which increase, even as total production in Vietnam 
is depressed under the closing-yield-gaps scenario 
relative to the business-as-usual scenario. In the 
absence of this assumption, prices rise by about 
$1/kg by 2030 in the closing-yield-gaps scenario. 
Second, we assume that countries and regions 
that previously used more land for coffee production 
can easily increase their land use in response to higher 
prices. This is particularly relevant for Brazil, which 
previously had very large amounts of land under coffee 
cultivation. However, this increase in farming takes a 
few years of higher prices to take effect (see appendix), 
resulting in Arabica coffee prices that rise slightly to 
2022, and then drop back down.
This report is particularly concerned with the potential 
losses of coffee variety and producer livelihoods over 
the next decade. Under the business-as-usual scenario, 
while the increased demand helps some countries, there 
are several that see significant decreases in production, 
particularly India and Malaysia. Total production 
increases by 26%, of which 76% is accounted for by 
Vietnam and Brazil (see figure 37). Under the closing-
yield-gaps scenario, many of the same countries 
experience decreases, but the decreases are smaller 
overall, and the increases are less concentrated in Brazil 
and Vietnam. Total production increases by 29%, of which 
64% comes from Vietnam and Brazil. This highlights 
the need for countries that have smaller market shares 
to maintain competitiveness if their varieties are to be 
sustained. This competitiveness will require raising the 
value per hectare that farmers receive, which entails, to 
various degrees, both improving quality and improving 
yields.
Figure 36: 
Business-As-Usual	vs	
Closing-Yield-Gaps	Scenario	
Prices
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Figure	37:	Shifts	in	Production	Under	
Business-As-Usual	(BAU)	and	Closing-
Yield-Gaps	(CYG)	Scenarios	By	2030.	
The values in the pie charts are the portion 
of the global increases (top) and decreases 
(bottom) in production quantity that occur 
within each country. Total BAU increases 
in increasing countries are 1.2 million MT, 
and decreases in decreasing countries 
are 29,500 MT. The area of the Closing-
Yield-Gap pie charts are scaled relative to 
the BAU charts, and the size of the BAU 
chart is shown as a grey circle on the right. 
Countries representing greater than 1% of 
the increases/decreases are labeled.
 
Figure 38: Closing Yield 
Gaps Scenario: Supply
Figure 39: Closing Yield 
Gaps Scenario: Demand
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT | 51
ENSURING ECONOMIC VIABILITY & SUSTAINABILITY OF COFFEE PRODUCTON  A REPORT
Closing Yield Gaps Scenario
Below we further explore the closing-yield-gaps scenario, and its consequences for supply and 
demand through 2030. Between now and 2030, total production increases steadily, but the 
increases are uneven across countries (see Figure 38).
On the demand side, the consuming countries that currently dominate the coffee market show very 
little change, while emerging markets represent the greatest driver of the coffee industry’s growth. 
This reflects emerging markets’ growing incomes and purchasing power. Under the business-as-
usual scenario, higher prices result in slightly lower consumption than in the closing-yield-gaps 
scenario.The baseline demand scenario is driven by population and income growth. Several other 
factors are emerging in the coffee market that may alter demand: 
1) Accelerated demand growth from East Asian and coffee-producing countries. According to 
the ICO, coffee consumption in East Asia (India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, China, 
the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan) has grown at an accelerated annual rate of 6% in the last 
25 years. The region’s share in global coffee consumption has grown from 5% to 12%. The 
highest growth rates are for China (12%), Vietnam (10%), and Taiwan (10%).115 In addition, 
consumption is expected to grow in several coffee-producing countries, due to urbanization 
and policies to encourage domestic coffee consumption. Brazil,116 Colombia,117 and Uganda,118 
for example, have implemented policies to incentivize increased coffee consumption at home. 
In an alternative demand growth scenario for East Asian and coffee-producing countries, an 
annual growth rate of 10%119 was used. The emerging demand from East Asia and from 
producing countries is expected to have a bigger impact on consumption of Robusta coffee 
than Arabica coffee. This is because Robusta coffee is associated with lower prices, which 
makes it more appealing in low- and middle-income countries.120 
2) The improvement of technology enables Arabica coffee and Robusta coffee blends to taste 
similar to a 100% Arabica coffee.121 This trend has the potential to decrease Arabica coffee 
demand and increase Robusta coffee demand. As there is a lack of data and studies that 
assess the potential impact of this trend, this alternative demand scenario was not formally 
tested in the model.
3) There is growing demand for capsules and pods in developed economies. The sales of coffee 
capsules and pods represents 11% of the world sales of coffee today122 and is expected to 
grow by a CAGR of 7% in the near future.123 While capsules and pods sell at a premium, the 
amount of coffee used in each capsule is lower than in traditional coffee-making processes. 
For capsules, only 5-7 grams124 of coffee is needed per cup,125 while filter/drip coffee requires 
10-15 grams126 per cup. Capsules therefore have the potential to reduce the amount of coffee 
needed by up to 50%. Using this assumption, an alternative demand scenario was modelled, 
which foresees a market share for capsules (consuming half of green beans as compared 
to wholesale/ground coffee) growing to 23% of total Arabica coffee demand in 2026 and 
remaining constant thereafter (from a baseline of 17% in 2017). 
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4) Consumption per capita in developed countries 
might be increasing, driven by the growth 
of specialty coffee, which encourages higher 
coffee consumption in some markets.127 Thus 
one alternative demand scenario considers an 
additional annual growth of 1.5% on top of the 
baseline. 
Figure 40, below, shows the difference in demand 
by 2030 resulting from testing the above outlined 
alternative demand growth scenarios. The first three 
bar charts show the results for each of these scenarios 
separately. The last bar chart combines them. 
In our model, the demand resulting from these 
combined factors would moderately increase global 
prices because supply, even from Brazil, will not be 
able to keep up with demand at a constant price, but 
there remains uncertainty as to whether each demand 
growth factor will materialize. The greatest increase 
in demand comes from the developed country 
assumptions in this combined demand-factor scenario, 
because of their high baseline level of demand. The 
effects of higher demand growth rates amongst 
producer countries and East Asian countries are fairly 
minor until after 2025. Capsules, which are assumed 
to increase their market share by 23% of the total 
market, have a large impact on the price of Arabica 
coffee, so that the gap between the combined factor 
demand scenario and the closing-yield-gaps scenario 
is much larger for Robusta coffee prices.
D. Discussion of the Model Results
Understanding the challenges and opportunities of 
coffee production requires sophisticated models which 
can account both for economic decision-making and 
for environmental changes. This is relevant for coffee 
yields and production, where farmers make important 
decisions about maintenance and harvesting, as well 
as for coffee demand, which responds to prices and 
changing tastes.
There are considerable differences between regions 
and varieties in terms of their production potential 
and how they respond to climate and changing 
prices. On average, Arabica coffee is more sensitive to 
rising temperatures, and producers of Arabica coffee 
respond more slowly to prices. Over the next 30 years, 
14 – 34% of land currently under coffee cultivation is 
at risk of becoming economically unproductive. While 
there remains plentiful land for coffee production 
across the tropics, ensuring that the movement of 
coffee does not result in land grabbing or deforestation 
is an important challenge. Meanwhile, the growing 
productivity of coffee in Brazil and Vietnam could 
result in greater concentration of coffee production 
there, putting many specialty varieties at risk.
Figure 40: 2030 Change in 
Closing-Yield-Gaps	Scenario	
Demand as Compared to 
Baseline (In %)
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Smallholder farmers are particularly vulnerable. 
They have the fewest resources to adapt to climate 
change, and temporary economic or environmental 
shocks can force them out of coffee farming. There 
are about 12.5 million coffee farmers,128 most of 
whom are smallholders, and ensuring a stable 
livelihood for these smallholder farmers, in coffee 
or out, is an important development priority. Low 
prices also hit these farmers the hardest, and 
under current prices, we predict most countries to 
decrease their land under coffee cultivation, and 
some countries to cease coffee production entirely. 
 
New resources are needed to inform smallholders, as 
well as other producers, about the risks they face, and 
to help them improve their management practices 
to be productive, resilient, and profitable. Providing 
these kinds of services requires resources, trained 
helpers, and new science. Research centers like 
Cenicafé in Colombia have an important role to play, by 
developing new disease-resistant and heat-resistant 
varieties, supporting tree renovation, and providing 
or supporting extension services. In particular, coffee 
farmers everywhere are in need of “climate services,” 
which help them to manage their risks and potential 
under climate change. These services include 
information on new varieties and management 
practices, and how these practices can protect them 
under more frequent weather and disease risks. In 
some areas, they will need to understand the potential 
changes in coffee suitability, to help inform the long-
term decisions that are necessary for coffee farming. 
On a season-by-season basis, there is also important 
information available on expected weather, since 
many regions are heavily affected by climate patterns 
like El Niño and La Niña, which are predictable months 
in advance. Finally, greater variability should not be a 
barrier to areas that continue to be productive in most 
years, and expanding the availability of crop insurance 
programs (see Box 9) can greatly help farmers endure 
occasional shocks. The needs for new resources and 
services for smallholders and other producers could 
be met the multi-stakeholder undertaking that we 
present in Section IV. Such investment would also 
support greater sustainability within the coffee sector 
generally. In the following section, we discuss what 
coffee sustainability entails—including the economic 
sustainability of producers—and review some of the 
sustainability efforts undertaken in the coffee sector 
to date.
Figure 41: Impact of the 
Combined Factors of 
Demand Growth on Long 
Term Prices (Closing Yield 
Gaps Scenario)
54 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
A. Coffee Sustainability and the 
Sustainable Development Goals 
Sustainability has three components: 
environmental, social, and economic.133 
Environmental sustainability encompasses 
two broad issues: the continued availability of 
resilient ecosystem services, and the maintenance 
of conserved nature. More broadly, it requires 
climate resiliency. Social sustainability considers 
impacts on people. This includes the avoidance 
of harms—no child labor, no land grabbing—
as well as positive steps, such as increasing 
food security. Economic sustainability focuses 
on the ability of producers and farmworkers to 
earn sufficiently from their respective roles in 
coffee production to live a life with dignity. This 
component, which has presented some of the 
most intractable sustainability challenges, and 
which has been urgently highlighted by the 
World Coffee Producers Forum since its inception 
in 2017,134 is discussed further in box 2.  
These three sustainability components are 
overlapping, and are often mutually supportive. 
For example, improved economic sustainability in 
the form of higher earnings for coffee farmers can 
help alleviate or avoid social sustainability issues, 
such as child labor and food insecurity. Stronger 
environmental sustainability practices, such as the 
incorporation of cover crops in some locations, 
can help make some farmers more resilient to the 
impacts of climate change, thereby supporting 
their longer-term economic sustainability.   
The Sustainable Development Goals provide a 
specific framework for integrating sustainability 
within the coffee sector, and for supporting 
sustainable development in coffee-growing 
regions. Aligning coffee with the SDGs presents 
a clear goal for upstream and downstream actors 
along the value chain.135  
While nearly all of the 17 SDGs hold some 
relevance for the coffee sector, 14 of them are 
particularly relevant, and can help to provide 
substantive goals for the coffee industry and 
for governments of coffee-producing countries. 
These SDGs are, in brief:  
• No Poverty (SDG 1). Particularly—but not 
only—at times of low global coffee prices, 
poverty persists amongst coffee producers 
and farmworkers. Coffee prices are currently 
32% below the average of the last ten years, 
following a general downward trend since 
2016,136 resulting in a steady erosion of 
many coffee farmers’ abilities to achieve a 
decent livelihood. Finding ways to eradicate, 
or at least significantly reduce, the poverty 
that stalks those who are providing the raw 
ingredient at the heart of the $200 billion 
industry137 will be critical for the coffee 
sector to align with the SDGs. This includes 
finding new models for increased producer 
profitability (see Section IV) and, potentially, 
providing social protection through income 
support transfers for the poorest farmers (see 
Box 7). Efforts to reduce producer poverty 
can also include strategies such as increasing 
their tenure security and documentation of 
land rights, per SDG Indicator 1.4.138  
Photo by Tina Guina on Unsplash
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Box 2: Economic Sustainability Within the Coffee Sector 
For coffee producers, economic sustainability requires, at a minimum, that coffee production be 
economically viable over the long-term.184  Producers who are planting below a minimum threshold 
of hectarage may never be economically viable, as it is nearly impossible to avoid poverty when 
landholdings are too small.185 For those above that threshold, economic viability is possible, although 
very difficult when global prices are extremely low. 
Economic viability can be considered the minimum core of economic sustainability. Going beyond 
viability, economic sustainability should also consider producers’ earnings and whether those earnings 
are sufficient compensation for their unpaid labor.186 This is at the core of the “living income” concept, 
which has been defined as “[t]he net annual income required for a household in a particular place to 
afford a decent standard of living for all members of that household.”187 This decent standard of living 
encompasses elements such as food, housing, education, and healthcare.188 
The concept of living income recognizes that household income can come from multiple sources.189 
This aligns with the realities of many producers, for whom diversification, including to non-coffee 
crops and to off-farm work, can supplement income and/or limit risk. Such diversification can also be 
important as a means of climate adaptation.190 A recognition of the realities around, and importance 
of, diversification does not mean, however, that diversification should distract from the challenges of 
making coffee production itself more economically sustainable for producers. 
In very low price environments, the economic sustainability component of coffee production at a global 
scale might primarily be achieved either through changes in pricing mechanisms, or through income 
supplementation, as discussed further below. There is also a role for promoting increased farmer 
profitability at the individual and association levels, whether through increased productivity, efficiency, 
and/or quality, depending on individual contexts and market opportunities. Yet the benefits that farmers 
in many countries might realize from increased productivity or efficiency will still be constrained during 
periods of sustained low prices.
For farmworkers, economic sustainability requires decent work191 and adequate “living wages.”192 A 
living wage is a wage that is “sufficient to afford a decent standard of living for the worker and her or his 
family.”193 Minimum wage laws covering farmworkers generally do not require a living wage, and the vast 
majority of farmworkers working in coffee—and in all other agricultural commodities, in any country—
do not earn living wages. For economic sustainability to be a reality in coffee production, farmworker 
earnings will have to increase. Yet increased wages for farmworkers could drastically increase costs of 
production, thus placing producers’ own economic viability at risk—unless prices are high enough to 
cover both decent earnings for producers and decent wages for their workers.
Particularly when prices are low, the challenges of achieving economic sustainability in the coffee sector 
are enormous. Of course, these challenges also go beyond coffee. They mirror challenges found in 
other agricultural commodities, even in highly developed economies, as well as general economic 
development challenges of rural areas in low- and middle-income countries. 
Nonetheless, the various considerations noted above, along with companies’ co-responsibility for 
economic sustainability, imply the need for new strategies that insert more equity within coffee global 
value chains, including those discussed below in Section IV.
\
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• Zero Hunger and Sustainable Agricultural 
Production (SDG 2). Hunger, food insecurity, 
and malnutrition often go hand-in-hand with 
poverty. For many coffee farmers, who harvest 
coffee at peak times once or twice a year, 
hunger is cyclical, as farmers work to stretch 
the payment for the coffee they have sold 
after the last harvest as well as to stretch any 
staple food crops they have produced for their 
own consumption. In Latin America, farmers 
have described these periods in which they 
struggle to consistently feed their families 
as “the thin months.”139 Achieving SDG 2 in 
coffee thus implies supporting farmers and 
their families to avoid this seasonal hunger, 
including through supporting higher incomes 
from coffee as well as other strategies, 
such as diversification.140 In addition, the 
targets developed under SDG 2 focus on 
sustainable agricultural production through 
increased productivity, incomes, and climate 
resilience,141 and through investments and 
initiatives that support access to, among other 
things, inputs, knowledge, financial services, 
markets, research and extension services, 
and rural infrastructure.142 Improving coffee 
farmers’ access to these goods and services, 
and providing more general support for 
increasing the productivity and profitability 
of farmers, is equally critical for achievement 
of SDG 2. 
• Good	 Health	 and	 Well-Being	 (SDG	 3). 
Across coffee-producing countries, significant 
or major challenges remain towards the 
achievement of SDG 3.143 While the most 
pressing health concerns within each country 
are varied, one key commonality affecting 
coffee farmers, farmworkers, and coffee 
communities is limited access to healthcare. 
Amongst the top ten producing countries 
by volume, for example, the availability of 
universal health coverage is classified as 
a major challenge in Ethiopia, India, and 
Uganda.144 Even outside of those countries, 
however, coffee farmers and workers can 
struggle to access necessary and affordable 
healthcare. In coffee-producing countries, 
improving access to healthcare will be an 
important aspect of achieving the SDGs, 
one that should be prioritized by relevant 
governments and their donor partners.
• Quality Education (SDG 4). Universal access 
to quality education also remains a challenge 
in many coffee-producing countries. In 15 
of the top 20 coffee-producing countries, 
access to quality education remains a 
significant or major challenge.145 Without this 
access, children in rural coffee-producing 
areas face a bleak future. Compounding the 
general lack of affordable, accessible, and 
quality schools are the effects of child labor, 
which also diminishes children’s educational 
opportunities. Here, too, some of the issues 
and solutions are intricately related to poverty 
and earning potential—children work rather 
than going to school when their families 
need the money—as well as to the prices 
paid to farmers, who may be incentivized 
to encourage child labor as a way to lower 
labor costs.
• Gender Equality (SDG 5). Women tend to 
benefit less than men from the production of 
commodity crops tied to global value chains. 
Coffee is no exception. It is estimated that 
70% of the labor in coffee production is 
performed by women, but they are only 20% 
of the household heads or land-owners in 
coffee-producing families.146 This tendency 
towards exclusion of women raises inherent 
gender equality concerns, and can also result 
in other negative impacts, such as on the 
health and nutritional status of children.147 
Aligning with SDG 5 requires at a minimum 
that, whichever sustainability interventions 
are used, care is paid to ensure that women 
are also able to benefit. For example, a 
gender-sensitive approach to supporting 
increased farmer productivity might include 
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using women agronomists and trainers, and 
scheduling training sessions at times and 
locations that are accessible for women.148 
• Clean Water and Sanitation (SDG 6). 
Access to clean water and sanitation is 
a challenge across many rural coffee-
growing regions. All of the top 20 coffee-
producing countries have significant or 
major challenges to achieving SDG 6.149 
Many coffee farmers, their families, and 
their communities lack sufficient access 
to clean water and sanitation. In addition, 
at the farm-level, many workers also lack 
access to clean water and sanitation, even 
though access to safe water and sanitation 
when working is a labor right.150 While 
supporting coffee farmers’ increased access 
to clean water has happened at a limited 
scale,151 a more widespread approach is 
needed to scale up this access throughout 
coffee-growing regions. Additional efforts 
are also required to ensure farmworkers’ 
consistent access to water and sanitation 
when working. 
• Affordable	 and	 Clean	 Energy	 (SDG	 7). 
Yet another challenge in many coffee-
growing regions is ensuring access to 
affordable and clean energy, such as 
electricity. Only two of the top 20 coffee-
producing countries are top performers in 
the achievement of affordable and clean 
energy.152 Electrification can have significant 
development benefits generally, as well as 
for farmers and rural dwellers specifically, 
such as by reducing time burdens on 
farm families, supporting improved health 
outcomes when displacing unhealthier 
energy sources, and facilitating educational 
improvements.
• Decent Work and Economic Growth (SDG 
8). Coffee is failing to provide decent work. 
Decreasing prices in real terms, increasing costs 
of production, and significantly more exposure 
to climate-induced shocks have combined to 
limit the ability of coffee to support decent 
livelihoods. Meanwhile, labor rights, such as 
the right to be paid the minimum wage, are 
routinely violated for coffee workers,153 while 
realizing the right to collectively organize and 
form unions remains a broader challenge for 
farmworkers around the world. Moreover, as 
mentioned above, child labor continues to 
persist in coffee production. Alignment with 
the SDGs implies not only avenues to support 
better livelihood outcomes for coffee farmers, 
but also, importantly, the enforcement of 
labor laws that meet minimum international 
standards, and the eradication of child labor.  
• Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure (SDG 
9). In some places, a lack of good transport 
infrastructure in rural coffee-producing regions 
has driven down the prices that smallholders 
can charge for their coffee at the farmgate. 
Limited investment in irrigation infrastructure 
has lowered productivity and increased 
farmers’ climate vulnerability. Although the 
adoption of new technologies can help farmers 
increase productivity, reduce information 
asymmetries, and help track sustainability 
practices, much more needs to be done to 
support innovations and to harness the latest 
technologies to further the sustainability of the 
sector: for example, facilitating the use of smart 
phone applications, blockchain,154 or satellite 
imagery to strengthen climate resiliency, 
reduce environmental impacts of agriculture 
practices, or facilitate greater productivity in 
support of higher incomes. 
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• Life on Land (SDG 15). As mentioned 
above, coffee production is not always 
environmentally sustainable. Yet 
incorporating more environmentally sound 
practices that protect life on land is critical for 
coffee sustainability. For the coffee sector, this 
encompasses two broad issues: supporting 
the continued availability of resilient 
ecosystem services through sustainable 
agricultural practices (e.g., efficient water 
use, limited chemical use, and in some areas 
use of permanent shade, cover crops, and 
ecoforestry), and maintaining conserved 
nature. This calls for, among other things, no 
deforestation, the protection of biodiversity 
and high conservation value areas, and 
efforts to ensure that any increases in coffee 
demand do not place additional pressures 
on finite natural resources, biodiversity, and 
the climate. As climate change disrupts more 
farmers, stringent policies are needed to 
ensure that coffee production does not shift 
into forests and other natural areas. Healthy 
co-existence with the natural environment 
is essential for both coffee farmers and the 
reputation of the coffee sector.
• Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions 
(SDG 16). The global justice gap is estimated 
at 5 billion people, meaning that two-thirds 
of the world’s population lack meaningful 
access to justice.158 This justice gap includes 
those who live in extreme conditions of 
injustice, those who are unable to resolve 
their justice problems, and those who are 
excluded from opportunities that the law 
provides.159 Just as access to basic services 
in coffee-producing regions is a critical 
component of achieving the SDGs in the 
coffee sector, so too is ensuring that people-
centered justice solutions are available 
to coffee farmers, farmworkers, and their 
families, in the context of coffee-related 
transactions and more broadly within coffee-
producing regions.160 In addition, ensuring 
• Responsible Consumption and Production 
(SDG 12). Although responsible 
consumption and production is critical for 
achieving sustainable development within 
our planetary boundaries,155 significant 
challenges remain for the coffee sector. At 
the consumption end, the increasing reliance 
on single-use plastics and other disposable 
single-use packaging (such as those used for 
pods and capsules) is deeply concerning. At 
the production end, multiple factors have 
facilitated unsustainable production practice 
in some places. Specific targeted actions 
throughout the value chain will be necessary 
to support more responsible consumption 
and production of coffee. 
• Climate Action (SDG 13). In recent decades, 
coffee has been responsible for deforestation 
in important coffee-producing countries.156 
In some places, coffee production may 
also have been accompanied by overuse of 
synthetic fertilizers. Both of these activities 
contribute to climate change. Climate 
change will also create immense challenges 
for coffee production in areas where coffee 
has been historically produced. Supporting 
climate resilience amongst coffee producers 
and within the industry overall should thus 
be a key sustainability priority for the coffee 
sector. At the farmer and sub-regional levels, 
the appropriate responses for supporting 
climate resiliency are context-specific. 
Assessing potential climate impacts can 
help indicate whether farmers in specific 
locations are likely to require incremental 
adaptation, more systemic adaptation, 
or full transformation.157 More generally, 
approaches such as supporting more 
widespread access to affordable insurance 
options could help mitigate climate-related 
risks for coffee farmers (see Box 9).
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public access to information is a critical 
component of SDG 16. For the coffee 
industry, integrating more transparency 
and traceability within their supply chains 
will be an important contribution towards 
sustainability, supporting farmers in their 
price negotiations (see Box 6) and enabling 
more robust monitoring of sustainability 
issues throughout supply chains. 
• Partnerships	 for	 the	 Goals	 (SDG	 17). 
SDG 17 provides inspiration for how 
relevant actors—along global value chains 
and more broadly within the sector—
might work together to achieve the 
SDGs. Combined with other international 
instruments and soft law guidance,161 SDG 
17 also implies co-responsibility of public 
and private sector actors for aligning the 
sector with the SDGs. 
Actors up and down the value chain share 
responsibility for aligning with the SDGs and 
for better integrating all three components 
of sustainability within the coffee industry. 
Upstream actors, such as producers and 
cooperatives, have critical roles to play in 
implementing sustainable practices, whether 
that is taking steps to improve climate 
resiliency or ensuring that hired laborers are 
paid decently. Midstream and downstream 
actors, such as traders, roasters, and retailers, 
equally have responsibility for ensuring 
sustainability within their supply chains, as well 
as within the coffee sector more generally. In 
other words, companies are co-responsible for 
advancing economic, social, and environmental 
sustainability within the coffee sector.  
Actors outside of global value chains also have 
relevant obligations related to sustainability. In 
particular, governments have legal duties under 
international law, as well as commitments under 
the SDGs, to support the realization of the rights to 
food, health, water, housing, and education, among 
others. Certain activities—such as ensuring access 
to healthcare and education, or enforcing the 
minimum wage—remain the primary responsibility 
of governments. Yet that does not absolve upstream 
or downstream actors within the coffee industry 
from their responsibilities to integrate sustainability 
throughout the production and sale of coffee.
B. Current Sustainability Efforts in 
Coffee
In considering the three components of 
sustainability, and against the SDG Framework 
described above, it is clear that the coffee sector 
is not yet sustainable. Rampant poverty amongst 
producers, the use of child labor, serious climate 
vulnerability, and challenges in accessing basic 
services in coffee-growing regions paint a sobering 
picture of how far the sector has to go to become 
fully sustainable. 
Today’s grim reality has arisen despite sincere 
efforts at the industry level and from individual 
companies, as well as by actors within coffee-
producing countries, to advance coffee 
sustainability. At the industry level, multiple 
platforms have been designed in recent years to 
bring together stakeholders to make coffee more 
sustainable. These include, for example, the Global 
Coffee Platform (GCP)162 and the Sustainable 
Coffee Challenge (SCC),163 which have jointly 
produced a sustainability framework for coffee.164 
This co-owned Sustainability Framework provides 
a useful starting point for transparent metrics and 
potential monitoring of sustainability efforts, with 
15 defined intervention pathways, each with their 
own suggested investments, actions, and outputs, 
along with enabling conditions, outcomes, and 
impacts.165 The framework’s use as an effective 
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monitoring tool, however, has been limited to 
date: although the platforms have supported 
some level of transparency by disclosing online 
sustainability commitments by companies and 
other entities, such disclosure does not appear 
to include information about whether targets 
have been met or are on track (see Box 3). 
Another joint effort focused on indicators is the 
Coffee Data Standard.166 Undertaken by the GCP, 
the Committee on Sustainability Assessment 
(COSA), Rainforest Alliance, and Waterwatch 
Cooperative, the project has developed a set of 
15 farm-level sustainability indicators, which can 
be integrated by supply chain actors into their 
reporting systems. The objective is to “establish 
a common language to measure sustainability.”167 
This is a welcome development, as scaling up 
sustainability in the coffee sector has arguably 
been hampered by the fragmentation of efforts 
and limited comparability.168 How indicators are 
defined, however, will determine their ultimate 
usefulness (see Box 3, which draws lessons from 
the Sustainability Framework).  
Box 3: Does the Sustainability Framework 
Adequately Cover Economic Sustainability? 
The Sustainability Framework developed jointly by the GCP and the SCC includes 
15 intervention pathways to advance sustainability within the coffee sector. Each 
of these pathways, in turn, includes various metrics, including on relevant outputs 
and outcomes. Many of the pathways are relevant for supporting farmers’ economic 
viability: for example, technical assistance, renovations, access to inputs, and access 
to finance, as well as some of the topics under producer country policy, standards/
certification, and sourcing. Yet in terms of outputs, there do not appear to be any 
that would align with companies’ co-responsibility for economic sustainability in low 
price environments. One of the closest outcomes is under standards/certification: 
“Improved price received for coffee exceeds cost of production.” However, the 
“output” in that pathway does not measure company action that would necessarily 
lead to this outcome, as it says “Pounds of green coffee produced in compliance 
with a standard.” As noted both above and below, a significant amount of coffee 
is produced but not sold under sustainability standards; a more helpful indicator 
would instead measure company purchases of certified products, such as “pounds 
purchased in compliance with a standard,” or even “percentage of supply certified.” 
Similarly, two outcomes for the “sourcing” pathway and the “consumer country 
policy” pathway are “Improved prices received for coffee” and “Increased purchases 
of sustainable coffee in markets.” Yet those pathways also do not include specific 
outputs that translate into actions that roasters or retailers would take to reliably lead 
to those outcomes.
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These various sustainability platforms, and the 
shared Sustainability Framework developed 
by the GCP and the SCC, represent critical 
steps towards an industry-wide approach to 
advancing sustainability. Collaborative and 
joined up efforts amongst companies, on 
a precompetitive basis, and in partnership 
with civil society, will be crucial for achieving 
sustainability within the sector. However, the 
multiplicity of these platforms risks undermining 
their ability to achieve their sustainability goals. 
Continued sustained coordination amongst all 
of the relevant platforms, along with other ways 
to reduce fragmentation—including, potentially, 
mergers of relevant platforms or initiatives—
would help mitigate the challenges inherent 
in a fragmented landscape of initiatives, and 
should be seriously explored.169
Apart from these global-level multi-stakeholder 
platforms and initiatives, other collective efforts, 
both at international and at local levels, are 
underway to advance coffee sustainability. While 
too numerous to list here, one is the World Coffee 
Producers Forum, which has helped to catalyze 
dialogue on, and the search for solutions to 
address, producers’ economic sustainability during 
the recent price crisis. In addition, two interesting 
examples of precompetitive efforts to advance 
the public goods necessary for building a more 
sustainable coffee sector are the Farmfit Fund 
(and related Farmfit Business Support Facility) 
and World Coffee Research, described in Boxes 
4 and 5, respectively. These latter two examples 
highlight the potential for corporate leadership 
and precompetitive collective action to help propel 
the coffee sector, and smallholder agriculture more 
generally, towards a more sustainable future.
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Box	4:	IDH	Farmfit	Fund
The €100 million IDH Farmfit Fund, launched in November 2018, is a blended finance investment 
vehicle, developed to increase investment in smallholder farmers.194 The IDH Farmfit Fund has 
received private investment from Jacobs DE, Mondelez, Unilever, and Rabobank, public support 
from the Dutch Government, and public support from the U.S. Government in the form of 
guarantees from USAID. 
The Farmfit Fund sponsors big projects at scale, working with specialized service providers (such 
as NGOs like TechnoServe and One Acre Fund), cooperatives, global commodity traders, and 
local commercial businesses. These partner organizations offer services to smallholder farmers, 
such as loans and training. These services aim to facilitate greater profitability of farmers through, 
for example, increased agricultural productivity and efficiency. (Although service delivery can 
improve smallholder farmers’ incomes from their very low baseline, their incomes are often still 
below national median incomes even after engagement interventions.)195
The Farmfit Fund is designed to help assume the risk in smallholder financial transactions, making 
it easier for banks to loan to smallholder farmers. Because some service delivery models with 
high upfront costs are cost-efficient in the long-term,196 the funding strategies for Farmfit Fund 
projects can change over time. During pilots, for example, a service package may use grant 
support to provide concessional loans. After a pilot, a service package may still be considered 
high risk, but may obtain access to funds from a development finance institution. As projects 
mature, concessional loans can be phased out as projects become independent, using their own 
revenue to pay back loans and gain access to commercial banks.197 For their part, farmers or 
farmer organizations often have to pay back loans or pay service fees to access service delivery 
models: the loans are sometimes paid directly through crop yields.198 If a service delivery model 
is financially sustainable, there should be net profitability in the long term for farmers, service 
providers, and investors.199  
Box 5: World Coffee Research
World Coffee Research (WCR) specializes in the study of coffee plant genetics and 
varietals. Its agricultural research aims to support advanced agricultural science for 
producers around the world,200 and to ensure a robust future supply of coffee despite 
climate, disease, and quality challenges. In doing so, its work can help to support producer 
resiliency as well as greater origin diversity of coffee through scientific analysis that will 
enhance production choices. Such a WCR study is currently underway in 23 countries, 
measuring how local and new varietals interact with different environments and growing 
conditions. While this work is less necessary in countries with robust agronomic research 
focused on coffee, it may be critical for supplementing research and knowledge in other 
countries. 
WCR is funded primarily by coffee companies,201 some of which contribute on a per 
pound basis for every pound of green coffee purchased. Through this precompetitive 
collective effort, WCR is able to support the development of public goods that are critical 
to supporting farmer wellbeing around the world, as well as the future health of the 
coffee industry.
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Beyond these collective efforts, various
certification schemes, such as Fairtrade and 
Rainforest Alliance/UTZ, have also been used 
to advance sustainable practices in (parts
of) the supply chains of multiple companies.
Although research has shown mixed impacts
of these schemes on different measures of
sustainability,170 some certification schemes 
have offered important benefits to participating 
producers and have shifted the conversation
about what practices are acceptable in
agricultural production. One broad challenge
stymieing the ability of these schemes to have 
broader impact is simply that companies have 
not purchased enough of the coffee produced 
under such standards (see Table 4),171 which
they argue is due to low consumer demand.
(Of course, nothing would stop a company
from committing to source only third-party
certified coffee.) Because of the relatively low 
purchase levels of certified coffee, producers 
who absorb significant costs to comply with the 
standards thus may struggle to recoup those
costs when they are unable to find a market for 
their certified coffee. Another worrying trend is 
the potential dilution of certification standards 
through, essentially, a race to the bottom,
particularly as the entry of the 4C standard has 
threatened to simply lower the bar for what can 
be certified as sustainable, rather than serve as a 
stepping stone towards better and more stringent 
standards.172 
Roasters and retailers have also undertaken more 
individualized efforts to integrate sustainability
measures within their own supply chains. While some 
have chosen to primarily rely on external certification 
schemes, others have instead developed internal 
standards and verification methods,173 such as the 
Starbucks C.A.F.E program and Nespresso’s AAA
Sustainable Quality Program. Individual efforts by 
companies have also included support for specific 
projects relevant to their supply chains; these are 
sometimes undertaken in partnership with non-
profit organizations, and often seek to leverage 
donor funding as well.174 At times, these individual 
company efforts, while targeted towards improving 
sustainability within their own supply chains, are
not limited exclusively to them.175 
Traders have similarly taken steps towards
integrating sustainability in certain ways. While
their purchase and sale of certified coffee seems to 
be driven primarily by client (e.g., roaster/retailer) 
demand, most major traders have programs at
origin to support producers through trainings and 
technical assistance. Some also seek to support
communities in coffee-growing regions more
Table 4: Percentage of Production Sold under a Sustainable Label
Certification	Program Production (tons) Sales (tons) % sold under standard 
Fairtrade 430,000 128,000 30 %
Organic 248,767 133,163 54 %
Rainforest Alliance 265,565 129,846 49 %
UTZ Certified 715,648 188,096 26 %
AC Association 1,782,052 152,708 9 %
AAA 247,114202
CAFÉ Practices 457,339 222,550 49%
Total adjusted for multi-
ple certifications 3,300,000 840,000 25 %
Source: BASIC based on IISD (2014) data203
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generally through community development
projects.176 
Although each company has a different approach, 
these individual sustainability efforts by midstream 
and downstream actors are not uncommon.
While the extent to which companies embrace 
sustainability varies considerably, awareness of 
the need to address sustainability issues, and 
basic attempts to do so, appear widespread. A 
2018 review of ten large roasters and 5 traders, 
for example, found that all but one (KraftHeinz) 
offered publicly available information about their 
sustainability policies and practices.177 
Within coffee-producing countries, efforts by
governments, research institutes, producer
associations, innovative companies and
entrepreneurs, and producers themselves have 
focused on achieving greater sustainability within 
coffee production. These efforts, which are also 
far too numerous to list here, provide some of 
the best approaches to achieving sustainability, 
as they are grounded in local contexts and
sustainability needs. One example, from Kenya, 
is Vava Coffee Ltd., a social enterprise that
sources from and works to empower smallholder 
producers, helping them to earn more through 
improved quality and increased market access 
to buyers who pay premium prices.178 Other
examples, from Colombia, are the work of
Cenicafé, which undertakes critical research that 
has led to innovations such as ECOMILL (which 
allows coffee to be washed using significantly 
less water and energy),179 and the National
Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia (FNC), 
which provides a range of sustainability-oriented 
services for producers, from support for tree
renovation to support in exporting coffee directly 
(see Section IV(B), below). Excellent examples 
can be found around the world; one challenge 
that many national- and local-level efforts face, 
however, is in surmounting the constraints of 
business-as-usual global value chains and low-
price environments.
Taken together, these collective and individual 
efforts by a range of stakeholders to integrate 
sustainability within supply chains and to support 
broader sustainability within the coffee sector 
provide hope that the coffee sector will choose 
the path of sustainable development. These 
sustainability efforts also demonstrate that
roasters, retailers, traders, and other private 
sector actors are cognizant of the needs and 
challenges, are willing to take steps to advance 
sustainability of the coffee they source, and are 
increasingly working together to address the 
sustainability challenges that affect the sector 
more broadly.
However, the collective and individual efforts 
undertaken to date are also not enough. This 
is apparent from an impact perspective, when 
viewed against the current sustainability crisis 
confronting coffee. It is clear from conversations 
with various industry actors, who acknowledge 
much more is needed to scale up sustainability. 
And it is obvious when viewed in monetary 
terms, as the amount of money dedicated to 
sustainability is essentially negligible as a fraction 
of overall value: less than 0.2% of the annual value 
of the industry, with about half of that occurring 
as premiums for certified products.180
In addition, these sustainability efforts risk being 
undermined by business practices and sourcing 
practices of roasters and retailers that result, 
ultimately, in even greater pressure on producers. 
For example, a move away from external 
certification standards to internal sustainability 
ones may allow a company to continue purchasing 
the same coffee from the same producers at a 
drastically reduced price181—clearly suboptimal 
from a producer perspective. Pressure to reduce 
the costs of sourcing green coffee similarly 
can result in efforts to renegotiate prices with 
long-term producer partners.182 Even business 
practices unrelated directly to sourcing, such 
as the finance terms requested by roasters of 
traders, may ultimately create additional pressure 
on producers.183  
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT | 65
ENSURING ECONOMIC VIABILITY & SUSTAINABILITY OF COFFEE PRODUCTON  A REPORT
Box 6: Pricing and Transparency
Even when producers are selling high-quality coffee and/or coffee 
produced under certification standards, various business practices, such 
as the ones mentioned above, can exert downward force on the prices 
they receive. Two other factors—a lack of transparency, and a reliance on 
the C-Price as the starting reference point for many negotiations—can also 
dampen prices for specialty producers, for whom the C-Price should be 
less relevant. 
For this reason, disclosing reliable and transparent information on the price 
paid for specialty coffee both at the farmgate and on an FOB basis could 
support farmers’ and cooperatives’ bargaining power, giving them an 
alternative reference point when negotiating on price. One useful initiative 
in this regard is the Specialty Coffee Transaction Guide,204 which provides 
detailed recent transactional data on specialty coffee purchases. This 
Guide aims to equip producers and buyers with specialty-grade specific 
reference points for negotiations, empowering them to move away from 
commodity prices as a starting point. While one potential challenge for 
the Guide is that specialty buyers who otherwise would pay higher than 
average prices might use the data to instead justify paying closer to the 
average, the Guide nevertheless presents a useful tool for helping the 
specialty coffee community move away from using the C-Price as a price 
discovery mechanism. 
Although the Specialty Coffee Transaction Guide is not relevant for 
producers of commodity coffee, greater transparency around costs of 
production and value captured throughout supply chains could similarly 
help commodity coffee producers to negotiate on price. During the 
current low-price crisis, many coffee producers have sold coffee at prices 
that do not allow them to recoup their costs of production. While many 
coffee brands are generally aware of this, the lack of data on costs of 
production arguably helps to perpetuate this situation. Disclosure of data 
on costs of production and value captured could help to articulate new 
price discovery mechanisms—such as a commitment to pay prices that 
cover costs of production.205 Producers or traders can potentially use 
information on costs of production in their negotiations with potential 
buyers, to ensure that prices do not go below costs of production.206 
Other initiatives promoting greater transparency and corresponding 
consumer awareness could also help stimulate support for higher prices to 
producers. For example, the World Coffee Producers Forum has proposed 
an economic sustainability seal,207 while Le Basic has proposed that coffee 
product packaging include explanations of how payments were divided 
among producers, intermediaries, and downstream actors.208   
This sustainability gap, between 
what is needed and what has 
been done to date to advance 
sustainability, existed before 
the most recent price crisis. 
So too has the tension that 
occasionally exists between 
sustainability investments and 
general business practices. 
Yet the price crisis has 
illuminated just how far the 
sector has to go, and how 
inadequate current efforts are 
to achieve sustainability in 
the face of market forces and 
climate change. Much more 
is needed, and soon, to build 
on what has worked, to scale 
up efforts across the sector, 
and to facilitate new efforts 
to fill coffee’s sustainability 
gap. Below, we present 
recommendations for doing so. 
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Coffee’s sustainability crisis has thrown into stark 
relief one indisputable fact: the current structure 
of the coffee industry is not working well for most 
producers. While market power has consolidated 
amongst roasters and retailers, who are flourishing 
closer to the consumer end of the value chain, 
producers in many countries are struggling. As our 
model shows, all producers are vulnerable to climate 
change. Nearly all are price-takers. And because of 
this, in low price contexts, many cannot cover their 
costs of production, let alone earn a decent living. 
There are multiple points along the coffee value 
chain where value is created and extracted, through 
actions by and payments to specific actors. These 
points offer opportunities to consider how producers 
can capture more of the final retail price of coffee, 
as well as to identify mechanisms for increasing 
the investments necessary to make coffee truly 
sustainable.
In consideration of these opportunities, as well as of 
the challenges facing the coffee sector today and in 
the future, we make two broad recommendations. 
First, we suggest that each coffee-producing country 
develop a National Coffee Sustainability Plan, the 
implementation of which would be financed in part 
by an ambitious but feasible initiative to achieve 
a sustainable coffee sector: a Global Coffee Fund 
(GCF). The GCF, in turn, would facilitate a broader 
public-private partnership to invest in sustainability 
throughout coffee production and in coffee regions, 
including by equipping producers to be more 
profitable and resilient. Second, we recommend 
that producing countries as a group seriously 
examine two options for capturing more of the 
retail price of coffee: requiring a minimum quality-
adjusted price (discussed above in Section II(a)), 
and supporting producers to harness the potential 
of new technologies (e-commerce and targeted 
mobile applications) to change their business models 
towards greater participation in sales to consumers. 
Although both of these latter options have been tried 
and have partly or largely failed in the past, we believe 
that the current market dynamics, along with new 
opportunities offered by e-commerce, might make 
such options possible at this point. We turn first to the 
national plans and the Global Coffee Fund.
A. National Coffee Sustainability
Plans and the Global Coffee Fund
1. National Coffee Sustainability Plans
Given the realities of the global coffee market and 
the climate crisis, producing countries need national 
sustainability strategies to support their producers 
and their coffee lands. In the absence of clear plans 
and corresponding actions, the global coffee market 
and climate change will remain brutally unforgiving for 
producers. 
While the general challenges are universal, the context-
specific challenges and opportunities confronting 
producers and producing countries are distinct.  In 
some places and for some producers, coffee may never 
be more than a poverty crop, unless concerted efforts 
are undertaken to support producers, improve their 
enabling environment, and otherwise address existing 
challenges. Even still, those steps will not be enough for 
marginal producers with extremely small landholdings, 
or for producers located in areas where climate change 
will be unforgiving. In other places and for other 
producers, coffee production offers a more viable future, 
yet producers will remain at the mercy of global market 
forces and climate change, unless concerted efforts are 
taken to limit and buffer the impacts of those factors.  
Photo by Nathan Dumlao on Unsplash
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We suggest that each coffee-producing country 
develop a National Coffee Sustainability Plan (NCSP), 
that accounts for differentiated needs, challenges, and 
opportunities within the country. NCSPs could serve as 
a tool for coffee-producing countries, their producers, 
and other relevant stakeholders to assess clearly, plan 
effectively, and act strategically. NCSPs would offer a 
mechanism for taking stock of: (1) current and likely 
future prospects for producers (differentiated by size, 
region, and other relevant factors) regarding coffee 
production and sales, particularly in light of expected 
climate change impacts, and (2) SDG track record 
and sustainability gaps within coffee production 
and coffee-growing regions.209 Based on these 
assessments, an NCSP would provide a platform for 
envisioning the coffee future that producers and other 
relevant stakeholders in the country want and can 
realistically achieve, and for determining the steps 
needed to get there. Colombia, as one example, has 
already begun to develop such a plan, based on sub-
regional assessments and aligned with the SDGs.210 At 
their core, NCSPs would offer clear strategic plans for 
supporting producers, promoting sustainable coffee 
production, and aligning producing regions with the 
SDGs. 
While the SDGs provide a relevant framework for 
coffee-producing regions and the coffee sector 
generally, each coffee-producing country is starting 
from a distinct position, with its own needs and 
opportunities. Local design and ownership of 
NCSPs means that relevant stakeholders within each 
country—including producers and their associations, 
policymakers, private sector actors, civil society and 
research institutions, and others—should determine 
the appropriate priority activities and approaches 
necessary for investing in coffee sustainability within 
the country. The design of NCSPs should thus be done 
through multi-stakeholder, participatory, inclusive, 
and transparent processes.
There will not be a one-size-fits-all approach. Our 
research suggests, however, that each NCSP should 
include a focus on some or all of the following 
collective goods (some of which are interrelated) that 
could help fill short-term and long-term needs: 
• Developing and implementing 
comprehensive climate change adaptation 
strategies, to help achieve SDG 13 (climate 
action and resilience). Depending on the likely 
climate impacts in specific areas, adaptation 
may need to be incremental, systemic, and/
or fully transformative.211  Under any of those 
approaches, producers may need financial 
or technical support for implementation. 
Climate change adaptation strategies should 
also include the participatory creation and 
subsequent dissemination of affordable 
insurance	options	to	reduce	climate-related	
risks for producers (see Box 9). For some 
countries, it may also include the development 
of a disaster relief fund to help smallholder 
farmers recover from the shocks of climate-
induced extreme events. 
• Ensuring	 on-farm	 financing	 options	 at	
attractive rates for producers, including 
for women, who could use the financing to 
invest in productivity-enhancing activities 
(such as mechanization, irrigation, inputs) and 
to adopt climate-smart practices. This would 
help to achieve SDG 1 (ending poverty), SDG 
2 (sustainable agricultural practices), SDG 5 
(gender equality), SDG 13 (climate action and 
resilience), and SDG 15 (life on land). In many 
coffee-producing countries, producers do not 
have sufficient access to affordable credit or 
to financial products that are adjusted to the 
coffee crop. This can affect producers’ ability 
to invest, to weather difficult circumstances, or 
to make otherwise rational selling decisions. 
In these countries, concerted efforts may 
be necessary to bridge this gap, including 
through subsidization that helps to lower the 
risk of such products for financial actors. Any 
significant expansion in credit opportunities, 
however, should be accompanied by borrower 
education and other safeguards to reduce the 
likelihood of producers becoming trapped in 
cycles of indebtedness. 
• Strengthening	 on-farm	 support	 to	 viable	
small-	 and	 medium-scale	 producers	 with	
a	 focus	 on	 increasing	 their	 profitability, 
whether	 through	 increasing	 efficiency,	
increasing productivity, and/or increasing 
quality.  This includes but is not limited 
to mechanisms such as funding and 
disseminating agronomic science and 
improved cultivars, expanding extension 
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services as needed, supporting access to 
affordable and optimized inputs, and/or 
improving irrigation. It may also include 
other types of support, such as ways to track 
costs of production so that producers can 
better factor them into decision-making.212 
All of these various mechanisms should 
include support for women, and should also 
be designed to improve climate resiliency. 
In some places, they may require a careful 
balancing act to ensure that efforts to 
increase productivity are not grounded in 
environmentally unsustainable practices.213 
In developing the NCSP, stakeholders 
should also think critically both about 
what is possible within the current bounds 
of productivity, as well as what might be 
possible in terms of increased productivity 
and efficiency. These approaches would help 
to achieve SDG 1 (ending poverty), SDG 2 
(sustainable agricultural production), SDG 5 
(gender equality), SDG 9 (innovation), SDG 
13 (climate action and resilience), and SDG 
15 (life on land). 
• Implementing other improvements to 
the enabling environment for farmers. 
This has several dimensions: a legal and 
policy dimension (including commitments 
to formalize and protect land rights of 
small-scale producers), a physical dimension 
(e.g., improving or increasing physical 
infrastructure such as roads and storage 
facilities), and an information dimension 
(e.g., increased market information). This 
could also help to achieve SDG 1 (ending 
poverty), SDG 2 (sustainable agricultural 
production), SDG 5 (gender equality), SDG 
9 (infrastructure) and SDG 15 (life on land).
• Supporting producers’ market 
opportunities, both internationally and 
domestically. On the international front, 
producers could be supported in their efforts 
to market more directly to smaller buyers or 
consumers (see Section IV(B), below); this 
may include more institutional support in 
developing a destination marketplace for 
that country’s coffee, as well as institutional 
support to producers in navigating import 
requirements, in accessing low-cost shipping, 
and in dealing with the other administrative 
and logistical challenges that may arise. On 
the domestic front, policies that encourage 
more domestic consumption of coffee can 
help to shield producers from disadvantageous 
exchange rates and can provide an avenue for 
coffee that is harder to export. This support 
could help to achieve SDG 1 (ending poverty).
• Providing income support to the poorest 
farmers during periods of sustained low 
prices, to help achieve SDG 1 (ending poverty), 
SDG 2 (zero hunger), and SDG 8 (decent work, 
including no child labor). This would essentially 
be akin to a second payment for farmers, beyond 
what they originally received for their coffee, in 
recognition that the market is currently failing 
to internalize the full value of coffee and that 
the poorest farmers need some form of social 
protection. Income support is discussed further 
in Box 7.
• Improving access to basic services, including 
healthcare, quality education, safe water and 
sanitation, electricity, and justice, to achieve 
SDG 3 (good health and well-being), SDG 4 
(quality education), SDG 6 (clean water and 
sanitation), SDG 7 (clean energy), and SDG 16 
(peace, justice, and strong institutions). 
• Strengthening government capacity in rural 
areas to monitor farmworker conditions and 
enforce compliance with labor laws, including 
payment of the minimum wage and avoidance of 
child labor, as well as strengthening government, 
civil society, and community capacity to monitor 
deforestation and other environmental harms. 
This could help to achieve SDG 8 (decent work), 
SDG 13 (climate action), SDG 15 (life on land). 
The activities to be undertaken through NCSPs should 
be designed and implemented using a gender-sensitive 
approach (SDG 5). Implementation of many of these 
activities, as well as related monitoring, could also be 
facilitated in many cases through the use of mobile 
applications, new technologies, and other innovations 
(SDG 9).
These collective goods require significant investment. 
Many of them are the co-responsibility of public and 
private sector actors, and many of them will not be 
fully possible without an intensive multi-stakeholder 
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partnership. Below, we describe how a Global Coffee 
Fund could make this investment, and thus coffee 
sustainability, a reality.   
2. A Global Coffee Fund Underpinned 
by	a	Multi-Stakeholder	Approach
A Global Coffee Fund (GCF), financed by the main 
coffee industry actors and used to leverage additional 
public sector funding, would enable stakeholders to 
implement activities under the NCSPs. Such a Fund 
would serve as the backbone to the intensive multi-
stakeholder efforts needed to make coffee production 
sustainable and to support coffee-growing regions to 
achieve the SDGs. 
The GCF would multiply, at a far greater scale, the 
public-private efforts that have been undertaken by 
specific companies within their own coffee supply 
chains, and would ensure the necessary financing for 
more robust and comprehensive sustainability efforts 
within coffee production and coffee-growing regions. 
In short, the GCF would be a key pre-competitive 
initiative of the coffee sector as a whole, in order to fill 
critical financing gaps for sustainability investments.
The GCF is not charity. Rather, it is an avenue for 
downstream and midstream actors such as roasters, 
retailers, and traders to fulfill their co-responsibility for 
achieving a sustainable coffee sector and to shoulder 
more of the risks that currently fall too heavily on 
producers alone. In doing so, the GCF provides a 
mechanism to leverage the financing needed for 
significant investments in sustainability. 
These sustainability investments would help to directly 
support the implementation of activities under the 
locally owned NCSPs. Funding from the GCF, along 
with complementary public funds and private-sector 
company investments in their own supply chains, 
would aim to fill the largest sustainability funding gaps 
in the global coffee sector, and to enable provision 
of the collective goods that can help producers to 
thrive in an era of increasing market consolidation and 
climate change. 
All low- and middle-income countries that grow and 
export coffee would be eligible to receive GCF funding 
and matching funds. To fill the largest sustainability 
gaps, significant funding would be prioritized for the 
poorest countries and poorest regions within middle-
income countries, as well as for the poorest actors 
within value chains: smallholders and farmworkers. 
The Global Coffee Fund embodies a multi-
stakeholder approach at three levels. First, the GCF 
catalyzes multi-stakeholder financing. As discussed 
below, the GCF would be a pre-competitive effort, 
with contributions from the main coffee industry 
actors, including roasters, retailers, and traders. 
That pre-competitive industry funding would be 
complemented by: 1) increased funding by bilateral 
and multilateral donors, 2) increased commitments 
in the national budgets of coffee-growing nations, 
and 3) commercial investments by the private 
sector within their own value chains. Second, the 
GCF would be governed at the global level by a 
multi-stakeholder Governing Board, potentially 
including, for example, representatives of the major 
global companies, national grower confederations, 
smallholder farmer representatives, and participating 
donor governments. Third, the GCF would co-fund the 
implementation of the National Coffee Sustainability 
Plans described above, which would be designed 
and submitted by multi-stakeholder Country Coffee 
Platforms (CCPs). Together, these various multi-
stakeholder collaborations would provide a public-
private partnership to achieve the SDGs and other 
sustainability goals, at scale, within the coffee sector.
3. Operations and Governance of the 
GCF
The operations and governance of the Global Coffee 
Fund would integrate multi-stakeholder oversight, 
local ownership of planning, and independent expert 
support. Governance mechanisms would be designed 
to guard against corruption and fraud. To minimize 
redundancy and the need to develop entirely new 
bureaucracies, the GCF could potentially be hosted 
by one or more existing multi-stakeholder initiatives 
focused on coffee sustainability.214
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Box	7: Income Support and Social Protection
Historically, efforts to support farmers confronting low prices have centered on input and output subsidies. By lowering the 
price of inputs, raising the price of outputs, and/or by serving as a guaranteed buyer, governments can increase the marginal 
returns of agricultural production. However, both subsidies/premiums and price floors tend to help larger farmers more than 
smaller farmers, given that benefits are proportionate to sales.269 In addition, price support systems have caused market 
distortions, reduced domestic consumption, and either encouraged oversupply—with a consequent lowering of the world 
price of the subsidized product—or required complicated supply management efforts.270 
Past coffee price support efforts at different levels have also failed to reach their objectives over the long-term. For example, 
at the multilateral level, producing and consuming nations signed the first International Coffee Agreement (ICA) in 1962 with 
the aim to stabilize the price of coffee above the price created by the free market through a quota system. The quota system 
ended in 1989, however, following political disagreements at all levels of the system (between consuming and producing 
nations, within producing nations, and within the supply chain in producing nations).271 
At the country level, multiple governments have established price stabilization funds as a mechanism to provide support for 
coffee farmers. While some of these funds pre-dated the ICA’s quota agreement system, others have been set up following its 
collapse. Stabilization funds are used to provide price support to dampen the effect of low prevailing coffee prices. In times 
of crisis, other countries have instead established a loan platform with favorable terms for farmers. Stabilization funds and 
loan platforms are established either through direct Government funding or through the issue of coffee bonds. Both types 
of mechanisms have relied on farmers to replenish the funds when prices are high through a levy per unit of production. But 
stabilization funds and loan platforms have often been designed in a way that do not replenish the funds. This has resulted 
in the funds having to borrow from the Government or issue additional bonds, which has increased the debt of farmers. Both 
mechanisms have also been criticized for doing little for the poorest farmers who can afford neither a tax nor a credit.272
While price support systems in coffee have run into significant challenges, there may be potential for renewed efforts to 
develop a minimum price for coffee, as noted in Section II(a), above, that would not require supply management. However, 
such a minimum price would need to remain relatively low. 
More generally, income support systems in the agriculture sector have fared better. They are now the preferred mechanism 
adopted by jurisdictions such as the European Union, the United States, and India.  
Because income support avoids some of the challenges tied to price support, we suggest that the Global Coffee Fund, as well 
as the matching public funds, could be used in part to provide income transfers to the poorest coffee farmers, particularly during 
sustained periods of low global prices. These transfers would essentially serve the function of a supplemental payment for the 
coffee that farmers have sold, in recognition that the market is failing to internalize the full value of coffee. Various mechanisms 
could be considered for implementing this. Non-profit entities that have developed methodologies for identifying farmers 
(such as Enveritas) and for implementing cash transfer programs (such as Give Directly) could be mobilized to help develop 
national rosters of coffee farms and to support income transfers to those operating the farms. Alternatively, coffee income 
support payments could potentially be integrated into existing social benefits programs273 with the support of international 
donor agencies.274 The banking275 and mobile phone sectors276 could play an important role in facilitating the transfers. 
One of the most critical aspects of designing country-specific income support programs for coffee farmers, to be funded 
in all or in part by the GCF and matching public funds, would be in setting parameters for the recipients. In setting these 
parameters, stakeholders would want to take into account the cost of targeting, in order to develop a cost effective approach 
that facilitates support to the poorest farmers. 
In Table 6, below, we provide an estimate of the income support that would have been needed to raise most smallholder 
coffee farmers above the poverty line of 1.90 international dollar/day under 2017 prices and costs.277 
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The GCF would be governed by a multi-stakeholder	
Governing Board. The Board could be comprised 
of representatives of major global coffee companies 
contributing to the Fund, national grower 
confederations, smallholder farmer representatives, 
farmworker unions, and other relevant stakeholders. 
Donors and producing country governments that 
contribute significant matching funds could potentially 
serve as non-voting members. Participation on 
the board could occur through a rotating system, 
to enable geographic diversity and to ensure that 
each stakeholder has sufficient representation, while 
maintaining a manageable size. 
The GCF’s Governing Board would have multiple 
functions, some of which would change as the Fund 
moves from concept to implementation. At the 
beginning, the Governing Board could help support 
the initial design and function of the Fund. This could 
include, for example, determining the length of the 
funding cycle—which could respond to business 
cycles, coffee planting cycles, and/or matching 
donor cycles215—and deciding how funding might 
be prioritized and allocated across countries. After 
the Fund were established, the Board’s roles could 
include making final funding decisions, and providing 
oversight of the Fund and its management.
The GCF would co-finance—along with public 
funding and, potentially, private sector competitive 
investments—the implementation of the National 
Coffee Sustainability Plans, discussed above. These 
NCSPs should be designed in a transparent and 
participatory way that allows input from a range of 
relevant stakeholders. We suggest that they could 
be prepared and submitted by Country Coffee 
Platforms (CCPs) in each coffee-producing country.  
The CCPs would include representatives of groups 
relevant to the coffee sector and coffee regions within 
the country, such as producer associations, farmer 
cooperatives, governmental line ministries, private 
sector actors, civil society organizations, and research 
institutions. Where possible and desirable, the CCPs 
could build on existing National Coffee Platforms that 
have been facilitated by the Global Coffee Platform 
(GCP). Alternatively, or in producing countries without 
pre-existing platforms, stakeholders might integrate 
lessons learned from the GCP’s country platforms into 
the design of the CCP. In short, where possible, the 
CCPs could build on successful existing initiatives 
that have in-country support, rather than setting up a 
separate entity.
On the basis of the NCSP, the CCPs would develop and 
submit a funding request to the GCF, setting out how 
the country’s implementation partners would use the 
allocated funds if approved by the GCF. The request 
would also identify other proposed funding sources 
and implementation partners to support specific 
activities under the NCSP. Aside from the GCF, this 
would include national budgets, external donors, and 
private sector investments in their respective supply 
chains. 
Upon receipt of a proposal for funding, the NCSP 
could be reviewed by an Independent Review Panel 
(IRP). The IRP should be composed of individuals 
with expertise on the SDGs, the coffee sector, and 
relevant country contexts, and drawn from a range of 
relevant disciplines such as agronomists, economists, 
engineers, and climate scientists. The IRP would make 
recommendations (fund, deny, or revise and resubmit), 
while the GCF multi-stakeholder Governing Board 
would take all final funding decisions. 
The IRP’s recommendations would take into 
consideration the transparent formula or set of 
parameters developed by the GCF Governing 
Board,	 in	 partnership	 with	 the	 IRP,	 for	 decision-
making around funding allocations to individual 
countries. Such formula might include a range of 
factors, such as national or regional income, the 
SDG gap for the priority activities mentioned above, 
the state of the enabling environment for coffee 
production and the potential to improve it, and the 
quality of the national institutional process put in 
place to implement funding received from the GCF. 
The formula might also include an assessment of 
the potential for various proposed activities to be 
funded by matching public contributions or private 
sector competitive investments. At the outset, the IRP 
and GCF Governing Board might also use a partial 
“first come, first served” approach, whereby some 
priority is given to proposals based on when they are 
received, while still ensuring that decisions are taken 
72 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
SECTION IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
under the guidance of these other factors. 
An independent evaluation unit for the GCF 
could monitor and evaluate programs throughout 
grant implementation using progress updates and 
country visits. The results of evaluations would 
be made publicly available. Moreover, financial 
activities would be monitored and verified through 
audits, which would also be disclosed publicly. This 
evaluation unit would also be in charge of providing 
necessary training in financial management to 
the relevant CCPs or implementing agencies, as 
needed. Experiences in this regard can be learned 
from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria, which has deployed a set of tools to 
enable country programs to “control and mitigate 
operational fiduciary and financial risks related 
to grant implementation,”216 including through 
disseminating guidelines, a handbook, and a list 
of pre-qualified service providers that can support 
country platforms with technical assistance in 
financial management.217 
Many of these operational and governance 
suggestions are modeled on those used for the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria. The sustainability challenges facing the coffee 
sector are, of course, very different from the global 
health context that predicated the creation of the Global 
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Clearly, 
that Fund should not be viewed as an exact blueprint 
for any effort undertaken in the coffee sector. At the 
same time, however, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria proved that large amounts of 
multi-stakeholder funding can be channeled to address 
complex challenges relevant to both the private and 
public sectors. It also has demonstrated the value of 
developing national plans through multi-stakeholder 
mechanisms, using an independent panel of experts 
to review national proposals, and having approvals go 
through a governing board. In light of its successes, we 
suggest that it is appropriate to take inspiration, if not 
an exact blueprint, from such a Fund.
At the end of each funding cycle, the GCF could be 
responsible for producing an SDG report of the coffee 
sector on the basis of all the NCSPs and progress 
realized under their implementation. This report could 
include reporting on SDG indicators, targets, and key 
coffee metrics (including, for example, the breakdown 
of costs of production, the number of farmers and 
workers working on coffee within the country and 
Figure 42: Overview of the Global Coffee Fund Organizational Structure278
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benefiting from programming supported by the 
GCF and by matching funds, etc.). The report could 
also document relevant stakeholders’ funding efforts 
and contributions. Such an undertaking would fill an 
important gap, as sustainability in the coffee sector 
cannot happen without good data, traceability, and 
transparency.
4. Scale of Effort and Financing of the 
GCF
As outlined above, the GCF would support coffee-
producing regions in achieving the Sustainable 
Development Goals and to make a significant 
difference in integrating sustainability within the 
coffee sector and in coffee-growing regions. While a 
more detailed analysis of the costs required to help 
achieve the SDGs in coffee-producing regions and 
along the coffee value chain would be needed, the 
below estimates from existing studies can help give a 
sense of the scale.
Several efforts of late have sought to estimate how 
much it would cost to achieve the SDGs. For example, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has recently 
estimated the costs associated with the achievement 
of SDGs 3 (health), 4 (education), 6 (water/sanitation), 
7 (electricity) and 9 (quality of infrastructure) at the 
global scale and in five country case studies.218 Among 
the five country assessments are Guatemala and 
Rwanda, which are coffee producers. For Guatemala, 
the IMF estimates an annual cost of US$6.8bn and 
for Rwanda US$1.8bn. The figures below show how 
these two countries perform across the five SDGs and 
how the costs are divided by sectors.
Figure 43: SDG Performance and Funding Requirement for Guatemala
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The above figures do not isolate the coffee-
producing regions. To do so, we can use the latest 
per-capita cost and financing gap estimates from the 
SDSN SDG Financing Team, which is working with 
the IMF, World Bank, OECD and other multilateral 
institutions to develop more refined cost estimates 
for the achieving the SDGs in low and lower-middle 
income countries.219 The methodology builds on 
the Move Humanity (2018)220 report, and includes 
cost estimates for health, education, infrastructure, 
biodiversity conservation, agriculture, social 
protection, access to justice, humanitarian aid 
and SDG data collection and monitoring efforts. 
After estimating the per capita costs for low and 
lower-middle countries, the existing outlays by 
governments and donors are subtracted to get to 
the financing gap estimate. Using the smallholder 
farmer estimates by Enveritas221 for the low-income 
countries (Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, 
Tanzania, Uganda) and lower-middle income 
countries (Honduras, Laos, Nicaragua, Papua New 
Guinea and Vietnam) and assuming that each 
coffee producer has four dependents, we come to 
an annual financing gap estimate of $9bn for these 
countries. 
Another useful calculation to provide an indication of 
the required scale of the GCF is provided in Table 6. 
It estimates across major coffee-producing countries 
the social protection payments that would have been 
needed in 2017 to help smallholder coffee producers 
receive an income above the extreme poverty line 
of 1.90 international dollars per day. In a low-price 
environment like the one observed in recent years, the 
GCF could play an important role in keeping smallholder 
coffee farmers above the extreme poverty line, while 
also supporting them to understand their long-term 
viability and future prospects. Decisions to be made 
for each country include what eligibility parameters to 
use, as well as the amount of supplemental income that 
might be offered. This amount would presumably differ 
across countries, and should be set at the infra-marginal 
level: it should be, on the one hand, low enough to 
avoid encouraging non-viable farmers from remaining 
in coffee production long-term or additional farmers 
from joining the coffee sector, while, on the other hand, 
high enough to ensure that, in the short term, farmers 
avoid extreme poverty. The assessment of this amount 
would also take into account whether a minimum price 
(as discussed in Section II(a)) is implemented.
Figure 44: SDG Performance and Funding Requirement for Rwanda
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The estimates suggest that the amount of money 
needed to make considerable progress on achieving 
the SDGs in coffee-growing regions, through 
the activities discussed above, is in the region of 
US$10bn per year. As discussed further below, the 
precompetitive contribution by industry would not be 
expected to cover purely public goods and services 
that are primarily the remit of government (e.g., health 
and education), which could instead be covered by 
the leveraged public funds. We provisionally suggest 
a goal of raising $2.5bn per year through pre-
competitive private sector contributions to the GCF. 
Using the 2018 global export number of 7.3bn kg of 
green coffee,222 this would amount to 34 cents per 
pound of green coffee contributed to the GCF, which 
is in the range of 0.25 - 0.50 cents per cup.223 In other 
words, the targeted level of funding would require 
no more than half a penny per cup sold. 
These dedicated pre-competitive contributions by 
coffee industry actors should be a strong signal to the 
public sector to also do more. We thus suggest that 
this amount of $2.5 billion be matched by bilateral 
and multilateral donors for work in coffee-growing 
regions, and that it also be matched by national 
budget outlays of producing-country governments on 
programs that support SDG achievement in coffee-
growing regions. This matching annual funding would 
create an additional $5 billion to put towards things 
like improved access to basic services in coffee-
growing regions, and strengthened efforts to support 
farmers and workers. 
We also expect that additional competitive 
investments by the private sector that support 
sustainability within specific value chains could also 
rise to roughly equal levels. These investments 
would largely be expenditures by roasters, retailers, 
and traders that support the farmers within their 
value chains. Competitive investments could also 
include changes in business practices that would 
result in companies sharing more of the risks typically 
shouldered by farmers (through, e.g., long-term 
fixed price contracts, a willingness to purchase lower-
quality coffee when quality was affected by climate 
variables, etc.). 
Table	6:	Estimation	of	the	Transfer	Needed	in	2017	to	Raise	Smallholders	Above	the	
Poverty Line (in Millions)279 280
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Taken together, this would result in a 25% allocation 
of the overall funding goal for each main source 
of funds: the GCF, donors, producing-country 
governments, and competitive private sector 
investments. Such an approach would embody 
a public-private partnership grounded in equally 
shared responsibility between the public and the 
private sectors. 
While these private sector and public sector funds 
would be roughly equal at the global level, money 
from the GCF would not have to be distributed in 
equal proportions for each participating country. 
Indeed, it would be appropriate for the GCF 
to allocate different amounts of money to each 
country, as well as to fund different percentages 
of the full amount required for implementation of 
National Coffee Sustainability Plans (which will also 
be funded by public funds and, potentially, private 
sector competitive investments). Doing so would 
enable the GCF to support all coffee-producing 
countries, while also taking into consideration the 
country-specific needs and funding opportunities 
that each country has (e.g., government budgets, 
private sector competitive investments), as well 
as prioritizing the SDG gaps in the poorest places 
and for the poorest producers and workers. For 
example, the GCF might decide to contribute 
10% of an NCSP’s implementing costs in a country 
with large national budgets for basic services and 
significant private sector sustainability investments 
in coffee supply chains, and where a strong enabling 
environment for farmers already exists. Yet the 
GCF might determine that covering 30%, or even 
50%, of an NCSP would be prudent in a country 
with significantly higher SDG gaps and significantly 
fewer opportunities to leverage additional support 
from government budget lines and private sector 
competitive investments.  
In addition, these different funding sources would 
not necessarily be allocated to the same types of 
activities under an NCSP. The GCF would finance 
pre-competitive efforts focused in particular on 
supporting sustainable coffee production and 
ensuring farmer sustainability. This would include 
prioritizing support for activities that advanced social 
protection for the poorest farmers, widespread 
climate resilience, and public goods that result in 
improved productivity and profitability for farmers, such 
as opportunities outside of supply chains to access 
credit, inputs, and agronomic support. By contrast, 
the competitive private sector contributions would be 
commercially oriented, applicable to each company’s 
own value chain, and aiming at goals such as improving 
the productivity, efficiency, and climate resiliency 
of farmers within their specific value chains. Public 
matching funds would include domestic budget outlays 
supported by bilateral and multilateral donors, and 
would target national development prerogatives, such 
as improved access to healthcare, quality education, 
clean water and sanitation, electrification, justice, and 
social protection.
The relative financing priorities among these actors 
might thus look as outlined in the adjacent Table 7. 
Investments in some of these activities could potentially 
be implemented using a “blended finance” approach. 
Similar to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria, the GCF could allocate a small portion of 
the Fund—potentially matched by donor funds—to be 
used as “blended finance” for catalytic investments. 
Traditionally, blended finance is a way to use initial donor 
funding to mobilize private sector finance, by helping 
to mitigate investment risks or otherwise make more 
viable investments that hold development potential.224 
The dedicated catalytic funding portion of the GCF, 
along with matching donor funds, could play this role, 
for example, by providing a risk-sharing mechanism, 
such as a first-loss guarantee. An example of this 
approach is discussed in Box 4, above, which describes 
the goals and model of the Farmfit Fund. Additional 
relevant examples of blended finance initiatives that 
aim to support smallholder farmers in coffee regions 
are highlighted in Box 8, below. Catalytic funding 
could be used for several of the main activities that the 
GCF might prioritize. Classic examples would include 
catalytic funding to increase farmers’ access to credit 
and to increase farmers’ access to affordable insurance 
options that mitigate climate risks (see Box 9). 
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Table	7:	Relative	Financing	Priorities	in	the	Coffee	Supply	Chain
SDG Category Global Coffee Fund
Private 
Sector 
Domestic 
Budget 
Outlays
Donor 
Agencies (bi-	 	
and multi-)	
Social Protection ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Sustainable 
Farming (including 
on-farm support 
and improvements 
to the enabling 
environment)  
✔ ✔
Healthcare ✔ ✔
Education ✔ ✔
Gender ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Water and 
Sanitation
✔ ✔
Electrification ✔ ✔
Decent Work and 
No Child Labor
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Coffee Innovation ✔ ✔
Supporting Market 
Opportunities 
and Innovative 
Business Models
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Responsible 
Consumption and 
Production
✔
Climate Resilience 
and Adaptation
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Sustainable Land 
Use
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Access to Justice ✔ ✔
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Box	8:	Blended	Finance	Projects	 in	Coffee-
Growing Regions of Nicaragua and Ethiopia
In Nicaragua, a partnership between the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), the 
Global Agriculture and Food Security Program 
(GAFSP), Atlantic (a subsidiary of the coffee 
trader, Ecom), Starbucks, and the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), focuses on providing 
long-term loans to help 500 farmers replant and 
renovate their farms following the devastating 
effects of the coffee leaf rust disease. GAFSP 
will provide a 25% first-loss guarantee for a 
$30 million loan program in which Atlantic and 
Starbucks invest $3 million each.225
In Ethiopia, a partnership between the IFC, 
GAFSP, Nib Bank (an Ethiopian Bank), and 
TechnoServe provides a risk-sharing facility 
of $15.2 million to expand financing to 
cooperatives. The financing will enable the 
cooperatives to source coffee cherries from 
farmers for wet milling, thereby adding value.226
The scale of contributions suggested for the GCF 
is much higher than the current sustainability 
spend within the coffee industry, yet it is entirely 
Figure 45: Main Coffee Roasters and Coffee Traders 
by Market Share in Volume
reasonable as a fraction of the overall value of the 
industry, particularly given the significant benefits that 
would accrue to coffee industry actors if a sustainable 
coffee future were realized. As the GCF would provide 
significant benefits for the coffee industry overall, and 
for the largest operators within it, we suggest that the 
largest roasters, retailers, and traders should be both 
the forerunners in contributing to the fund, as well 
as the entities that contribute the most. These actors 
have outsized impacts on the industry, should have 
particularly strong interests in a sustainable coffee future, 
and proportionally have the largest responsibilities for 
ensuring the long-term sustainability of coffee value 
chains. Figure 45, below, shows the largest roasters and 
traders in the industry as of 2018. 
 
The Governing Board of the GCF could be tasked with 
creating rules for calculating suggested contributions 
for private sector coffee actors, and monitoring 
those contributions. This might include, for example, 
developing suggested contribution amounts in 
proportion to market share or based on volumes 
handled or purchased. In general, all roasters, retailers, 
or traders purchasing over a certain threshold amount 
of coffee per year should be expected to contribute. 
Roasters, retailers, and traders purchasing less than that 
threshold could also be encouraged to contribute.
While there are various ways to collect contributions to 
the GCF, one interesting option in some countries could 
Roasters Traders
Source: Coffee Barometer 2018281
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Box 9: Micro Index Insurance
Micro index insurance is designed to compensate smallholder farmers when extreme 
weather events, such as droughts, floods, and/or excess of rains, disrupt their ability to 
produce crops and to make future investments that will increase coffee farm productivity.282 
It is potentially more cost effective than traditional forms of indemnity-based insurance, 
because insured farmers’ entitlements to payouts are based on annual weather data, rather 
than on the physical assessment and verification of losses they actually suffer (which is how 
indemnity-based insurance payouts are assessed).283 The cost effectiveness of micro index 
insurance increases the chances that it can reach more smallholder farmers in the global 
south.284 In some cases, index insurance initiatives have sought to target cooperatives of 
farmers, rather than individual farmers, in order to enhance uptake.285
Micro index insurance helps smallholder farmers build their financial resilience. Among 
other things, it offers the benefit of helping farmers, who pay insurance premiums, to feel 
financially secure, which can encourage them to take productive risks.286 This is important, 
because farmers often lose more from missed opportunities in good years than from the 
direct failure of crops in bad ones.287 Micro index insurance can therefore help reduce the 
precariousness that many smallholder producers, who rely on agricultural production for 
their livelihoods, experience as climate change makes weather more unpredictable.288 
One key challenge for micro index insurance is to design indices that reflect the reality 
of farmers’ experiences, so that farmers actually receive payouts when they need 
them.289 The design of these indices is also important for insurance providers, who use 
those indices to set the prices of their index insurance.290 Designing indices for index 
insurance typically involves a lot of field-based data collection and analysis about farmers’ 
experiences, which is combined with historical and satellite weather data in order to hone 
the indices. This data collection can be prohibitively expensive for initiatives seeking to 
offer inexpensive micro index insurance.291 Accessing rainfall data that accurately reflect 
the extreme weather that each farmer faces can also be very challenging, but is essential, 
as payouts are only made for years that have the most extreme rain fall (whether they are 
extremely wet or dry).292
Most smallholder coffee farmers do not have access to affordable insurance that helps 
to mitigate climate risks, or to disaster-relief funds that help alleviate the pain of certain 
weather- or climate-induced events. National Coffee Sustainability Plans could include multi-
stakeholder and participatory efforts to co-design and develop either attractive insurance 
options for smallholders or disaster relief funds for coffee farmers. A Global Coffee Fund 
could support such efforts in various ways, such as by funding the participatory processes 
and cost-effective technologies for the design, or by providing catalytic funding necessary 
to bring in private sector insurance providers willing to offer options at affordable rates.
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be the use of a check-off program, a mechanism that World Coffee Research (WCR) has piloted in the coffee 
sector, and which has also been used for various agricultural commodities in the United States.227 Through a 
check-off mechanism, traders could add GCF suggested contributions to the invoices that they provide to 
roasters and retailers, who would then pay their contributions to the Fund at the same time they paid their 
invoices. The traders could then transfer those contributions to the Fund itself, for example, on a quarterly 
basis. Although there are transaction costs to using this type of mechanism, one significant benefit would 
be that it provides a way to capture payments through existing supply chain transactions, simplifying the 
collection of contributions. 
If a check-off program were used, one important modification from WCR’s program to date could be to ask all 
major traders to offer this service—the option to participate and contribute through a check-off program—
Box 10: Antitrust Safeguards
One common concern that industry actors have when discussing any potential collective effort is whether the 
effort will raise antitrust concerns. As the Fund is currently proposed, this risk seems exceedingly unlikely. To 
further reduce antitrust risks, various antitrust safeguards could be implemented into the operation of the Global 
Coffee Fund. These include but are not limited to:
To the extent the Fund:
• Disseminates data (e.g. out of transparency or reporting considerations) about contributions and data
underlying the goals of the Fund:
o Consider whether the data reveals otherwise confidential sensitive information relating to individual
companies.
o Consider the age of that data, the potential audience, and whether it is sufficiently aggregated. The older
the data, the better.
o For example, publishing data that is 1 year old is better than publishing data about the most recent month
every month, particularly if it is traceable to individual companies and the information published allows
the calculation of the exact amount of coffee purchased or the price paid
• Communicates with contributors about the amounts they contribute:
o Do not seek to influence whether or how they pass their contributions on down the supply chain or to
consumers in terms of pricing.
o Do not recommend boycotts of certain suppliers, roasters, or traders if they opt not to participate in a
check-off scheme or the Fund.
o Consider suggesting companies patronize suppliers, roasters, or traders that participate in the check-off
scheme or Fund.
• Calculates the recommended amounts contributors could contribute:
o Do not suggest that contributions are compulsory or fixed.
o Use an objective, transparent calculation method.
o Avoid favoritism of specific contributors.
o Consider taking the amount the Fund would like to raise as a starting point/fundraising target for the
calculation.
• Involves leadership from industry actors: consider having a balanced, representative group.
When the Fund holds meetings involving competitors:
• Consider having antitrust counsel present as a safeguard against exchanging competitively sensitive
information.
• Draft an agenda and circulate it to the attendees prior to the meeting.
• Ensure that those present are aware that they should stick to the agenda and should not discuss competitively
sensitive information.
• Do not allow the meetings to be used for business other than Fund business.
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on all coffee invoices. This would help facilitate the 
broad participation required for the Fund; offering this 
service would thus be an additional avenue, beyond 
direct contributions, through which traders could help 
fulfill their own co-responsibility for supporting coffee 
sustainability.228 
Although not yet at a sufficient cumulative level, 
most major roasters, retailers, and traders are already 
supporting sustainability initiatives that can contribute 
to achievement of the SDGs in the coffee sector. 
Some particular types of sustainability contributions, 
if declared, transparently monitored, and verified, 
could potentially be counted against the amounts 
that specific companies might otherwise contribute to 
the GCF. One type of sustainability contribution that 
could trigger such an offset, for example, could be 
pre-competitive contributions to public goods that 
would benefit a broad range of coffee farmers, such 
as the aforementioned contributions to World Coffee 
Research, which supports climate research to find new 
varietals. Yet another type of contribution triggering 
an offset could be undertakings that provide direct 
income support to farmers during periods of low 
prices, such as Starbucks’s $20 million commitment in 
2018 to support Central American producers affected 
by the low-price crisis through an additional payment 
meant to enable farmers to more than cover their 
costs of production.229
Taken together, the National Coffee Sustainability 
Plans and the Global Coffee Fund provide a means to 
implement the strategic locally-owned actions within 
countries and the significant investments throughout 
the sector that are necessary for a sustainable coffee 
industry and thriving coffee producers. While such 
interventions have not been tried at scale within 
coffee-producing countries and in the coffee sector 
generally, they are indeed feasible, as demonstrated, 
for example, by smaller public-private interventions 
that have improved aspects of sustainability on the 
ground, as well as by the success of the Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, which provides 
inspiration, although not a blueprint, for a mechanism 
to channel significant multi-stakeholder funding 
towards effective solutions to complex challenges.
B.	Increasing	Producer	Profits
The coffee industry has changed significantly in recent 
years, which has created new challenges for many 
producers, but also opens up new opportunities for 
them as well. In particular, two recent transformations 
within and outside the industry—the high 
consolidation of the industry and the mainstreaming 
of e-commerce technologies and mobile applications 
for farmers—provide unique conditions to depart 
from the traditional coffee business model that has 
become increasingly unsustainable for many coffee 
producers.
We thus suggest that, along with the National Coffee 
Sustainability Plans and the Global Coffee Fund, 
producing countries as a group seriously examine two 
options for capturing more of the retail price of coffee. 
The first is implementing a minimum price, which 
would be linked to a Brazilian reference price and, if 
not set too high, could be possible without supply 
management, given the increased buying power of 
major coffee roasters and retailers. This possibility 
is discussed above in Section II(a). The second is 
supporting producers to harness the potential of new 
technologies to improve their incomes, in particular 
through more direct sales to consumers. We discuss 
this latter point next.  
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Increasing Market Access and Transforming Business Models
Mobile technologies and the Internet have created new opportunities for producers to change the way 
they do business, improving their business acumen, productivity, resiliency, and access to market; these 
are presented in this section. 
Mobile phones and targeted mobile and web-based applications can help coffee smallholders in 
certain contexts with a range of issues, sometimes compensating for the lack of agricultural extension 
officers. Depending on farmers’ situations, for example, such applications can help with: 1) locating 
micro-entrepreneurs who sell inputs at lower prices, thus breaking monopolies of middlemen; 2) 
Box 11: Mobile Phone Applications to Support Climate Resiliency
Source: GSMA293
One mobile phone application supporting climate resiliency is the GeoFarmer app deployed 
and piloted in Colombia, Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda by the International Center for Tropical 
Agriculture (CIAT) in collaboration with the University of Salzburg.294 
The GeoFarmer app enables farmers to easily collect and share “geospatial data on weather, 
farm conditions including soil and crop types, and monitor the adoption of techniques to make 
farms more productive and resilient to climate change.”295 This mobile application builds on 
research findings that farmers are more inclined to make decisions based on inputs from their 
peers. 
Similar efforts have been undertaken in India, where farmers have used a mobile application 
that aims to enable climate-smart agriculture. The application provides farmers with tailored 
advisories on topics such as whether they should harvest early, delay irrigation, or switch to crops 
that are resistant to flooding, as well as providing insights on crop diseases by allowing farmers 
to upload photos of affected crops to receive quick advice from agronomists.296
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calculating farmers’ costs of production for better 
decision-making;230 3) providing price information and 
transparency, thereby supporting farmer decision-
making around sales; 4) facilitating access to climate 
and weather data, thus supporting farmer resiliency 
(see Boxes 4 and 11); and 5) supporting crop 
diversification with applications telling farmers which 
supplemental crops are more profitable and more 
suitable to, for instance, a drought-prone area. While 
the expansion of smart phones and accompanying 
services should generate significant benefits both for 
farmers and for roasters (through the improvement of 
the farmers’ productivity and resiliency), these benefits 
are not always realized due to farmer education, age, 
or access to the Internet. In some contexts, harnessing 
the potential of mobile technologies thus requires 
institutional support from a range of stakeholders 
including the government, producer associations, 
donors, and/or the private sector.
Moreover, the development of e-commerce has 
opened up new opportunities to find markets and 
sell producers’ products directly to consumers. This 
has the potential to reduce market concentration and 
provide a means for producers to add and capture 
more value, although the challenges should not be 
underestimated. These opportunities are most likely 
to be exploited by relatively larger and better-off 
coffee producers who produce high-quality coffee, 
and by coffee producers who can access transparent 
intermediaries or other entities willing to enter 
into more equitable partnerships with producers. 
However, the penetration of mobile phones and 
the resurgence of cooperatives231 may help reach 
smallholders that previously could not have access to 
these opportunities. Even still, for such opportunities 
to scale to the benefit of a larger set of smallholders, 
institutional support through producer associations or 
similar organizations will prove critical. 
Between the producer and the consumer, there are 
many entities that handle coffee, adding and capturing 
value along the way. The producer generally receives 
only a small fraction of the final retail price of coffee.232 
This raises the question of whether it is possible to 
“cut out” some of the middlemen. Yet the major 
entities along the value chain all provide important 
functions or otherwise add certain value that takes 
green coffee beans in a producing country and turns 
them into roasted coffee beans or a coffee beverage in 
a consuming country.233 A more appropriate question, 
then, may be whether producers themselves can take 
on more of these steps and accompanying efforts 
(such as marketing) to create and capture more value, 
or whether they can align themselves with entities—
either for-profit or non-profit—that provide some of 
these steps oriented more as a service to producers.
Although value addition in theory can be a way for 
producers to capture more of the final retail price, it 
only works if producers understand the consuming 
market and are able to provide additional value that 
meets market demands. For example, bad on-farm 
processing of wet cherries can lead to high rejection 
rates from buyers; in that case, farmers may be better 
off selling wet cherries directly to a mill, because they 
can sell a higher proportion of their crop and ultimately 
earn more money.234 Similarly, while roasting adds 
value to a green coffee bean, poor roasting destroys 
most of the bean’s value. And even when producers 
or their partners are able to roast beans well, if they 
are unable to find a market for those roasted beans 
and can only access markets for green coffee beans, 
then roasting will not benefit them.235 
Direct to Consumers 
The Internet provides an avenue for online marketing 
and a platform for commercial transactions that some 
producers may be able to exploit. Online marketing is a 
significant way for small coffee companies and certain 
producers to promote their brand, whether based on 
social responsibility, coffee quality, or price. Although 
online marketing offers the potential to reach many 
more consumers than would previously have been 
possible for producers or small companies, online 
retail is also fiercely competitive, and producers can 
be at a disadvantage given the high consumer loyalty 
to major brands. To break through the competition, 
significant offline investments would have to be 
made by producers and supporting institutions on 
marketing, quality control, and logistics. 
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One advantage that producers have is their narrative: the story of who they are, and why 
consumers should buy their coffee. Yet this narrative is only compelling to a segment of the 
market, and the marketplace is also crowded with similar narratives from coffee companies that 
discuss their partnerships with producers. Producers would thus have to be exceedingly clear 
on why producer-owned (or origin-owned) coffee brands are preferable to other alternatives, 
such as direct trade or Fairtrade. In that regard Geographical Indications (GI) can help (See 
Box 12).
Box 12: Geographical Indications to Build Producers’ Branding
Producers and producing countries have started using Geographical Indications 
(GIs),236 an intellectual property tool, to protect the reputation of their coffee origin 
and capture more value. In trade theory, GIs and other trademarks correct consumer 
information asymmetries regarding an attribute of value—the origin—as long as the 
information is reliable. 237 
Examples can be found in Colombia (Café de Colombia, Café de Nariño), the 
Dominican Republic (Café Valdesia), Guinea (Ziama–Macenta coffee), Jamaica (Blue 
Mountain), Ethiopia (see below), and Mexico (Café Veracruz)). 
GIs support long-term differentiation and origin branding, which allows producers 
to access a higher value for origin products while also avoiding appropriation of 
geographical names by other entities not linked to the area. As such, in some areas, 
coffee is following the same path as cheese, wines, or spirits that have used GIs “to 
avoid unfair competition and free-riding of their quality reputation, empowering local 
producers to define the specific rules for using the origin label.”238 
One example comes from Ethiopia, where the government launched the Ethiopian 
Coffee Trademarking and Licensing Initiative in 2004 for three coffee origins 
producing high quality beans: Sidama, Yirgacheffe, and Harar.239 The government has 
subsequently offered licensing agreements to importers, roasters, and distributors; 
licensees are expected to enter into a brand management strategy and promote 
these coffees with customers. While licensees do not pay any royalty, the Ethiopian 
government hopes that the brand management strategy will result in increased global 
demand for these origins in the specialty segment. The government also hopes to 
increase the farmers’ share of the retail coffee price by improving their negotiating 
power.240
However, GI protection does not automatically trigger a substantial price increase or 
a pass-through to farmgate prices.241 Developing and promoting GIs requires long-
term efforts and strategic planning. Substantial institutional support is needed, from 
the government and/or producers’ associations, to ensure careful and consistent 
quality control, brand management, and marketing strategies that, over time, can 
help producers capture more value.242 
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT | 85
ENSURING ECONOMIC VIABILITY & SUSTAINABILITY OF COFFEE PRODUCTON  A REPORT
Box	13:	Pachamama	Coffee,	a	Producer-
Owned Vertically Integrated Company 
Pachamama Coffee is owned by participating 
cooperatives, and its board of representatives 
is composed of cooperative representatives. 
This gives the cooperatives control of 
company strategy, and a path towards financial 
independence.244 There are five member 
cooperatives within Pachamama, based in 
Ethiopia, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, and 
Peru. All the cooperatives specialize in producing 
certified organic coffee. Farmers are paid 
above the market price for green coffee.245 The 
cooperatives then are allocated a share of the 
profits, based on how much they sell. The board 
votes on how to allocate profits, which may be 
retained to invest in Pachamama projects.246 
Pachamama offers online subscriptions direct 
to consumers, runs two cafés in California, and 
has retail and wholesale relationships with other 
companies. This farmer-owned and farmer-
governed model shifts some new business risks 
onto farmers, but also moves farmers from price-
takers to price-setters, who control value addition 
and who thus capture significantly more of the 
profits than in most coffee value chains. 
One alternative to producer-led roasting is paying 
an external reputable roaster. In such a relationship, 
the roaster serves the producer in the same way 
that it otherwise serves as a private label roaster 
for a retail brand: it is paid for its service, but is not 
otherwise seeking to add or capture value derived 
from branding or intangible aspects. These external 
roasters could be in origin countries or in consuming 
countries. Roasters in origin countries may be 
cheaper and easier for producers to work with; some 
roasters in origin countries are also willing to package 
and export for producers.247 Roasters in consuming 
countries are another option to explore; working 
with them can alleviate concerns (likely overwrought) 
about freshness, while also taking advantage of the 
overcapacity of roasters in some consuming markets, 
Three broad possibilities for (more) direct-to-consumer 
sales include:
	• Direct-to-consumer	 sales	 of	 high-quality	
green coffee beans, which consumers then 
roast themselves. This removes the need 
for producers to roast the beans, but does 
require that producers can guarantee a high 
quality level of beans, as well as proper 
preparation and packaging to ensure that 
there is not significant quality loss in transit. 
This will always be a niche market; most 
consumers are not in the habit of roasting their 
own beans, and the larger trend is instead a 
growing reliance on capsules and pods that 
make coffee preparation easier rather than 
harder. Yet some coffee enthusiasts already 
roast at home,243 and producers could seek to 
increase this segment of consumers, and to 
capitalize on it through direct sales, potentially 
through producer-owned online platforms that 
could aggregate offerings. For this strategy, 
producers might be competing primarily on 
quality, with their narrative and the direct link 
to the producer as a compelling secondary 
motivation for consumers.
	• Direct-to-consumer	 sales	 of	 high-quality	
roasted coffee beans. Selling roasted beans 
requires producers either to roast the beans 
themselves or cooperatively, or to work with 
a roaster that is paid to roast and package the 
beans. While roasting at the farm level might not 
be economically viable, roasting cooperatively 
is more feasible, either at the level of a 
cooperative in country, or through a producer-
owned vertically integrated company such as 
Pachamama Coffee (Box 13). Although roasting 
adds value to coffee beans, poor roasting can 
ruin the product, and producers should only 
undertake roasting if it can be done well. 
86 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
SECTION IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
such as the United States.248 Some mid-sized farms 
already roast their coffee in coffee-consuming
countries and handle their own sales. For example, 
Unleashed Coffee is a Brazilian coffee estate that 
roasts its coffee in the United States and sells its 
coffee directly to consumers online.249
A variation of this is for producers to partner with 
innovative roasting and retailing companies that
put producers at the forefront of the business
(see Thrive Farmers in Box 14, Moyee Coffee in
Box 15). While these opportunities are currently
limited, producer associations or other institutional 
actors could consider how to support scale up of 
those models, or how to replicate them for other 
producing locations. 
Box 14: Consignment Service for Producers
Thrive Farmers provides a revenue-sharing
model that essentially operates as a
consignment service for producers, thereby
significantly increasing the producer’s share of 
the final retail price. Thrive Farmers generally 
requires producers to pay for the roasting and 
exporting of their coffee. It then pays producers 
after their coffee has been sold to retailers,
giving 50% of the sale price to the producer.250 
Sometimes, Thrive Farmers sells coffee to other 
roasters; when it does so, it pays the producers 
75% of the sale price. Farmers must wait 6-12 
months to be paid in this system, which is not 
always feasible for smallholders.251 
If enough trust and transparency exist, similar 
consignment approaches could potentially
be integrated into the operations of existing 
specialty coffee companies. One leading
specialty company, for example, has used a
modified consignment model with one supplier: 
paying an initial lower price upfront, and then 
providing an additional payment based on how 
the coffee sold.252  
For this direct-to-consumer strategy, there may be two 
distinct but overlapping categories in which producers 
would be competing with existing specialty coffee 
companies: quality and social responsibility. While 
most specialty coffees have a social responsibility 
narrative, quality-oriented consumers care less about 
social responsibility and more about taste and brand-
related intangibles. Producers seeking to compete on 
quality will need to find ways to have an attractive brand 
offering that speaks to this segment of the market253—
although coffee consumers also behave differently 
throughout the day, appreciating different qualities 
depending on the hour.254 In addition, the willingness of 
some consumers to purchase coffee based more on its 
social responsibility narrative than its quality, combined 
with traceability technologies such as blockchain (see 
Moyee in Box 15), opens up additional opportunities 
for producers, many of whom produce coffee at a range 
of quality levels. Working collectively, producers might 
then be able to find ways to sell both higher-quality 
coffees and lesser-quality coffees through different 
avenues or producer-owned brands. 
Box 15: Moyee Coffee Using 
Blockchain for Traceability
Moyee Coffee is an Ethiopian and Dutch coffee 
growing, roasting, and retailing company that
uses blockchain and geotagging to trace the
transactions within its supply chain.  When it buys 
directly from cooperatives, Moyee assigns unique 
IDs to each farmer and pays farmers via mobile 
phones. Customers can access this information 
by scanning the QR code on their package of 
coffee.255 When buying directly, Moyee pays a 20% 
premium to farmers.256 Moyee also buys coffee 
from the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange; when it 
does so, it reserves a 20% premium that is then 
allocated to farmer training.257 Moyee Coffee sells 
to institutions,258 but also directly to consumers 
through the Internet.259 
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Direct-to-consumer	 sales	 of	 commercial-grade	
roasted coffee beans. As with the approach above, 
this requires either producer-led roasting or securing 
the services of private label roasters. Rather than 
competing on quality, or relying on the producer-origin 
narrative, however, producers of commercial-grade 
coffee would compete on price, seeking to reach price-
sensitive consumers who like the ease of purchasing 
coffee online and who are willing to try a new brand or 
source of coffee. Because the cheapest coffee brands 
have a relatively lower profit margin compared to 
specialty and quasi-specialty brands, producers also 
would have a lower profit margin when competing on 
price than on quality. Despite this, and assuming that 
they are able to find ways to efficiently move coffee 
to consumers (discussed below), producers would still 
receive a higher share of the ultimate retail price paid 
by consumers. Profitability and economic viability 
would require sufficient volume. 
Of the three strategies noted here, this third strategy 
is the most different from what has been tried in the 
past. The analogy is what Chinese manufacturers 
have been able to do given the existence of Amazon: 
they can now cut out the middlemen, and sell 
directly to American consumers. However, Amazon’s 
infrastructure has facilitated Chinese manufacturers’ 
ability to do this, both through support in shipping260 
and then through fulfillment once goods reach Amazon 
warehouses.261 Coffee producers would similarly
need significant institutional support that aggregates 
products and ensures some baseline consistency of 
quality, lowers the costs of transport, and helps with 
navigating export and import requirements and any 
legal obligations. 262
While absolutely critical for the third strategy above, 
institutional support would also help to scale the 
opportunities for producers to take advantage of 
other direct-to-consumer possibilities. Economies of 
scale are likely necessary to make the administrative 
and logistical aspects feasible for many producers. 
Some of the institutional support needed could
potentially be undertaken by producer associations—
for example, the FNC supports Colombian producers 
that have found buyers in particular countries by 
arranging the logistics and shipping for a fee. Aside 
from taking these roles on themselves, producer 
associations could also help to aggregate producers 
for economies of scale, and to identify and negotiate 
better rates with existing entities and companies that 
could provide necessary services, such as transport or 
distribution. 
Producer associations could also connect with the 
electronic World Trade Platform (eWTP) initiative,
which aims to integrate local small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) into global value chains by 
addressing the barriers commonly faced by SMEs 
in international trade, such as access to information 
regarding export opportunities, access to trade
finance, and logistics costs.263 This initiative was jointly 
created by the World Trade Organization, the World 
Economic Forum, and the Electronic World Trade 
Platform in 2016, and it is led by China’s Alibaba 
e-trade platform.264 Rwanda was the first African 
country to join the initiative in October 2018; Rwandan 
coffee is now sold on Alibaba’s Tsmall international 
marketplace.265 Participation in the eWTP initiative can 
make possible an endeavor that would otherwise be 
prohibitively expensive. It is usually expensive for an 
SME to open a section on Alibaba (foreign companies, 
qualified as gold members, must provide deposits of 
up to $25,000, pay annual seller fees up to $10,000, 
and a royalty commission of 2-5% on each sale).266 
In the agreement between the Rwanda Government 
and Alibaba, however, Rwandan coffee roasters—
often cooperatives selling quality coffee267—are not 
currently charged these fees for selling on the platform 
as per the guidelines of the eWTP initiative.268 
Although currently niche, the models discussed
above, many of which have already shown proof of 
concept, have potential to scale or replicate with 
sustained institutional support. The design of National 
Coffee Sustainability Plans, discussed above, offer 
one opportunity for relevant government institutions, 
producers associations, and other local stakeholders 
to assess the opportunities for producers within
the country to capture more of the final retail price, 
including by taking advantage of technology to get 
closer to the end consumer. 
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Under current and future market conditions, which include persistent low prices, 
rising input costs, and devastating climate change effects, even efficient producers 
will struggle to remain viable, and the SDG gap in coffee-producing regions will 
grow. Without sustained collective action, and without strategic national-level 
planning and investments, more producers will be thrown into or remain in extreme 
poverty, while increasingly consolidated origins will result in heightened supply risks. 
The prosperity of the coffee sector relies on healthy and viable farmers, including 
smallholders; this business-as-usual scenario is not sustainable for them or for the 
industry. 
Coffee sector actors have acknowledged these deep sustainability concerns, 
particularly in light of the ongoing price crisis and impending climate crisis. Multiple 
calls for global collective action on prices have been made, including by the World 
Coffee Producers Forum since its creation in 2017, as well as by the International 
Coffee Council, which mandated the ICO to address low coffee prices by launching 
a sector-wide dialogue to identify transformational multi-stakeholder solutions 
to be implemented by committed ICO members.297 We suggest National Coffee 
Sustainability Plans, to support strategic planning and investment that account 
for differentiated producer needs and future prospects given climate impacts. 
We suggest a Global Coffee Fund, as a transformational and multi-stakeholder 
mechanism that embodies the shared responsibility of public and private actors in 
achieving sustainability in coffee production and in coffee-producing regions. And 
we suggest serious exploration of other ways to increase producer profits that take 
advantage of recent transformations relevant to the coffee sector (in particular, high 
consolidation of the industry and mainstreaming of new technologies), including 
through a minimum price and through business models that allow producers to 
capture more of the final retail price. Taken together, these strategies provide 
ambitious yet achievable pathways for making coffee truly sustainable.
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1. Changing Climate
Z-Score	Deviations
In Figure 23, we normalize present and future temperature ranges to show how regions 
across the tropics are moving outside of their historical range. The normalization method is 
to convert each region’s temperatures into z-scores:
Where  is the average annual temperature from 1900 - 1960 in each region, and 
 is the standard deviation across those temperatures. Under this transformation, 
the z-scores of the historical period conform approximately to a normal distribution, with 
mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Any future average temperature can be compared to 
this distribution, where temperatures with z-scores greater than 1 occur 16% of the time 
under the historical distribution, values greater than 1.96 occur 2.5% of the time, and values 
greater than 2.33 occur 1% of the time.
Z-scores in the recent period are computed from an average from 1999 – 2018, representing 
a climatic average around 2010 for each region, and z-scores in 2050 are computed using 
the climatological mean temperature from GISTEMP.298 The spatial distribution of these 
z-score values is shown on the next page.
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Deviation from historical range in recent years and by 2050. These maps correspond to 
the distributions in Figure 23, showing where deviations from the historical distributions are 
high. Z-score deviations are clipped at 4 (above the 99.99th percentile) in the figures.
Recent	Z-score	deviations	in	temperatures	(around	2010)
Z-score	deviations	predicted	in	2050
Shifting Suitability
To analyze the loss of suitable land, we use the Global Agro-Ecological Zone (GAEZ) project, 
version 3.0, which provides a combined climate-related suitability constraint as a percentage 
from 0 – 100%. We treat values below 50% as unsuitable. We use a rainfed, intermediate 
inputs scenario for both the baseline (1961 – 1990) and climate change (2050, Hadley3 
model, A1 scenario) periods. These suitability ranges can be extended considerably with 
the application of improved management. The resulting suitability levels are shown in the 
adjacent maps.
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Spatial	suitability	values	used	to	determine	county-level	area	suitable.	Suitability values 
below 50% are treated as 0, and other suitability levels are reduced by 50%.
Arabica suitability over 50% at baseline
Arabica suitability over 50% in 2050
Robusta suitability over 50% at baseline
Robusta suitability over 50% in 2050
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The total suitable land is calculated as follows:
where the sum is taken over grid cells that are neither forests nor wetlands. That is, if 
suitability in an area is 51%, then 2% of the land area is counted toward the country-level 
suitable land total. Forests and wetlands are excluded because conversion of these land use 
types to coffee production could undermine climate change and sustainability goals. Land 
cover is from the USGS EROS LandCover GLCCDB version 2.0 database for the year 2000. 
This formulation provides an indicative measure of suitable land, but the actual relationship 
between suitability levels and suitable land areas is not grounded in empirical analysis.
2. Changes in Coffee Yields
Updates to the coffee supply database
We build upon the coffee supply database developed for the Earth Institute, which collects 
production records from agricultural ministries and coffee production regions from grey 
literature. We rely on comprehensive production records for administrative regions, rather 
than individual farms, because they provide a less biased representation of how coffee-
growing is affected by climate change. The production records are summarized in the 
adjcacent table.
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Summary of the coffee production database records. The trend is computed for yields 
from FAO records, which generally span 1980 - 2017, and no records before 1980 are used 
because of the limitation of the weather data. The standard error is on the trend estimate, 
and represents the degree of variability in the yields.
Understanding the risks of climate change for coffee production requires matching it to high-
resolution weather. For this, we extend the Coffee Production database with high resolution 
cultivation maps for Bolivia, Burundi, China, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Hawaii, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Laos, Mexico, Nicaragua, Nigeria, 
Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Tanzania, Uganda, and Yemen.
 
The statistical production models developed here relate how changes in weather result in 
proportional changes in yields. This proportional relationship uses the logarithm of yields 
as the dependent variable:
where p indexes farms and ptis an error term. This relationship is assumed to hold most 
closely at high resolution; theoretically, at the scale of each individual coffee tree. Because 
we only observe region-average yields, it is necessary to translate this model to the regional 
scale.
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This uses what is called the LogSumExp approximation, and argues that the weather at the 
most productive location is the most effective predictor for the entire region’s yield (more 
predictive, for example, than the average weather across the region). With this insight, 
we use coffee cultivation maps to identify a location of maximum cultivation within each 
country or sub-country region for which we have production data. For sub-country regions 
without cultivation maps, we use the centroid of the region. For countries without cultivation 
maps, we identify the point of maximum coffee suitability from GAEZ. These points are 
shown below.
Locations of observed coffee production data. Both the coffee production data 
(production, harvested area, and planted area by variety) are drawn from multiple sources, 
and the points in many cases represent the geographically weighted centroid of high 
resolution coffee production maps from multiple sources. The database includes 2983 sub-
country regions from Brazil, India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Colombia, and Honduras; country 
data from 59 other countries; and years ranging from 1980 to 2017 matched to weather 
from ERA-Interim.
Two	major	coffee-producing	countries	are	missing	from	our	dataset,	because	
of unresolved data inconsistencies within our analysis: Peru and Tanzania. We 
apologize for this omission.
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Weather Data
For this project, we use data from ERA-Interim (ERA-I), a reanalysis product that combines 
station and satellite data with meteorological modeling to construct a consistent, gridded 
dataset.299 The ERA-I data is available at a 0.75° resolution at a daily scale. To improve the 
resolution, we use the CHELSEA spatial downscaling dataset, available at a 30 arc-second 
resolution, monthly for precipitation, minimum temperature, maximum temperature, and 
mean temperature.300 To maintain the daily resolution, we apply monthly differences from 
the grid-cell mean to each daily observation for these four variables.
Finally, we use these data to develop a regional dataset of the following variables:
• Average temperature at 2m by month [K]
• Average maximum temperature at 2m by month [K]
• Average minimum temperature at 2m by month [K]
• Average dewpoint at 2m by month [K]
• Dewpoint at 2m during minimum temperature by month [K]
• Dewpoint at 2m during maximum temperature by month [K]
• Top soil temperature by month [K]
• Top soil moisture by month [m3 / m3]
• Wind speed at 2 m by month [m/s]
• Photosynthetically-active solar radiation at surface [J / m2]
• Precipitation runoff by month [m]
• Total precipitation by month [m]
• Exceedence degree-days by threshold and month [C day]
• Frost degree-days (below 0 C) by month [C day]
We extracted this data at point locations for the year of the reported yield and for the 
previous year, at a monthly level, to feed into a cross-validation model selection exercise to 
identify the most effective predictors.
Weather Emulation
We use a variety of weather variables to predict coffee yields, available from the ERA-Interim weather 
reanalysis dataset. Many of these variables are not reliably predicted by global climate models, and 
MIROC-ESM-CHEM GCM data requires downscaling to represent daily variation (which we use for 
precipitation and growing degree-days) and specific locations.
To translate GCM results into high-resolution weather appropriate for predicting yields, we apply 
GCM-driven adjustments to historical weather, as follows:
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1. We use the observational data to construct linear spline functions that relate each weather variable to average 
annual temperature. We prefer this approach to using projections for other weather variables provided by the 
GCMs because of the inconsistencies between projected and historically observed weather for precipitation and 
some other variables. We construct the linear splines using all observed data, producing a set of functions 
, indexed by weather variable v.
2. In each future year, we compute each location’s adjusted annual average temperature, as 
 , where  is the average temperature for region i in the observational data 
over all years after 2005 (when most GCMs start); is GCM g’s predicted temperature for the grid cell covering 
region i in future year t; and  is GCM g’s average temperature for that grid cell over the same years as used 
to compute .
3. We select a random year, s, upon which the temperature changes will be applied.
4. We evaluate the spline functions at  and , and determine adjust the weather variables using the 
difference: .
For an example of how this process works, consider a projection for average temperatures, for which 
. We consider a region in Colombia and make 10 independent draws, performing the rest of the operations:
Ten random realizations of the weather at a location in Colombia. Temperatures continue to increase according to the 
anomalies inferred from the MIROC-ESM-CHEM model.
The linear splines use knots at 19 °C, 21 °C, 23 °C, 25 °C, and 27 °C. These are chosen because we have a 
distribution of temperatures such that no single region dominates any spline segment.
Distribution of annual average temperatures by region. Brazil, Honduras, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam are 
split out because we have subnational data for these, while Global includes all other countries. The vertical lines 
represent knot locations, which generally fall within, rather than around, the distributions.
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The resulting relationships between average temperature and weather variables  
are shown in the figure below. The relationships are generally as expected: GDDs increase 
gradually, until about 27 °C when the upper limit begins to cap them. KDDs are 0 until 23 
°C, at which point some daily highs exceed the 34 °C limit. Precipitation measures display 
a U-shaped relationship, with higher rainfall at low temperatures and high temperatures.
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Estimated linear spline relationships between annual temperature and the 9 variables used in yield 
estimation. The weather variables reflect the predictors chosen by the cross-validation exercise below, recorded 
within the seasonal limits identified there.
Cross Validation
Identifying the weather variables which most effectively predict yields requires a careful screening process. To 
do this, we use a technique called “cross-validation”, where the model is successively fit to a training dataset, 
and then applied to a test dataset to evaluate its ability to predict out-of-sample yields. For dividing the data 
into training and testing datasets, we define a collection of subsets of the data. For countries in which we have 
sub-country data, we define a different subset of reach state (ADM1 region). For other countries, each country is 
its own data subset. Then, for each possible model, we perform this test by “leaving out” each subset, using it 
as the test data, and fitting the model to the remaining subsets. The metric for evaluating datasets is the portion 
of the RSME explained, defined as the root-mean-squared predicted yield. We are interested in models that 
maximize this metric.
To filter possible sets of predictors, we impose the following constraints:
• Monthly predictors will be accumulated over “month spans” within each year. These month spans will be 
considered relative to the month of harvest, which is taken as an average of the major harvesting period 
for each country. For example, the month span used for precipitation might be accumulated across the 
precipitation observed from 7 months before the harvest month to the month of the harvest. Month 
spans may extend from 12 months before the harvest month to the harvest month.
• Exceedance degree-days are translated into “growing degree-days” (GDDs) and “extreme degree-
days” (EDDs). In each case, two thresholds are chosen: a low threshold and a high threshold. Below the 
low threshold, degree-days are not included in either predictor; between the low and high threshold, 
they are only included in the GDD predictor; above the high threshold, the GDD predictor for that day 
takes its maximum value and the additional degree-days are included in the EDD predictor. Only the 
following threshold points are considered: 0 °C, 10 °C, 20 °C, 28 °C, 30 °C, 32 °C, and 34 °C.
• Precipitation may be included a single term or a quadratic pair of terms (but not only the squared term 
of the quadratic); EDDs may only be included if GDDs are also included.
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A subset of the comparison between specifications is shown below, for only those specifications that included 
variables ultimately included in the final result.
 
RMSE	 Explained	 for	 specifications	 that	 contain	 predictors	 selected	 in	 the	 final	 model. In general, 
specifications with more predictors are preferred (bars colored by number of terms).
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This set of assumptions applied to the predictors above results in (1+91)12(1+2•92)
(1+2•7!/2!5!) ≈ 3e27 combinations. To reduce this search space, we first search for the most 
predictive month span for each predictor individually and for each predictor in combination 
with the possible GDD and EDD spans. Only about 4000 possibilities need to be considered 
for each of these cases. As an example, a plot showing the relative effectiveness of different 
month spans for only GDD and EDD is shown below. 
RMSE	explained	for	different	model	specifications	including	only	the	GDD	and	EDD	
coefficients. The best temperature thresholds for each month span are identified, and 
shown as the text in each box. For each month span, specifications with only GDD, only 
EDD, and both are tried; in all cases, the specification with both has the maximum RMSE 
explained, and is shown.
Next, a cross validation is performed where the set of final predictors is chosen from the 
optimal predictors identified above. Each predictor (such as solar radiation) is represented 
in this choice-set in two forms: by the month span that was found most predictive when 
it was selected in isolation, and by the month span that was to be most predictive when 
combined with GDD and EDD predictors. GDD and EDD predictors are included both 
using the temperature and month spans that were identified when these were considered 
on their own, and in the forms identified when combined with each of the other predictors. 
This results in the testing of about 2 million combinations. Only final specifications that 
included a single GDD-EDD predictor combination where considered.
We find that more terms are beneficial until about 9 terms. The graph below shows the range 
of RMSE explained values for all specifications that have a given number of terms. Each has 
a characteristic “hump” shape, representing the greater predictive power associated with, 
in particular, frosts and precipitation.
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The final specification is:
where maximum temperature and dew point are averaged over the 7 months prior to harvest; top soil moisture 
is averaged over the 2 months prior to harvest; GDDs and EDDs are totaled over the 3 months prior to harvest 
with a temperature range from 20 °C to 34 °C; photosynthetically-active solar radiation is averaged for the 3 
months prior to harvest; precipitation is totaled in quadrative form for the 7 months prior to harvest; and frost 
degree-days are applied from 1 month prior to harvest.
The regression results are shown below:
Although individually some of the coefficient values are difficult to interpret, they combine to create a smooth 
response curve relating yields to temperatures.
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We model the restriction of harvests when a weather shock reduces yields, and infer costs 
and true planted areas from this response. The basic steps in coffee production, as we 
model them, are shown below.
The Main Steps in Coffee Cultivation. In the first year, the farmer must plant and maintain 
the seedlings, and respond to any losses from adverse weather (boxes 1 - 3). Starting 
in year 3, the coffee plant beings producing beans, and the farmer makes a harvesting 
decision that ultimately results in production (boxes 4 - 6).
Diagram of the modeling of the harvesting decision. Harvest across the available fields 
down to where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. When a shock decreases the yields, 
farmers will decide to harvest less. This boosts observed yields, but is a limited solution.
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Under the full model, we can estimate the effects of each coefficient separately for Arabica 
and Robusta, even though these are generally not distinguished in the data. These full set 
of model parameters are shown below.
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3. Changes in Planted Area
Farm Gate Price Model
We find that in (1) farmers in individual countries experience prices that are 5.5% (Robusta 
in the Republic of the Congo) - 46.2% (Arabica in Jamaica) of international prices in 2000; 
(2) for every 1% increase in international prices, farmer prices raise by 0.8% [0.79 - 0.81%]; 
and (3) in addition, farmer prices increase by 0.2% [0.1 - 0.3%] per year.
All prices in constant 2010 USD (not PPP adjusted).
  
Where  is the farm gate price in country i and year t,  is the international price, and 
is normally distributed. The expected price is then
accounting for the residual standard error . The regression results are shown on the next 
page.
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Another view of these prices is in terms of the predicted portion of the international price 
paid at the farm gate, in the year 2000, as shown below.
We also include a premium if the production of an area decreases significantly, and a 
price reduction if it increases far beyond historical levels. These premiums are based on 
how observed differentials vary based on the amount of coffee produced. The reported 
differential for both Arabica and Robusta regional varieties is shown below, along with its 
recent range. There is considerable variation, and we use the average change shown in 
the line below. This has the potential to increase prices for coffee from a given country by 
about $300 / MT. These are added (or subtracted) on top of price effects that are already 
represented in the farm gate prices, and depend only upon total production relative to the 
historical level.
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Planting Model
Our planting model is an extension of the basic Nerlove model301, but using revenue (as the 
product of prices and yields) rather than just prices as the fundamental driver of increases 
in land cultivation. The comparison of an estimate using price and revenue is shown below.
Observed changes in planted area, as a function of the previous year’s farmgate prices 
(left) or revenue (right). The blue curve and confidence intervals are from a LOESS smooth 
fit to the data. No clear pattern is represented on the left, while one emerges on the right.
Using this insight, we develop a model that predicts increases and decreases in planted 
area, in response to price and yield changes. For any level of revenue, each region has a 
stable “optimal planted area,” which is determined by the rate at which yields fall and costs 
climb as farmers expand beyond their prime land. Increases in expected yields or expected 
prices will increase this stable planted area level.
On average, the land planted for coffee within each region gradually approaches the optimal 
planted area. Higher revenues cause coffee to be planted more extensively and more quickly, 
if it is currently below the optimal level. If land planted with coffee is above the optimal 
level, given the current prices and yields, farmers will begin to abandon unproductive areas. 
In general, increases in coffee cultivation occur more slowly than decreases.
A simple theoretical diagram of the decision-making process is shown below:
Theoretical model of planting decisions.  is the revenue in year t, under the given 
prices and yields.  is the current planted area. By finding where marginal price equals 
marginal cost, we can estimate the optimal planted area, .
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We assume that yields, and marginal revenues, decrease linearly as progressively more marginal areas are 
included, so that Marginal Revenue,
Where  is the observed yield, in MT per hectare, across an observed planted area  in a given year.
 is the price per MT, so that  is the marginal revenue per hectare. Similarly, marginal costs, MC, 
increase linearly:
If all of these parameters are known, the optimal equilibrium area, from the perspective of a given year, is:
Now, we assume that observed changes should approach this optimal planted area, and include both a term 
that is irrespective of existing planting and one that is proportional to it:
If we ignore the specific parameters, this simplifies to the structure:
Although no specific term in this expression is a direct price elasticity, the elasticity is equal to 
. We estimate this expression both using ordinary least squares (OLS) and a 
median quantile regression. The quantile regression is more robust to outliers. When modeled across the entire 
globe, the observed elasticity of price for total production is approximately 0.16 for Arabica and 0.36 for 
Robusta.
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These low elasticities correspond well to estimates for other crops in the literature302. 
However, they do not reflect the ease with which some countries can expand their coffee 
land. For example, Brazil has multiple times as much land suitable for coffee as is currently 
in use, and previously had about twice as much under cultivation as now. To reflect this 
we allow countries to appropriate previously used land at a rate which increases as higher 
prices persist. Specifically, when  > 0, we use the expression:
where N is the number of consecutive years for which > 0, excluding the current one, 
E is the maximum planted area for coffee in the given region, and A is the current planted 
land.
Production costs
We collected 180 estimates of total production costs from multiple reports, across 17 
countries and spanning 11 years. The production costs figure in the main text only displays 
countries for which we have at least 4 observations, to estimate a trend. Below, we show 
results from a regression analysis of all of the observations.
where  is either real USD/kg prices in log or level terms for country i in year t,  is 
an intercept for each country (the dropped country is Brazil), and  is an intercept for the 
variety (the dropped variety is “unspecified”).
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Costs Components – A. Direct Costs
A.1. Labor cost 
There are two main categories of labor in the coffee production context. First, “harvest labor” refers to seasonal 
coffee pickers. Second, there is general labor or yearly labor needed to maintain the plantation. A third labor 
consists of administration staff, but this is usually accounted in cost estimates as administration rather than labor. 
It is important to mention that in small farms, these types of labor are overlapping with family labor, as family 
members would be performing many of the tasks. Overall labor costs differ significantly from one country to 
another. For instance, in El Salvador, labor makes up 6% of the overall cost, while it represents 12% of the total 
cost in Guatemala.303
A.2. Inputs/Supplies 
Inputs and supplies are variable direct costs that include fertilizers, pesticides and fuel for machinery. These 
costs are injected over the course of the cropping seasons and depend on the expected yield. The costs 
fluctuate following the overall prices for agrochemical inputs such as fertilizer and pesticides, which are on their 
turn follow the changes in oil prices.304
Costs Components – B. Indirect Costs
B.1. Administration
Even though management are often neglected305, the greatest part of the cost of coffee production is under 
administration according to Caravela Coffee study.306 Administration costs includes administrative labor as well 
as supervisory expenses, legal costs, financial costs, and certification costs. In fact, 35% of costs in Colombia are 
administration costs and 37% in Ecuador.  
B.2. Planting and Renovation 
Planting and renovation costs are generated by the depreciation of the coffee plantation. Renovation of the 
plantation refers to removing old trees and replacing seedlings. This also covers adding new seedlings and 
shading material between current trees307. This is done because tree productivity decreases through time. In 
addition to this, some trees need to be replanted because of disease and pests. Other causes that might 
require renovation are the impact of climate change and poor agricultural practices. The establishment of the 
coffee plantation comprises the preparation of soil, costs of seedlings and the planting. This is a large part of 
the cost. However, this cost is divided over the lifetime of the coffee plantation. The lifespan varies significantly 
(between 8 and 20 years or more), depending on several factors including but not limited to the country 
and the management practices308. All of these activities require upfront investment309. However, because of 
the increasing costs, in particular labor costs, less budget is allocated to renovation. For instance, 1% of the 
production costs in Colombia is for renovation, while 5% is invested in renovation in El Salvador.
B.3. Infrastructure 
Infrastructure refers to the type and capacity of facilities that the plantation contains. The process of coffee 
production includes several activities that need specific infrastructure. The cost structure thus depends on the 
type of facilities famers own, and the type of services provided in their context. For example, in Nicaragua 
farmers pay to dry their coffee310. Hence, Nicaragua has the highest infrastructure cost amongst Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru, Guatemala and El Salvador311. 
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Costs Components – C. Other Factors Impacting Cost Structure
C.1. Farm Level: Distinguishing average farms and/or different farm types  
Some studies of coffee production costs classified farm types312 and sizes for more accurate calculation of cost 
description and structure. One possible classification is dividing farms depending on both size and specialties. 
One classification of five farm types consists of Large coffee farms, Farms with off-farm activities, Coffee 
dependent farms, Diversified farms, and Banana/coffee farms.  
The size and the type of the farm translate into an associated type of business model. This is true mostly because 
different business models entail different farming practices and decision-making processes, specific to each 
type313. This means that different types of farms have different technology adoption patterns314.  Consequently, 
production costs (and in particular labor productivity and cost) depend substantially on different farm types.
To get a sense of the costs differences between business models, we note that Coffee specialists generated 
more than 75% of their revenue from coffee, Diversified coffee farmers generated 51% of their revenue from 
coffee, and Off-farm income farmers generated 15 % of their revenue from coffee315. 
C.2. National Legal Framework
This factor is related to national legal framework in coffee-producing countries. This would comprise both the 
active local associations in the coffee production and consumption ecosystem, as well as all formal regulations 
and coffee policies related to coffee production and commercialization. In Guatemala, for instance, there is both 
a Coffee Law, created in 1969316, and a governmental entity called The National Coffee Association (ANACAFE), 
designated to be responsible for advising on coffee policies as well as providing research and informational 
services and farmers support (such as cupping, registration, statistics, and warehouses). The national legal 
framework appears to be a crucial component in promoting coffee production activities and shaping them, as 
it affects directly the cost production structure and the management practices of farmers. 
C.3. Exchange rate 
The payment to producers is usually made in dollars, which means that the fluctuation of the exchange rate 
has a significant impact on the total amount farmers get. For instance, if in Colombia, a dollar depreciates 
from 3,000 pesos down to 2,800 pesos, farmers would lose a considerable amount of their profit317. In general, 
the real impact of the fluctuations of exchange rates on the total amount farmers get is still unclear. This is 
mainly because of the effect of the fluctuation of the exchange rate on inputs such as fertilizer and pesticides. 
Undeniably, depreciation in global exchange rates against the dollar contributes to a significant cost risk318. 
C.4. Minimum Wage, Wage in Agriculture
Both the difference between rural and urban salaries and policies that enforce a minimum wage affect costs319. 
These increase labor costs320. This phenomenon is related to economic development and rural-urban migration. 
The cost of labor also has increased in many areas due to the higher cost of legal fees and insurance. Finally, 
the trend of workers out of agriculture, and the greater difficulty in finding workers for agriculture, reduces the 
labor supply and increases labor costs. 
Costs	Components	–	D.	Other	not-reflected	Costs
This section gives an overview of the impact of the economic activities related to coffee production321, which are 
not reflected in the price. This includes social costs and environmental costs.
D.1.Social
Social cost is one of the hidden costs in the supply chain of the coffee beans production. Some of the most 
important social price externalities are as follows:
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D.1.1. Child Labor 
Child labor is one of the dominant social costs. In African countries, a large percentage of the production chain 
workers (farmers mainly) are below the legal age of labor, making them undeclared workers.
D.1.2. Labor related (rural labor employed, forced labor, health and safety) 
Other social cost externalities that have similar effects, while remain invisible in the price equation, are aspects 
related to social security (including health security, annual leaves, sickness, maternity and paternity leaves), and 
underpayment of the hired labor forces as well as unpaid overtime. The lack of or/and non-enforced labor rights 
in some of the most highly productive coffee beans countries is related to the reduced coffee costs. Other social 
aspects such as harassment (sexual or non-sexual), forced labor, and restrictions against unions, are not taken 
into account in the price calculations as well.
D.2. Environmental
Coffee cultivation, as any other crops, is being affected directly and indirectly by environmental factors. Over-
fertilization and over-irrigation are common practices and are directly affecting the fertility of land. In addition, 
water pollution, land degradation, deforestation, temperature rise and green house effects have negative 
impact on coffee production and are indirectly affecting the costs and imposing externalized costs.
Some of the most important environmental related aspects are as follows:
D.2.1. Water use
Water use (especially in conventional farms) is considered the largest externalize environmental. For example, 
in Vietnam conventional farms use more than double the amount of water required per hectare. Unmonitored 
water use can lead to a decrease in the water tables in coffee areas, and the rise of temperatures and the 
prolonged droughts from climate change will impose additional costs.
D.2.2. Energy Use
Another important related factor is the energy consumption, directly connected to the water use as the electrical 
and diesel pumps are being used to pump groundwater for irrigation. The production of fertilizers is also an 
energy intensive process, exacerbated by the over-use of these chemicals.
D.2.3. Land Use
Land use is considered by many NGOs to be one of the most crucial environmental issues, especially when it is 
directly related to deforestation and drought. The quantification of land use impacts is challenging, but includes 
effects on local and global climate change, migration, and soil erosion.
4. Coffee Demand Model
Early work used both prices and incomes to explain demand, and found a price elasticity of demand of -0.26 
and an income elasticity of demand of 0.23 in the US.322 However, these estimates suffer from both challenges 
of co-integration and the endogeneity of prices.323
First, we solve these problems using an estimation approach the predicts differences rather than levels to 
address co-integration, and an instrumental variable approach using coffee production to instrument for prices 
to address endogeneity. We include the effect on demand both of prices and of country incomes, and allow 
prices and demand to evolve autoregressively. We show a normal econometric analysis first, and then improve 
upon this with a Bayesian approach. The Bayesian approach allows us to account for the variation of responses 
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT | 115
ENSURING ECONOMIC VIABILITY & SUSTAINABILITY OF COFFEE PRODUCTON  A REPORT
across countries, using a hierarchical Bayesian method, which causes country-specific data to be “partially 
pooled.”324 The partial pooling technique simultaneously estimates a pooled response and country-specific 
estimates of elasticities, allowing the country-specific estimates to be informed by the pooled response to the 
extent supported by the data.
The coffee demand model is estimated by the following pair of expressions:
In the first expression,  is the international price in year t, and  is the quantity produced in the 
previous growing season. This is the first stage of an instrumented variable regression, which uses production 
quantities to predict prices. Prices are influenced by production, so that when production increases, prices tend 
to decrease. However, prices also have a progression of their own, represented by an autoregressive term.
In the second expression,  is the amount demanded in country I and year t, and it is affected by the 
predicted price from the first stage,  , and similarly has a strong autoregressive element. Demand also 
increases with income . The second expression is estimated in differences, which accounts for a different 
starting level in each country.
We perform these regressions in 6 different forms, with the results displayed in the table below. The basic 
instrumented variable regression is shown in columns IV1 (the first stage) and IV2 (the second stage). These 
show coefficients of the expected sign, but large amounts of uncertainty on the parameters of interest, the 
effect of quantity on prices and the effect of predicted prices on demand. When the true prices are used, rather 
than predicted prices, we see a stronger effect on Arabica demand, which is also statistically significant, with an 
elasticity of -0.075. 
Finally, we run the instrumental variable approach as a computational Bayesian model. This allows us to place 
priors on the coefficient values, forcing the elasticities of production on price and of price on demand to both 
be negative. The first stage under these priors is shown in the Bayesian IV1 column. Entries with tildes after the 
number are limited by the prior to be positive or negative (which makes the standard econometric definition of 
statistical significance irrelevant). Next, we can run the first and second stages simultaneously. This allows the 
predictability of price in the second stage to influence the fit of the model in the first stage. This is shown in the 
Uniform column. Finally, we perform a hierarchical Bayesian regression, as described above, which has the same 
form, but where each region has its own values for the various parameters, partially pooled across regions as 
determined by the data. The hyperparameters of this model are shown in column Hierarchical, and this is the 
final form used in the report.
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The extent of variation across elasticities is estimated to be low. This is largely driven by the 
low precision of the elasticity coefficient in each country. These country-specific coefficients 
are shown below.
Country-specific	elasticities	of	price	and	income. Each point represents a single country 
at the values of its elasticities. Some of the largest countries are labeled.
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Arabica Elasticities
Robusta Elasticities
 
We then project these demands into the future, as income levels and population sizes 
change. Real GDP growth rates by country were taken from the IMF,325 available through 
2024. Growth rates after 2024 are held constant at the average growth rate from 2020 – 
2024. Population evolves according to the UN Population Division medium projection.
In each period in the model projection, we update demand curves for each country, and 
then solve for the equilibrium price. If the equilibrium price for Robusta beans is greater 
than the equilibrium price for Arabica beans (which can happen in extreme scenarios, but 
does not occur in the main scenarios we present), we allow Arabica beans to be sold on the 
Robusta market to equalize the prices.
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5. Stock Model
Stock levels averaged 2 million tons (about 25% of production) between 2004 - 2013 (see 
below).
Stocks show a cyclical style, similar to coffee production, but offset. This reflects strategic 
behavior, to build up stocks in periods where prices are low, and sell them on the expectation 
that the next year will have a better price.
Since green coffee beans can be stored for up to a year without losing significant quality, we 
take a yearly timestep for the model, assuming that timing within each year of the collection 
and release of stocks does not matter for equilibrium prices. The model fit is shown the 
table below. The largest component is an autoregressive term, which also reflects stock 
managers’ expectations of future prices.
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Under prediction, we use this estimate to build a consistent handling stocks in response to 
prices, as follows:
Where =12762.3, =0.801, and =-2.526. In this expression, we cap the direct 
autoregression at 50%, to represent the show time period that green beans can be stored. 
The remainder of the autoregressive effect is used to center the stocks around their most 
recent levels, of 1 million MT.
Changes in the stocks from year to year are added to or subtracted from the supply 
available for consumption, with 2/3 of the change assumed to be Arabica, and 1/3 assumed 
to be Robusta. The remainder of the supply is consumed, according to the country-level 
proportions from the demand model.
6. Market Equilibrium
To combine the supply and demand models to construct equilibrium international prices, we 
start by taking production quantity as given. Since the farming decisions behind production 
have already been made, the equilibrium within each year cannot affect production.
Since this dynamic changes the prices, when we determine a joint equilibrium between 
demand and stocks. To do this, we find a fixed point between two relationships. On one 
hand, the price is determined by the demand curve, inverted based on total production 
plus any changes in the stock released to the market. On the other hand, the price level 
should predict those same changes in stocks released. We determine a fixed point between 
these two relationships.
This equilibrium price is then fed into the production model to influence the next year’s 
levels of production. Although decisions around new planting can take years to influence 
the price, price changes can have immediate effects on harvest levels and on cultivation 
reductions.
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